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THE JOINT ECB-CFS Research Network on “Capital Market and
Financial Integration in Europe” aims at promoting high quality
research. The Network as such does not express any views, nor
takes any positions. Therefore any opinions expressed in
documents made available through the Network (including this
report and the website) or during its workshops and conferences
are the respective authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect
views of the ECB, the Eurosystem or CFS.3
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In April 2002 the European Central Bank
(ECB) and the Center for Financial Studies
(CFS) launched the ECB-CFS Research
Network to promote research on “Capital
Markets and Financial Integration in Europe”.
The ECB-CFS research network aims at
stimulating top-level and policy-relevant
research, significantly contributing to the
understanding of the current and future
structure and integration of the financial
system in Europe and its international linkages
with the United States and Japan. This report
summarises the work done under the network
after two years.
Over time the network formed a coherent and
growing group of researchers interested in the
integration of European financial markets,
while using light organisational structures and
budgets. The members of this evolving group
met repeatedly at the events organised by the
network to present the latest results of their
research and to share views on policy options.
In this sense, the “network of people” intended
at the start was created. Overall, the network
aroused great interest, as leading academic
researchers, researchers from the main policy
institutions and high-level policy makers
participated actively in it by presenting
research results, through speeches and in
policy panels. It also stimulated a new research
field on securities settlement systems, an area
of high policy relevance and interest to the
ECB that had not attracted much interest in the
research community beforehand. Also, the
network seems to have triggered several related
outside initiatives by international institutions,
such as the IMF or the OECD.
During its first two years the network was
organised around three workshops and a final
symposium on 10-11 May 2004. To focus
research resources and to ensure medium-term
policy relevance, a limited number of areas
have been given top priority: bank competition
and the geographical scope of banking;
international portfolio choices and asset
market linkages between Europe, the United
States and Japan; European bond markets;
European securities settlement systems; and
the emergence and evolution of new markets in
Europe (in particular start-up financing
markets).
In order to stimulate further research focused
on the priority fields of the network, the ECB
Lamfalussy research fellowships were
established. These fellowships sponsor
projects proposed by young researchers, both
advanced doctoral students and younger
professors. Five Lamfalussy fellowships were
granted in 2003 and five more in 2004. The first
papers from this program have already been
issued in the ECB working paper series or are
forthcoming. One of them won the prize for the
best paper written by a Ph.D. student at the
2004 European Finance Association Meetings
in Maastricht.
Results of the network in the five top priority
areas can be summarised as follows:
Bank competition and the geographical scope
of banking. First, integration does not appear to
be very advanced in many retail banking
markets. Second, some of the inherent
characteristics of traditional loan and deposit
business constrain the cross-border expansion
of commercial banking, even in a common
currency area. Hence, the implementation of
some policies to foster cross-border integration
in retail banking may be ineffective. Third,
theoretical research suggests that supervisory
structures may not be neutral towards further
European banking integration. Finally, a
stronger role of area-wide competition policies
could be beneficial for further banking
integration. This would also stimulate
economic growth, as more competition in the
banking sector induces financially dependent
firms to grow more.
European bond markets. While the government
bond market has integrated rapidly with the
EMU convergence process, its full integration
has not yet been achieved. The introduction of a
common electronic trading platform reduced
transaction costs substantially, but yield
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY5
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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
spreads of long-term sovereign bonds of the
euro area are still heterogeneous. This is
largely explained by different sensitivities to
an international risk factor, whereas liquidity
differentials only play a role in conjunction
with this latter factor. Somewhat surprisingly
in this context, the dynamically developing
corporate bond market exhibits a relatively
high level of integration. There is also
increasing evidence that the introduction of the
euro has contributed to a reduction in the cost
of capital in the euro area, in particular through
the reduction of corporate bond underwriting
fees. As a result, firms may wish to increase
bond financing relative to equity financing.
The development of a larger corporate bond
market is also important for monetary policy.
For example, US evidence suggests that the
rating of corporate bonds may contribute to the
persistence of recessions, as rating agencies’
policies affect firms asymmetrically in their
access to the bond market over the business
cycle. US evidence also suggests that liquidity
conditions in stock and bond markets tend to be
positively correlated.
European securities settlement systems.
European securities settlement infrastructures
are highly fragmented and further integration
and/or consolidation would exploit economies
of scale that could greatly benefit investors. It
is not clear, however, whether direct public
intervention in favour of consolidation would
lead to the highest level of efficiency, for
example because of the existence of strong
vertical integration between trading and
securities platforms (“silos”). In contrast,
promoting open access to clearing and
settlement systems could lead to consolidation
and the highest level of efficiency. Finally,
regarding concerns about unfair practices by
Central Securities Depositories (CSDs) toward
custodian banks, regulatory interventions
favouring custodian banks should be
discouraged, as long as CSDs are not allowed
to price discriminate between custodian banks
and investor banks.
The emergence and evolution of new markets in
Europe (in particular start-up financing
markets). While fairly well integrated, “new
markets” and start-up financing are less
developed and integrated in Europe than in the
United States. However, new markets and
venture capitalists are the most important
intermediaries for the financing of projects
with high risk but with potentially very high
return. The analysis carried out within the
network reveals that European start-up
financiers are mostly institutional investors,
while US venture capitalists are mostly rich
individuals. Also, new markets are essential for
the development of start-up finance in Europe,
as they provide an exit strategy for start-up
financiers who can then sell new successful
projects using initial public offerings. Finally,
the legal framework affects the development of
venture capital firms. For example, very strict
personal bankruptcy laws constrain early stage
entrepreneurs, reducing demand for venture
capital finance.
International portfolio choices and asset
market linkages between Europe, the United
States and Japan. At a global scale, asset
market linkages have increased recently. For
example, major economies such as the United
States and the euro area have become more
financially interdependent. This phenomenon
can be observed in stock and bond markets as
well as in money markets, where the main
direction of spillovers has recently been from
the US to the euro area. Country-specific
shocks now play a smaller role in explaining
stock return variations of firms whose sales are
internationally diversified. Increases in firm-
by-firm market linkages are a global
phenomenon, but they are stronger within the
euro area than in the rest of the world. Various
other phenomena also increase market linkages
and therefore the likelihood that financial
shocks spread across countries. One example is
the use of global bonds. Finally, the nowadays
more direct access of unsophisticated investors
to financial markets may increase volatility.6
ECB
Capital markets and financial integration in Europe
December 2004
Other areas. Financial integration affects
financial structures, but it does not need to lead
to their convergence across countries.
Financial structures matter for growth, as
market-oriented financial systems benefit all
sectors and firms, whereas bank-based systems
primarily benefit younger firms that depend on
external finance. Moreover, good corporate
governance increases firms’ value. In
particular, the dual board system, where the
monitoring and advising roles of the board of
directors are separated, is found to dominate
the single board structure. Therefore, the
further development of the European single
market should strongly require good corporate
governance. In general, well designed
institutions foster entrepreneurial activity,
partly by relaxing capital constraints.
The results of the network clearly illustrated
the substantial effects the introduction of the
euro had on euro area financial markets. In
addition to the effects on bond markets, stock
markets and the cost of capital summarised
above, research produced showed that the
single currency had its strongest effects on
money markets, whose unsecured segment is
now completely integrated. Without any doubt
the euro generally enhanced the liquidity and
efficiency of euro area financial markets, and
ongoing initiatives such as the European
Union’s Financial Services Action Plan will
help to continue this process.
In sum, in the first two years the network has
established itself as the hub for the research
debate on European financial integration.
Some of the best papers produced by the
network, leading to the conclusions mentioned
above, are currently being considered for
publication in two special issues of academic
journals. An issue of the Oxford Review of
Economic Policy on “European financial
integration” is published contemporaneously
with this report, and an issue of the Review of
Finance is planned for next year. The current
policy context, the gradual progress of
integration as well as the creation of other
related non-ECB or non-CFS initiatives on
financial integration suggest that this topic will
remain high on the agendas of policy makers
and academics for the years to come.
Therefore, the ECB Executive Board and the
CFS decided to continue the network,
refocusing its priorities. Three priority areas
have been added: 1) The relationship between
financial integration and financial stability,
2) EU accession, financial development and
financial integration, and 3) financial system
modernisation and economic growth in Europe.
These three areas have become particularly
important at the current juncture, but have not
received particularly strong attention in the
first two years of the network. For example, the
area of financial stability research was
highlighted by the ECB research evaluators as
an area deserving further development.
Moreover, despite the results found in the first
two years of the network, new developments
remain to be further explored in the earlier
priority areas.
A three-year extension is envisaged, running
from after the May 2004 symposium until 2007,
with two events to be held per year. The three-
year period is long enough to consider the first
effects of the Financial Services Action Plan. It
also constitutes a realistic horizon for the
ambitious agenda implied by the three new
priorities. The generally light organisational
structure and working of the network will not
be changed. In addition, given the value of the
Lamfalussy fellowship research program in
inducing further research in the areas of the
network, the program has also been extended
for all the research topics in the area of the
network.7
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INTRODUCTION
Financial markets integration can contribute to
higher European economic growth. A study of
the European Commission by Giannetti, Guiso,
Padula and Pagano (2002)1 shows that financial
integration, defined as a convergence for
European financial development toward the US
standard, would imply a one percentage point
gain in EU GDP growth. This important gain is
only a lower bound, as the report did not
consider integration of service sectors. To
quickly reap all the benefits from further
European financial integration, the
Commission initiated the Financial Services
Action Plan in 1999 to remove the regulatory
and market barriers that exist to the cross-
border provision of financial services and to
encourage the free flow of finance within
Europe.
In this context, the European Central Bank
(ECB) and the Center for Financial Studies
(CFS) launched, in April 2002, the ECB-CFS
research network to promote research on
“Capital Markets and Financial Integration in
Europe”. The network was launched in an
effort to understand better the state of
European integration in each financial market
and where improvements are possible. The
network was first established for a period of
two years, which ended in May 2004. This
report summarises the work done under the
network.
Section 2 recalls the purpose of the network and
its main priority areas. The activities of the
network are summarised in Section 3. Section 4
presents the main results, Section 5 makes the
case for the continuation of the network and
presents additional areas where further work is
advisable. Finally, Section 6 explains the
organisational structure.
1 INTRODUCTION
1 Giannetti, M., L. Guiso, T. Japelli, M. Padua and M. Pagano
(2002), “Financial integration, corporate financing and
economic growth”, CEPR, final report to the European
Commission, 22 November.8
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In 1999, the Commission presented a
framework for action in the financial services
industry to help achieve the benefits of the
Single Market in financial services. The
formulated objectives of this Financial
Services Action Plan (FSAP) are to ensure a
single EU market for wholesale financial
services and to guarantee open, secure retail
markets and modern, prudential rules and
supervision. The Commission proposed 42
measures and a timetable for their adoption
with a deadline of 2004. In 2002 the
Commission reported that “recent progress in
the Council and the European Parliament on a
number of proposals demonstrate that the
political commitment to implement the FSAP
on time is beginning to be translated into
firm political agreements …   Even if not all
barriers have been removed, significant
and irreversible progress towards a strong
integrated European financial sector by 2005 is
achievable – it is a prize that is now within our
grasp”. In this context the ECB-CFS research
network on “Capital Markets and Financial
Integration in Europe” was created.
The ECB-CFS research network aims at
stimulating top-level and policy-relevant
research, significantly contributing to the
understanding of the current and future
structure and integration of the financial
system in Europe and its international linkages
with the United States and Japan. The work of
the network focuses on three distinct, but
not unrelated, main broad research areas:
(i) European financial integration, (ii) financial
system structures in Europe and (iii) financial
linkages between the euro area/European
Union (EU), the United States and Japan. When
the network was created, these areas were
under-researched and knowledge about them
insufficient.
A detailed description of key research areas
was developed under the supervision of the
Steering Committee (SC) and made publicly
available in the network “roadmap”. While the
“roadmap” is geared towards applied and
policy-relevant questions, both empirical and
2 PURPOSE OF THE NETWORK AND MAIN
PRIORITY AREAS
theoretical research are important and were
encouraged. Annex A contains this “roadmap”.
To concentrate research resources and ensure
policy focus, a limited number of areas within
the three main broad research fields have been
given top priority: Bank competition and the
geographical scope of banking activities;
international portfolio choices and asset
market linkages between Europe, the United
States and Japan; European bond markets;
European securities settlement systems; and
the emergence and evolution of new markets in
Europe (in particular start-up financing
markets).
– Work on bank competition and the
geographical scope of banking activities
has been given priority, because – despite
the adoption of the “single passport”
principle – the euro area is still
experiencing relatively few cross-border
mergers compared with domestic
consolidation and relatively limited cross-
border corporate lending. Also, supervisory
structures and regulatory approaches
pertaining to the banking sector underwent
profound reforms whose effects should be
analysed.
– Priority was also given to international
portfolio choices and asset market linkages
between Europe, the United States and
Japan, as the past few decades have brought
an enormous expansion of international
capital flows. As a consequence, global
financial linkages have strengthened.
While their impact on economies is
nowadays far larger than traditional trade
linkages, for example, knowledge about
the driving factors behind international
financial flows is still relatively limited.
– European bond markets have undergone
rapid changes in the past few years,
including the development of euro area-
wide electronic secondary market trading
platforms, as well as the development of a
more significant corporate bond market.9
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2 PURPOSE OF THE
NETWORK AND
MAIN PRIORITY
AREAS
These changes are so recent that their main
sources and their wider implications are not
widely understood. For example, bond
markets constitute one key market for the
conduct of monetary policy by central
banks.
– Work on European securities settlement
systems has also received priority as the
fragmentation of this industry in Europe,
resulting in high cross-border securities
trading costs, may well constitute the
single most important obstacle to further
securities market integration.2 The rapid
structural change in the European securities
settlement industry, and the very limited
research available on these topics when the
network was created, made work in this area
particularly important and relevant to
policy-makers.
– The area of new markets also received a
very high priority. In 1998, the European
Commission reckoned that “fewer
technology-based enterprises are created
in Europe and their prospects for growth
are inhibited. Also, venture capital is
underdeveloped in many European
countries compared with the United States,
in particular in the field of seed and
early stage finance”.3 This highlighted
the importance of the availability of a
wide range of funding and investment
possibilities for innovations and risk
sharing – and hence ultimately for growth
and welfare.
2 See Giovannini Group (2001), Cross border clearing and
settlement arrangements in the European Union, Brussels,
November; and Giovannini Group (2003), Second report on
EU clearing and settlement arrangements, Brussels, April.
3 European Commission (1998), Fostering entrepreneurship in
Europe: Priorities for the future. COM (98) 222 final.10
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3.1  CONFERENCES
In its first two years the network was organised
around three workshops and a final
symposium. Workshops systematically worked
down the list of main priority areas, covering
each priority area on at least two occasions.
The symposium covered all areas of the
network. Each workshop and the symposium
featured parallel sessions where research in the
relevant area of the network was presented and
ended with a policy panel. This section briefly
summarises the structure of each workshop and
of the symposium.
The network was launched with a workshop at
the ECB on 29-30 April 2002. It featured
“agenda setting” talks by prominent
researchers and members of the network
Steering Committee, pure research paper
presentations and the key policy speeches
“Monetary policy in an environment of global
financial markets” by Otmar Issing (ECB),
“Competition, co-operation and public action:
Three necessary drivers for European financial
integration” by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa
(ECB) and “Consolidation in the European
securities infrastructure – What is needed?” by
Sirkka Hämäläinen (ECB).
The sessions of the launching workshop
concentrated on the priority areas of European
debt market structures and international
financial linkages. In the closing plenary
session, Jesper Berg (ECB), Alberto
Giovannini (Unifortune Asset Management)
and David Wright (European Commission)
gave their views about the status of the
European financial system and the way forward
to complete integration. Vítor Gaspar (ECB)
acted as moderator. Annex B contains the
program and a detailed summary of the
workshop. Aside from the research progress
reported in the parallel sessions, the main
result of the launching workshop was the
development of the “roadmap” to help guide
work under the network (see Annex A). This
roadmap has been developed by ECB staff
3 ACTIVITIES OF THE NETWORK
under the auspices of the SC on the basis of the
“agenda setting” talks and the policy speeches
at the workshop, in collaboration with the ECB
Internal Contact Group, the NCB Contact
Group (see section 6 below for those groups)
and other workshop participants.
The response to the workshop announcement
was very encouraging. Representatives of all
invited institutions expressed interest in
participating (including Eurosystems NCBs,
the BIS, IMF, World Bank, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, and the
European Commission). Also, the response to
the first Call for Papers was satisfactory with
68 submissions received. This positive
response led to a decision to combine the two
workshops originally planned for the first year
(2002) into the larger launching workshop.
There were 114 participants, of which 38 were
from academia, 35 from the ECB and 41 from
other official institutions. Affiliations of
network event participants are detailed in
Annex C.
In deciding to establish the network, the ECB
wished to hold subsequent workshops in other
European cities to present the network as a
truly European initiative. As a consequence,
two more workshops in 2003 were hosted by
euro area national central banks (NCBs).
The Bank of Finland hosted the network’s
second workshop in Helsinki on 11-12 March
2003. The main priority areas analysed in the
course of the workshop were (1) bank
competition and the geographical scope of
banking activities; (2) international portfolio
choices and asset market linkages between
Europe, the US, and Japan and, as a special
topic requested by several launching workshop
participants, European equity markets. The
workshop combined research key lectures,
research paper presentations and a plenary
panel discussion on “The future of exchanges,
consolidation or competition”. Panel speakers
were Niall Bohan (European Commission),
Peter Gomber (Deutsche Boerse AG), Hannu11
ECB
Capital markets and financial integration in Europe
December 2004
3 ACTIVITIES
OF THE
NETWORK Halttunen (Nordea) and André Went
(Euronext). Annex D contains the program and
a summary of this workshop.
The Call for Papers elicited 59 submissions,
from which 15 papers were selected. The
workshop was intended to gather a rather
smaller number of participants relative to the
launching workshop to allow for discussions
on each selected paper. There were 87
participants, of which 39 were from academia,
15 from the Bank of Finland (the hosting
institution), 15 from the ECB and 18 from other
official institutions.
The Bank of Greece hosted the network’s third
workshop in Athens on 20-21 November 2003.
The main priority areas analysed in the course
of the workshop were (1) European bond
markets; (2) European securities settlement
systems; and (3) start-up financing and new
markets. This third workshop also combined
research key lectures, research paper
presentations and a plenary panel discussion on
“European Securities Settlement Systems”,
which included Kenneth D. Garbade (Federal
Reserve Bank of New York), Randy Kroszner
(University of Chicago), Anso Thiré
(Euroclear France), and Gertrude Tumpel-
Gugerell (ECB). Annex E contains the program
and a summary of the network’s third
workshop.
The Call for Papers elicited 77 papers, again
confirming the research community’s interest
in the network initiative. 18 papers were
selected for presentation in Athens. There were
77 participants, of which 37 came from
academia, 3 from the Bank of Greece (the
hosting institution), 16 from the ECB and 21
from other official institutions.
The network’s first two years were concluded
with a symposium in Frankfurt on 10-11 May
2004 (see Annex F for the program and a
summary of the symposium). The Call for
Papers brought in 118 submissions. The
symposium was an opportunity to summarise
the progress that the network has accomplished
in terms of research and to outline its
continuing efforts and new priority areas. A
policy panel focusing on “Drivers of European
financial integration – Markets or policy?”
concluded the symposium. It was chaired
by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (ECB) and
included high-level representatives of the
public and the private sectors: Mario Draghi
(Goldman Sachs), Alexander Schaub
(European Commission) and Jens Thomsen
(Danmarks Nationalbank). Furthermore,
Robert Flood (International Monetary Fund)
delivered a key lecture on new approaches to
assessing financial integration; Otmar Issing
(ECB) gave a speech on “Asset prices and
monetary policy”; Alexandre Lamfalussy
(Institut d’études européennes, Université
Catholique de Louvain) expressed his views on
European bond markets; and Gertrude Tumpel-
Gugerell (ECB) closed the symposium by
laying down the priorities for work within the
network for the coming three years. There were
149 participants, of which 55 came from
academia, 51 from the ECB (the hosting
institution) and 43 from other official
institutions.
3.2 FELLOWSHIPS
The SC believed that the main priority areas
selected for both workshops in 2003 were
under-researched areas that were highly
relevant to the work of the ECB and the
Eurosystem. In order to stimulate network
participants further to undertake research in the
above-mentioned fields, the ECB members of
the SC proposed to fund some focused research
activity in the context of the network in the
form of fellowships. These fellowships are
aimed at young researchers, mainly very
advanced doctoral students and young
professors. This target group was felt to be
particularly responsive to suggestions for
research areas of high policy importance. The
fellowships were named after Alexandre
Lamfalussy, the first President of the European
Monetary Institute.12
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Following a Call for Projects highlighting the
top priorities of the network, five fellowships
were granted in 2003 and five more were
granted in 2004. Each fellowship is endowed
with €10,000. The 2003 Lamfalussy fellows’
papers are available in Annex G.
In 2003, the five Lamfalussy fellowships were
granted to:
– Rui Albuquerque (Assistant Professor,
University of Rochester), “Asymmetric
information and the persistence of
international equity flows”, ECB Working
Paper No. 310. This project falls under main
priority area “International portfolio
choices and asset market linkages between
Europe, the US and Japan”.
– Giulia Iori (Lecturer, King’s College,
University of London), “An investigation
of the efficiency and stability of alternative
designs for securities clearing and
settlement infrastructures”, ECB Working
Paper No. 404. This project is a
contribution to main priority area
“European securities settlement systems”.
– Leo Kaas (Assistant Professor, University
of Vienna), “Bank competition and
financial market integration”, ECB
Working Paper No. 403. This contributes to
main priority area “Bank competition and
the geographical scope of banking
activities”.
– Albert J. Menkveld (Assistant Professor,
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam),
“Substitutability, fragmentation and price
discovery in the European government bond
market: An empirical study based on
EuroMTS data”, ECB Working Paper No.
385. This project falls under the main
priority area “European bond markets”.
– Yigal S. Newman (Ph. D. student, Stanford
Graduate School of Business), “The volume
of new issuance and its impact on market-
wide credit spreads” forthcoming in the
ECB Working Paper Series. This project
contributes to the main priority area
“European bond markets”. Newman
received the 2004 European Finance
Association award for best Ph. D. paper for
his contribution.
In 2004, the five Lamfalussy fellowships were
granted to:
– Tomas Dvorak (Assistant Professor, Union
College, Schenectady, New York),
“European Union enlargement and equity
markets in candidate countries”. Following
the European Commission report outlining
the timing and countries involved in
enlargement, stock prices in the ten eastern
European candidate countries went up on
average by over 46%. The project will
investigate whether the rise in stock prices
in the accession countries was related to EU
enlargement and in particular, whether the
rise in stock prices was a result of repricing
of systematic risk due to integration of local
stock markets into the world market.
– Mariassunta Giannetti (Associate
Professor, Stockholm School of
Economics), “International banks: Effects
on firm growth and financial stability”.
Using micro-level data for listed and
unlisted companies and information on
foreign bank entry, the project will analyse
whether local firms in emerging markets
really benefit from the entry of foreign
banks in terms of growth and investment
policies. Moreover, it will study whether
young firms with little collateral benefit as
much as listed companies.
– Miklós Koren (Ph. D. student, Harvard
University and Hungarian Academy of
Sciences), “Financial integration and
income volatility”. The purpose of this
project is to investigate empirically the
relationship between financial integration
and income volatility and to provide a
theoretical model explaining the findings.
The envisaged key mechanism is that13
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3 ACTIVITIES
OF THE
NETWORK financial integration helps countries adopt
less risky technologies, which results in
long-term income stability.
– Michael Kollo (Ph. D. student, London
School of Economics), “The pricing of
underwriting services by European, U.S.
and Japanese underwriters in the Eurobond
market”. Underwriter fees are an important
part of the cost of capital for firms and
therefore may act as a barrier to entry into
the Eurobond market. The project will test
the relative importance of different
determinants of underwriter fees across the
different European and other nationalities
of underwriters in the Eurobond market and
will also provide a currency breakdown.
– Philip Lane (Associate Professor, Trinity
College), “Global bond holdings and the
Eurozone”. The project is based on the
observation that the pattern of foreign
ownership is not totally globalised, in the
sense that the nationality of investors still
matters. This heterogeneity in the investor
base has consequences for the stability of
the international demand for the assets
issued by a given region as well as for the
transmission of financial shocks and for the
choice of exchange rate regime. The project
will investigate these issues by analysing
bilateral patterns in global bond holdings
with a particular emphasis on the impact of
EMU. The compositions of the selection
committees in 2003 and 2004 are detailed
on the network website (http://www.eu-
financial-system.org/fellowships.html).
3.3 PUBLICATIONS
Dissemination of the work undertaken within
the network is through the normal academic
publication process via peer-reviewed
journals. However, in order to disseminate
results from the network at an early stage, the
SC decided to suggest the possibility of
releasing papers presented in the workshops or
the symposium in the ECB Working Paper
Series. It is expected that 10 to 20 of the best
papers presented in the workshops or submitted
to the symposium will be released in this way.
In addition to the publication in the ECB
Working Paper Series, two academic journals
are planning special issues. First, the “Oxford
Review of Economic Policy” is preparing a
special issue on European financial
integration, building on the work of a selection
of network contributors. The authors were
asked to prepare broad papers, discussing the
most important developments in the main parts
of the European financial system. The editors
Xavier Freixas (University of Pompeu Fabra),
Philipp Hartmann (ECB) and Colin Mayer
(University of Oxford) will prepare a general
assessment of the papers published and discuss
policy options. The outline of this special
issue, which will be published in December
2004, is in Annex H.
Second, some of the symposium papers will be
solicited for a special issue of “Review of
Finance”, the journal of the European Finance
Association, devoted to capital markets and
financial integration in Europe. All the papers
in this issue will be screened through the
journal’s regular refereeing process. Franklin
Allen (University of Pennsylvania) and Marco
Pagano (University of Naples Federico II) from
the network SC will edit this special issue.
Finally, there are plans to combine the papers
of the “Oxford Review of Economic Policy”
special issue with about 20 further
commissioned papers for a book on “Financial
Markets and Institutions: A European
Perspective”. This volume would be edited by
the same three persons for Oxford University
Press. It will cover sections on “Financial
systems and financial integration”, “Financial
systems and the corporate sector”, “Financial
institutions”, “Financial markets”, and
“Financial regulation and macroeconomic
policy”. The time horizon for the preparation of
this book is longer, extending to the end of
2005.14
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3.4 WEBSITE
A website for the network has been established
as a source of information for researchers and
practitioners interested in European financial
integration. It can be accessed at the following
address http://www.eu-financial-system.org.
It contains important information on European
financial integration that can be accessed either
through links or through a library of research
papers and official reports. As such, it
facilitates the dissemination of the information
related to network events and the work done
within the network. Over time, the website has
been developed into a source of information for
researchers worldwide interested in European
capital markets and financial integration. The
IT infrastructure of the network website is
hosted by the CFS. It is maintained by the
network secretariat as a service to the network
contributors and to the general public.
The website contains inter alia: A description
of the network’s goals and main research areas;
announcements of upcoming workshops nd
summaries of past events; information about
funding of research in the field of the network,
notably the Lamfalussy Fellowship program;
available statistical resources; and a library of
research papers and policy documents in the
area of the network.
The library has a search function that allows
users to search for research areas, keywords,
authors, etc. To a large extent, research papers
have been chosen among unpublished work.
However, the library also includes seminal
published papers and books of special interest.
Now that the ECB-CFS research network
website has been up for almost 24 months,
some usage statistics are available. The ECB-
CFS website had 209 “unique visitors”4 in 2002
(covering a period of 3 months), 10,188 unique
visitors in 2003 and 11,545 unique visitors in
2004 (covering a period of 9 months). There
were 1.7 visits per visitor in 2002, 1.4 in 2003
and 1.4 in 2004. A visit is here defined as each
new incoming visitor who was not connected to
the site during the last hour. A visitor viewed or
downloaded a page, image or file from the site
1.1 times per visit in 2002, 4.8 in 2003 and 4.1
in 2004.
Another relevant statistic is the page viewed by
those visitors. We restrict this measure to 2003
and 2004 given the short period in which the
website was active in 2002. In 2003, 35% of
visits viewed the home page (35% in 2004),
11% (8% in 2004) viewed the library and 6%
(8% in 2004) viewed the page related to
upcoming events. To give an idea of who uses
the website, we report the origin of visitors in
2003 only. National central banks viewed or
downloaded a page, image or file 4.9 times per
visit,5 followed by the European Commission
(1.1 times/visit) and the Federal Reserve Board
(0.5 times/visit).
3.5 RELATED INITIATIVES
This section describes other initiatives that fall
into the scope of the network and have been, for
the most part, initiated by participants to the
network, but do not fall into the above
activities.
The Second ECB Central Banking Conference
on the “Transformation of the European
Financial System” took place in Frankfurt in
October 2002. The purpose of the conference
was to convey the interest of the ECB in the
transformation of the financial system via,
among other things, financial integration. The
conference was based on four papers. Jean
Dermine (INSEAD) addressed the lessons that
can be learnt for banking system integration
from the corporate structures adopted by
banking firms. Raghu Rajan and Luigi Zingales
(both University of Chicago) described
substantial development of market finance in
Europe, as compared with more traditional
4 A unique visitor is defined as a host (IP address) who came to
visit the site and viewed at least one page.
5 Identified NCBs were the Bank of Finland, the
Oesterreichische Nationalbank, the Banco de Portugal,
Sveriges Riksbank and the Banco de España.15
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NETWORK bank credit financing. Kpate Adjaouté (HSBC
Republic Bank) and Jean-Pierre Danthine
(Lausanne University) looked at EMU’s
implications for the pricing of government
bonds and equities, arguing that the
introduction of the euro had a larger effect on
equity returns than usually perceived. Finally,
Bruce Carnegie-Brown and Matt King (both JP
Morgan) studied corporate bond markets,
advancing the hypothesis that the European
issuance boom following the introduction of
the euro may not be explained by the single
currency. The proceedings of the Second ECB
Central Banking Conference were published in
May 2003.6
In October 2002, the ECB published the
“Report on Financial Structures” in
collaboration with the national central banks of
the Eurosystem. The report aims at serving as a
reference work for researchers, policy makers
and the general public. It describes
systematically the structure of the financial
systems of the countries constituting the euro
zone. The report shows that the euro area
financial system is both deep and highly
diversified. However, it is changing rapidly.
While credit institutions still play a pivotal role
in the euro area economy, non-financial sectors
have been redirecting their funds increasingly
towards new forms of financial intermediation.
The report also notes the increased scope for
non-financial corporations to use debt
securities for their financing.
The policy relevance of financial integration
and financial linkages that the network set as a
main priority area at its inception two years ago
has been confirmed by various initiatives
recently taken by other institutions. For
example, the IMF research department has
started a strongly related “Global Linkages”
initiative. It organised a conference on “Global
Linkages” in Washington, D.C. on 30-31
January 2003 to explore how economic
linkages across countries have changed in
recent years and what implications these
changes have for policy makers in developed
and emerging markets. This initiative is
6 Gaspar, V ., P. Hartmann and O. Sleijpen (eds., 2003), The
Transformation of the European Financial System,
Proceedings of the 2nd ECB Central Banking Conference,
Frankfurt: European Central Bank.
strongly related to the network priority on
international financial linkages.
The OECD also appears to be planning a related
initiative on financial integration and the
ability of financial systems to absorb shocks.
Finally, a purely academic network initiative
by the Center for Economic Policy Research
(CEPR) on “International financial
integration”, aiming to improve understanding
of the link between financial integration and
financial efficiency, and between financial
efficiency and economic performance, has
recently been submitted for funding to the
European Commission. This proposed
initiative is quite similar to the present
network. The Commission decided to put it on
hold.16
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This section reviews the main results of the
network, going through the five priority areas,
as formulated in the network “roadmap”. What
follows is a selection of particularly relevant
results, as it is impossible to summarise all
papers that were contributed to the network
events. A summary of all contributed papers is
available in Annexes B, D, E and F.
4.1 RESULTS IN PRIORITY AREAS
4.1.1 BANK COMPETITION AND THE
GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF BANKING
Results reveal that, first, integration is not very
advanced in many retail banking markets.
Second, some of the inherent characteristics of
the traditional loan and deposit business
constrain the cross-border expansion of
commercial banking, even in a common
currency area. Hence, the implementation
of some policies to foster cross-border
integration of retail banking may be
ineffective. Third, theoretical research
suggests that supervisory structures may not be
neutral towards further European banking
integration. Finally, a stronger role of area-
wide competition policies could be beneficial
for further banking integration. This would
also stimulate economic growth, as more
competition in the banking sector induces
financially dependent firms to grow more.
The ECB Occasional Paper on measuring
financial integration in the euro area by Lieven
Baele (Ghent University), Annalisa Ferrando,
Peter Hördahl, Elizaveta Krylova and Cyril
Monnet (all ECB; see the symposium) finds
that the degree of integration varies in the
different segments of the retail banking
markets. In the corporate lending market,
short-term and medium- and long-term lending
markets are still segmented. Short-term
corporate lending is least integrated.
Household mortgage loan rates appear to have
become more uniform across countries, while
the consumer credit segment remains highly
fragmented. This price-based evidence is
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confirmed by quantity-based evidence showing
that cross-border activities within the euro area
are still limited in the retail-banking markets.
In this sense, there are also clear signs of
persistence in strong home biases in lending
and borrowing to non-financial corporations
and households.
Findings presented by Steven Ongena (Tilburg
University) at the launching workshop and the
second workshop confirm the home bias’
persistence. Empirical evidence shows that
large multinational corporations still prefer
small local institutions to global financial
institutions for their local cash management –
i.e. short-term lending, liquidity management,
etc. This is surprising, as one would expect
multinational corporations to be the first
beneficiaries of global banks. His studies also
point to informational and political barriers
that limit mergers and acquisition in banking.
In particular, there is evidence that banks
“over-invest” domestically. Furthermore Luigi
Guiso (University of Sassari), Paola Sapienza
(Northwestern University) and Luigi Zingales
(University of Chicago) reported evidence in
the launching workshop that even if financial
markets become increasingly integrated,
domestic financial institutions do not become
redundant. These results suggest that local
financial development and therefore local
banks are an important determinant of a
region’s economic success, even in an
environment where there are no frictions
impeding capital movements. All in all,
traditional retail loan and deposit business
appears to solve economic frictions in a way
that is difficult to reconcile with cross-border
expansions comparable to the one observed for
wholesale business.
Simple measures such as facilitating domestic
competition have been put forward in order to
facilitate mergers and acquisitions. Leo Kaas
(University of Konstanz and Lamfalussy
fellow) has addressed theoretically the
consequences that policies favouring foreign
banks’ entry into a domestic banking sector
would have on competition, bank stability and17
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policies favouring foreign banks’ competition
would improve welfare if incumbent banks
were somehow less efficient. In addition, two
papers have studied the effects of competition
in banking. In the symposium, Hans Degryse
and Steven Ongena (both Tilburg University)
reported empirical results suggesting that when
bank branches face stiff local competition, they
engage relatively more in relationship-based
lending. The effect of competition on industry
specialisation is much less pronounced. The
authors concluded that branches of a bank
engage somewhat fewer borrowers in the same
industry if local market concentration
decreases. Finally, they also reported that the
probability of observing relationship banking
decreases significantly with the distance
separating the borrower from the lender. Stijn
Claessens (University of Amsterdam) and Luc
Laeven (World Bank) tested empirically
whether competition in the banking sector is
beneficial to economic growth. Their results
depend upon the degree of financial
development. In less developed countries,
sectors that are financially dependent grow
slower when the financial system is more
competitive, while in developed countries
more competition is associated with higher
growth. More precisely, financially dependent
firms will grow by 1.5% per annum more if the
country’s financial sector is more competitive.
These findings support the view that market
power in banking systems might be beneficial
to less developed countries but detrimental to
industrial countries.
The regulatory and supervisory framework was
found to affect the retail credit market. In the
launching workshop, Gayle DeLong (Baruch
College) and Claudia Buch (Kiel Institute of
World Economics) found that regulation is a
driving factor behind international mergers:
Banks operating in a more regulated
environment are less likely to be the target of
international bank mergers. Hence, regulatory
barriers are an impediment to further mergers
and acquisitions. Also in the launching
workshop, Harry Huizinga (Tilburg University
and European Commission) and Gaetan
Nicodeme (European Commission) found that
international non-bank depositors appear to
favour banking systems covered by explicit
deposit insurance and they are attracted to
systems with co-insurance, a private
administration, and a low deposit insurance
premium. The sensitivity of non-bank deposits
to deposit insurance policies opens up the
possibility of international regulatory
competition in this area. A theoretical analysis
by Giovanni dell’Ariccia (IMF) and Robert
Marquez (University of Maryland), also
presented at the launching workshop, shows
that a centralised regulator would increase
efficiency at the cost of flexibility in applying
different regulations to countries with different
financial systems. The benefits of a single
regulatory framework therefore heavily depend
on the symmetry in the financial systems of the
relevant countries.
Finally, the joint consequences of bank sector
consolidation on reserves holdings and inter-
bank market liquidity have been analysed
theoretically by Elena Carletti (CFS), Philipp
Hartmann (ECB) and Giancarlo Spagnolo
(Sveriges Riksbank and University of
Mannheim), who presented their results at the
launching workshop. They conclude that a
merger wave leading to greater banking system
heterogeneity is more likely to generate an
adverse outcome in terms of the aggregate
liquidity needed. In contrast, a merger
movement that leaves behind relatively little
heterogeneity in banks’ balance sheets may
leave inter-bank market liquidity unaffected or
even improve it.
4.1.2 EUROPEAN BOND MARKETS
While the government bond market has
integrated rapidly with the EMU convergence
process, its full integration has not yet been
achieved. The introduction of a common
electronic trading platform reduced
transaction costs substantially, but yield
spreads of long-term sovereign bonds of the
euro area are still heterogeneous. This is18
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largely explained by different sensitivities to
an international risk factor, whereas liquidity
differentials only play a role in conjunction
with this latter factor. Somewhat surprisingly
in this context, the dynamically developing
corporate bond market exhibits a relatively
high level of integration. There is also
increasing evidence that the introduction of the
euro has contributed to a reduction in the cost
of capital in the euro area, in particular
through the reduction of corporate bond
underwriting fees. As a result, firms may wish
to increase bond financing relative to equity
financing. The development of a larger
corporate bond market is also important for
monetary policy. For example, US evidence
suggests that the rating of corporate bonds may
contribute to the persistence of recessions, as
rating agencies’ policies affect firms
asymmetrically in their access to the bond
market over the business cycle. US evidence
also suggests that liquidity conditions in stock
and bond markets tend to be positively
correlated.
The government bond market integrated
significantly with the EMU convergence
process and with some efforts to harmonise
issuing procedures and conventions. For
example, there is also a longer trend in the
gradual reduction in the home bias of
government bond investments. However,
empirical results from the ECB Occasional
Paper on measures of integration presented
at the symposium also indicate that full
integration of the government bond market has
not yet been achieved. For example, while the
level of convergence in yields is impressive,
yields of government bonds with similar, or in
some cases identical, credit risk and maturity
have not entirely converged. Typically, yields
on 10-year euro area government bonds may
differ by around 15-20 basis points between
different countries.
To explain the persistent yield differentials
observed between long-term sovereign bonds
in the euro area, Carlo Favero (Bocconi
University), Marco Pagano (University of
Salerno) and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden
(University of Mannheim) identify the relative
roles of an international risk factor (measured
as the differential between high-risk US
corporate bonds and US government bonds)
and liquidity differentials. At the symposium,
they argued that liquidity differentials alone do
not explain much of the yield differentials. The
differentials are largely explained by varying
sensitivities of local yields to the international
risk factor. Liquidity only plays a role when
interacting with the international risk factor.
Most European government bonds are now
traded on MTS, the single international
platform. Lamfalussy fellow Albert Menkveld
(Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam), Yiu Cheung
and Frank de Jong (both University of
Amsterdam) conducted a microstructure study
of MTS, showing that national order
imbalances appear to be diversifiable across all
market participants. More precisely, none of
the national order imbalances in the
government bond markets of Germany, France,
Italy or Belgium affects benchmark yield (i.e.
German yield) innovations. Governments have
also a lot to gain from integration and well
designed markets. The design of markets is
crucial for their integration and the prevailing
prices. Specifically, differences in the
microstructure of the European treasury bills
market across countries and through time affect
short-term yields in government treasury
auctions, and thus the cost of funds for
governments. In particular, as shown in the
paper by Bruno Biais, Antoine Renucci and
Gilles Saint-Paul (all University of Toulouse)
presented at the symposium, regularly issuing
bills significantly reduces yields. Also, when
bills are traded on a centralised, transparent
electronic limit order book, such as MTS, their
liquidity rises and the yields decline
significantly. Governments could therefore
enhance liquidity and reduce yields and the
costs of their funds by efficiently designing
Treasury securities and issuing procedures, as
well as by promoting modern trading systems.
Biais et al. estimate, for example, that by
designing Treasury auctions more efficiently19
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more than they do presently.
The ECB Occasional Paper on measures of
integration also reports price-based integration
measures for corporate bond markets in a
subset of six euro area countries. These
measures suggest that, somewhat surprisingly,
the level of integration is reasonably high in
this young and rapidly expanding market.
Specifically, the country where a bond is issued
has only marginal explanatory power for the
cross-section of corporate bond yield spreads,
once a number of systematic risk factors are
corrected for. Quantity-based indicators tend
to support this conclusion. Considering the
proportion of assets invested in bond market
funds with a European-wide investment
horizon between 1998 and 2002 the market
share of European-wide managed bond funds
(both government and corporate) increased
dramatically, from below 20% to above 60%
(on average), indicating a drastic reduction in
the home bias of bond portfolios in the euro
area. This is even more striking when
comparing it with the home bias in cross-
Atlantic portfolios of corporate loans. At the
symposium, Mark Carey and Greg Nini (both
Federal Reserve Board) provided empirical
evidence that interest rate spreads on
syndicated corporate loans are on average 30
basis points lower in Europe than in the US.
The authors conclude that the syndicated loan
markets in Europe and the US might not be
fully integrated and presume that the
explanation for the home bias they observe in
the data may be an important factor for
understanding this pricing difference.
There is increasing evidence that the euro’s
introduction has contributed to a reduction in
the cost of capital in the euro area. Arturo Bris
(Yale University), Yrjo Koskinen (Stockholm
School of Economics) and Mattias Nilsson
(Stockholm Institute for Financial Research)
showed at the second workshop that the
introduction of the euro has lowered firms’ cost
of capital by further increasing capital market
integration in Europe and by eliminating
currency risks among the countries that joined
EMU. More precisely, they showed that the
valuations of large firms in euro land (as
measured by Tobin’s Q) in the period 1998-
2000 increased by 7.9% per year relative to
firms in non-EMU countries, after controlling
for firm-, country- and time-specific effects.
Also, at the launching workshop, Kostas
Tsatsaronis (BIS) and João Santos (Federal
Reserve Bank of New York) showed that the
euro led to a reduction in the underwriting fees
of international corporate bonds issued in the
new currency and that this reduction is largely
explained by greater contestability of the
investment banking business in the post-EMU
European market. There was a clear global
downward trend in fees over the 1994-2001
period, with value-weighted average fees for
2001 standing 86 basis points below their 1994
levels, the equivalent of a 37% reduction,
which is largely attributable to a sharp drop in
the euro-denominated segment. As a result,
underwriting fees for euro-denominated
corporate bonds are now at the same level as in
the dollar segment of this market.
As a consequence of the lower borrowing costs
for firms, bond markets are expected to develop
further. This is important, given that Goizueta
Taurn Chordia (Emory University), Arsani
Sarkar (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam (University of
California, Los Angeles) showed that the
liquidity of US Treasury bond markets is
significantly and positively correlated with the
monetary policy stance during crises. They
found that the ratio of net borrowed reserves
over total reserves in crisis times explains
about 4.5% of the variation in bond spread after
2 months.7
Another issue in firm financing is the issuance
of corporate bonds. In the third workshop,
Yigal Newman (Stanford University and
7 The authors consider three crises: The bond market crisis of
1994, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the Russian
default/LTCM crisis of 1998.20
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Lamfalussy fellow) and Michael Rierson
(Citigroup) documented that a very large firm’s
new issues of corporate bonds can temporarily
raise the yield spreads of bonds issued by other
firms.8 They also show that the increase in yield
spreads begins well before the issuance date.
The temporary aspect of the effect and the fact
that it happens relatively close to the date of
issuance rather than to the announcement
suggests that this effect is not due to new
fundamental information about the issuer that
may be revealed during the issuance process.
Finally, João Santos argued in the third
workshop that rating agencies’ policies affect
firms asymmetrically in their access to the
bond market over the business cycle. As a
consequence, the impact of recessions across
firms is not uniform. The cost of capital
increases most for mid-credit quality firms.
As ratings become increasingly uncertain
in recessions, information becomes more
asymmetric. Uncertainty about the quality of
those firms then raises the cost of access to
capital. As a consequence, recessions will tend
to last longer in the presence of asymmetric
information than in its absence.
4.1.3 EUROPEAN SECURITIES SETTLEMENT
SYSTEMS
European securities settlement infrastructures
are highly fragmented and further integration
and/or consolidation would exploit economies
of scale that could greatly benefit investors. It
is not clear, however, whether direct public
intervention in favour of consolidation would
lead to the highest level of efficiency, for
example because of the existence of strong
vertical integration between trading and
securities platforms (“silos”). In contrast,
promoting open access to clearing and
settlement systems could lead to consolidation
and the highest level of efficiency. Finally,
regarding concerns about unfair practices by
Central Securities Depositories (CSDs)
toward custodian banks, regulatory
interventions favouring custodian banks
should be discouraged, as long as CSDs are not
allowed to price discriminate between
custodian banks and investor banks.
The two Giovannini reports (2001, 2003)
stressed the need to improve significantly the
structure of securities clearing and settlement
systems in Europe, especially regarding cross-
border settlement. Legal and technical barriers
to further integration were highlighted. Given
the Giovannini group’s already very
comprehensive work in analysing barriers to
consolidation, the network focused on
somewhat complementary issues. Two points
were particularly addressed. First, there is a lot
to gain in Europe from further consolidation of
securities settlement systems. Second, in
addition to the barriers highlighted in the
Giovannini reports, there may be intrinsic
features of the securities trading and settlement
industry that prevent consolidation.
Regarding the first point, Markku Malkamaki
(Bank of Finland), Heiko Schmiedel (ECB) and
Juha Tarkka (Bank of Finland) investigated the
existence and extent of economies of scale in
depository and settlement systems. They
presented their results at the third workshop.
They showed that settlement in Europe is 33%
more costly than in the US, as the average cost
per settled transaction is $3.86 in Europe and
only $2.90 in the US domestic market. This
difference is partly explained by segmentation
in the European market, as the average cost for
operating an international CSD in Europe is
$40.54, relative to $3.11 for a domestic one.
However, looking at the exploitation of
economies of scale in Europe and the US,
they also showed that systems on the other
side of the Atlantic are operating at a much
more efficient level. The European settlement
infrastructures show a strong potential for cost
saving: Costs will increase by a factor of only
0.7 when the number of instructions increases
by 1 – whereas the analogous factor for the US
is 0.9. Hence, Europe has a lot to gain from
8 For this paper, Newman received the 2004 European Finance
Association award for the best Ph. D. paper.21
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shown in the symposium by Jens Tapking
(ECB) and Jing Yang (Bank of England), who
theoretically analysed, in a two-country model,
welfare implications of vertical and horizontal
integration. They show that both vertical
integration of trading platforms and settlement
systems and horizontal integration of
settlement systems are welfare improving.
However, given the level of complexity in EU
international securities settlement systems,
the effectiveness of settlement industry
infrastructure may benefit from further
initiatives simplifying the procedure for cross-
border settlement, as for instance advocated in
the second Giovannini report (2002).
Cyril Monnet (ECB) and Thorsten Koeppl
(ECB) argued at the third workshop that lifting
all legal and technical barriers to consolidation
may not suffice to ensure that the best forms of
consolidation take place. They analysed
theoretically the role of vertical “silos” in
securities market organisation for efficient
horizontal consolidation between components
of the silo, i.e., exchanges and back-office
operations such as clearing and settlement. An
efficient merger is characterised by the lowest
cost of clearing and settlement. The paper
shows that it is impossible to achieve such a
merger when silos are in place because the lack
of information about the competitor’s cost
structure raises the costs of achieving an
efficient merger. These additional costs can
never be covered with the revenues of the
merger, as they increase with the revenues. The
authors then showed that exchanges can
achieve an efficient merger by outsourcing
their own settlement operation, respectively, as
long as each settlement system competes for
settling all trades of the merged exchange.
Hence, they argue that fostering competition
and open access to securities settlement
systems may be required.
Regarding the efficient design of the structure
of securities settlement systems, Cornelia
Holthausen and Jens Tapking (both ECB)
tackled the issue of the pricing strategy of
Central Securities Depositories relative to
custodian banks at the third workshop. Both
CSDs and custodian banks provide the same
service, but custodian banks often need to
resort to CSDs. In an environment where
CSDs’ pricing strategies do not discriminate
between custodian banks and usual investor
banks, Holthausen and Tapking showed that
CSDs can increase the costs of custodian banks
by increasing the variable part of their price
schedule. The equilibrium market share of the
CSD is relatively high and the equilibrium is
usually not efficient. However, whether the
efficient market share of the CSD is higher or
smaller than the equilibrium market share
depends on the parameters. The authors
concluded that regarding concerns about unfair
practices by CSDs toward custodian banks,
regulatory interventions favouring custodian
banks should be discouraged, as long as CSDs
are not allowed to price discriminate between
custodian banks and investor banks.
Also related to the efficient design of this
industry, Giulia Iori (University College
London and Lamfalussy fellow) presented at
the symposium a study on the efficiency and
stability of alternative designs for securities
clearing and settlement infrastructures. She
assumes that settlement takes place in batches
throughout the day and that settlement can be
delayed. She found that increasing the
frequency of settlement (and therefore
approximating real-time settlement) increases
the likelihood of failure but reduces the
systemic effects from a failure. As a
consequence, the shorter the interval between
settlement batches, the more stable gross
settlement systems are compared with net
settlement systems, and vice-versa.22
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4.1.4 THE EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF
NEW MARKETS IN EUROPE (IN
PARTICULAR START-UP FINANCING
MARKETS)
Relative to the United States, European “new
markets” and start-up financing are relatively
little developed and integrated. However, new
markets and venture capitalists are the most
important intermediaries for the financing of
projects with high risk and with potentially
very high return. The analysis carried out
within the network reveals that European start-
up financiers are mostly institutional
investors, while US venture capitalists are
mostly rich individuals.  Also, new equity
markets are essential for the development of
start-up finance in Europe, as they provide an
exit strategy for start-up financiers, who can
then sell new successful firms using initial
public offerings. Finally the legal framework
affects the development of venture capital
firms. For example, very strict personal
bankruptcy laws constrain early stage
entrepreneurs, reducing demand for venture
capital finance.
Marco Da Rin (University of Turin) described
at the third workshop key characteristics and
issues in the European venture capital industry.
During the 1990s, the European venture capital
(VC) industry invested 50% less than its US
counterpart, showing the relative
underdevelopment of this industry in Europe.
Also, its characteristics are different. The
European landscape of VC firms is highly
captive, with an important presence of bank
subsidiaries, corporate VC firms and public
VCs. Typically, these types of VC firms invest
less in early stage and high-technology projects
and provide less soft support to private
companies compared with individual venture
capital. There is also evidence that the goal of
European VCs is to sell their firms. As shown
by Giovanna Nicodano, Marco Da Rin and
Alessandro Sembenelli (all University of
Turin) at the third workshop, the creation of
New Markets could therefore foster the
creation of VC firms, as additional exit
opportunities create further incentives for VCs
to invest. However, Da Rin reported findings
suggesting that European VCs might actually
not make a difference for the companies they
are financing. While VC-backed companies
raise more capital with IPOs than mature firms,
they do not tend to grow faster than these other
firms. At the third workshop, Tereza Tykvová
(Center for European Economic Research,
Mannheim) and Uwe Walz (University of
Frankfurt and CFS) brought additional
evidence that firms backed by bank-dependent
and public VCs have significantly lower
market value relative to firms backed by
independent VCs. In general, firms backed by
independent VCs perform better and display a
lower return volatility than firms of other VCs
or non venture-backed firms.
Marco Da Rin (University of Turin) reported
that VC firms are investing very locally and
usually less than 10% of the partners come from
abroad. Also, cross-border investments of VC
firms represents less than 2% of total
investments. Finally, less than a third of funds
originate from foreign investors. Most foreign
investors are from the US and are concentrated
in only a small number of firms. This shows a
very low degree of integration in this sector. As
for characteristics limiting integration in the
credit markets, this may be explained by the
nature of the VC industry, which is quite
different from that of other financial
intermediaries: VC makes localised and
undiversified investments; is based on human
rather than financial capital and has a small
number of investors. However, financial
integration could indirectly restructure the VC
industry through its affect on the allocation of
funds and the changes in the EU economic
structure, notably on the listing ability of new
firms. In this regard, financial integration may
improve exit channels for VC and reallocate
talent and human capital.
Finally, the legal framework surrounding early
finance can also greatly affect the VC industry
and the development of New Markets. At the
third workshop, Douglas Cumming (University23
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University) reported that very strict personal
bankruptcy laws discourage early stage
entrepreneurs and therefore significantly
reduce the demand for VC finance.
4.1.5 INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO CHOICES
AND ASSET MARKET LINKAGES
BETWEEN EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES
AND JAPAN
At a global scale, asset market linkages have
increased recently. For example, major
economies such as the United States and the
euro area have become more financially
interdependent. This phenomenon can be
observed in stock and bond markets as well as in
money markets, where the main direction of
spillovers has recently been from the US to the
euro area. Country-specific shocks now play a
smaller role in explaining stock return
variations of firms whose sales are
internationally diversified. Increases in firm-
by-firm market linkages are a global
phenomenon, but they are stronger within the
euro area than in the rest of the world. Various
other phenomena also increase market linkages
and therefore the likelihood that financial
shocks spread across countries. One example is
the use of global bonds. Finally, the nowadays
more direct access of unsophisticated investors
to financial markets may increase volatility.
Robin Brooks (IMF) and Marco Del Negro
(Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta) reported at
the launching workshop that the degree of co-
movement across national stock markets has
increased dramatically in recent years. They
found that the ability of country-specific
effects to explain international variation in
asset and sales growth and return fell
significantly during the late 1990s, while the
explanatory power of global industry effects
increased and in some cases surpassed that of
country effects. Yet, this question is not
settled. Although Geert Rouwenhorst (Yale
University) reckoned at the second workshop
that there are some grounds to believe that
international linkages are becoming stronger,
he presented evidence that country effects are
still large. Where firms are located still appears
to matter more than what they actually produce,
although there is evidence that at the European
level industry effects are gaining further
importance.
Stronger international linkages may be
explained by growing cross-listings. Michael
Halling (University of Vienna), Marco Pagano
(University of Salerno), Otto Randl and Josef
Zechner (both University of Vienna) reported
at the symposium that more companies are
listing their shares, not only on their domestic
stock exchange, but also on foreign exchanges.
They found that cross listing initially raises
trading volume in foreign markets, but a
declining trend then follows. Although this
would suggest a return to the dominance of the
domestic market, the decline in foreign trading
is quite slow for certain companies. Foreign
trading volume turns out to be higher for
export-oriented companies and for companies
that cross-list on foreign exchanges with lower
trading costs and better insider trading
protection. Also, small, high-growth and high-
technology firms tend to have relatively high
foreign trading activity.
Investors, as firms, are seeking ways to exploit
financing capacities of all markets by creating
instruments, such as global bonds, that can be
simultaneously traded in multiple markets.
Darius Miller (Indiana University) and John
Puthenpurackal (Ohio State University)
reported at the third workshop that global
bonds are likely to be an expanding form of
finance, as this instrument reduces the cost of
debt capital. According to their study, the
borrowing costs for global bonds are 15 basis
points lower than on those of comparable US
domestic bonds. Moreover, issuing costs of
global bonds are 13 basis points lower than
those of US domestic bonds. Making these
types of instruments more attractive will
undoubtedly bring additional linkages between
Europe, the US and Japan, thus increasing the
risk of volatility spillovers among the different
markets.24
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Examining the effects of monetary policy
announcements and macroeconomic news on
interest rates in the money markets, Michael
Ehrmann and Marcel Fratzscher (both ECB) at
the second workshop already reported evidence
that the spill-over effects are stronger from the
US to the euro area than vice versa. They also
found that since the introduction of the euro the
cross-Atlantic interdependence of money
markets has steadily increased. In a similar
vein, Michael Fleming (Federal Reserve Bank
of New York) and Jose Lopez (Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco) examined at the third
workshop whether information from other
trading centres affect intra-market variances
for US treasury bonds in London, New York
and Tokyo. They find strong evidence that
volatility spills over from New York to London
and Tokyo but not the reverse.
Increased volatility spillovers may become
worrisome with the “democratisation” of
access to financial markets. Michael Haliassos
(University of Cyprus), Luigi Guiso
(University of Sassari) and Tullio Jappelli
(University of Salerno) presented evidence at
the second workshop that lower access costs
brings less sophisticated investors into stock
markets, with the potential consequence of
inducing greater volatility. For example,
unsophisticated investors can react excessively
to market signals, e.g., because of small
investors’ limited ability to withstand financial
pressure. This suggests that it would be wise to
consider policies that can reduce volatility,
such as improving the flow of accurate
financial information.
Cross-border asset holdings are also
encouraged by the harmonisation of securities
regulation, as Jonas Vlachos (University of
Chicago) showed at the symposium.
Institutional or cultural differences have
negative effects on bilateral asset holdings, and
results for regulatory differences are robust
even after taking these effects into account.
Hence, with increased cross-border asset
holdings, local markets will be populated with
investors that have more diverse information
and portfolios. The presence of heterogeneous
investors in stock markets has been analysed
by Rui Albuquerque (University of Rochester
and Lamfalussy fellow), Gregory Bauer
(University of Rochester) and Martin
Schneider (New York University), who showed
that this heterogeneity is crucial for explaining
international portfolio choices. They propose a
model of international portfolio choice where
investors are heterogeneous, both within a
country and across countries. Bringing the
model to the data, their main finding is
that domestic heterogeneity of investors is
much more important than cross-country
heterogeneity.
4.2 RESULTS IN OTHER AREAS
Financial integration affects financial
structures, but it does not need to lead to their
convergence across countries. Financial
structures matter for growth, as market-
oriented financial systems benefit all sectors
and firms, whereas bank-based systems
primarily benefit younger firms that depend on
external finance. Moreover, good corporate
governance increases firms’ value. In
particular, the dual board system, where the
monitoring and advising roles of the board of
directors are separated, is found to dominate
the single board structure. Therefore, the
further development of the European single
market should strongly require good corporate
governance. In general, well designed
institutions foster entrepreneurial activity,
partly by relaxing capital constraints.
In “The euro-area financial system: Structure,
integration and policy initiatives”, Philipp
Hartmann, Angela Maddaloni and Simone
Manganelli (all ECB) provide an overview of
the current structure and integration of the
euro-area financial systems and related policy
initiatives. They document how the euro-area
financial structure is placed somewhat in
between those of the US and Japan, with
financial institutions playing an important role,
but with market-based instruments developing25
ECB
Capital markets and financial integration in Europe
December 2004
4 RESULTS
OF THE
NETWORK further. They find that financial integration has
progressed quickly in some of the main euro-
area financial segments, such as the unsecured
money market, but rather slowly in others, such
as retail banking. Despite further financial
integration, they also show evidence that in
various dimensions the financial structures of
euro-area countries seem to become more
diverse over time. Apparently, progress in
financial integration does not imply
convergence of financial structures.
At the symposium, Solomon Tadesse
(University of South Carolina) provided
empirical evidence of the impact of financial
structure (bank-based or market-based) on
technological innovation. Market-based
financial systems have an overall positive
effect on technological progress. However,
financial structure appears to affect industries
heterogeneously. In particular, industries
whose small and young firms are relatively
more dependent on external finance fare better
in bank-based financial systems. Hence,
financial structure plays an important role in
shaping a country’s industrial structure.
Related to financial structure is the question of
why banks adopt multiple lending, i.e., why
banks share financing of a single firm with
other banks. Elena Carletti (CFS), Vittoria
Cerasi (University of Milan) and Sonja Daltung
(Sveriges Riksbank) tackled the effects of
multiple-bank lending at the symposium. First
it improves banks’ monitoring incentives by
allowing them to finance more projects and
therefore achieve greater diversification.
Second, it entails free-riding problems and
duplication of efforts, thus reducing banks’
incentives. Multiple lending is optimal
whenever the first effect dominates the second.
The model predicts a greater use of multiple-
bank lending when banks are small relative to
the projects they finance, when firms are less
profitable and when poor financial integration,
strict regulation and inefficient judicial
systems make monitoring more costly.
Finally, three noteworthy papers on firm
financing and corporate governance were
presented at the symposium. First, Mihir Desai,
Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner (all Harvard
University) investigated the importance of the
institutional framework for entrepreneurial
activity in Western and Central and Eastern
European (CEE) regions. The authors
identified a particular sensitivity of
entrepreneurial activity to institutional factors
(corruption/fairness, protection of property
rights, well-functioning legal system) in
countries of the CEE region. In particular, less
corruption and better protection of property
rights increase entry and reduce exit of firms.
This supports the view that well-designed
institutions foster entrepreneurial activity in
emerging countries, partly through the positive
impact on relaxing capital constraints.
Second, Renée Adams and Daniel Ferreira
(both Stockholm School of Economics)
addressed the question of why – unlike in the
US – European governance structures rely on a
“dual” board system, which separates the
monitoring and advising roles of the board of
directors. In their model revealing information
and getting advice enables the manager to make
better decisions, but this might increase his
probability of getting fired when this
information changes the board’s opinion about
his ability. This trade-off provides a rationale
for the board to reduce its monitoring activity
up-front whenever it is not too costly to induce
the manager to reveal his information. The
authors show further that the first-best level of
monitoring can be attained when a “dual” board
system is used. Hence, when given the choice
between a single and a dual board system, as in
the new European company statute, firms may
be advised to rather adopt the dual board
system.
Finally, Mariassunta Giannetti and Andrei
Simonov (both Stockholm School of
Economics) found at the second workshop that
investors are more likely to buy a firm’s stock
when the ratio of control to cash-flow rights of
the principal shareholder – expected to be26
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positively correlated with the extraction of
private benefits in a firm, and therefore used
as a proxy for bad governance – is lower.
Improved corporate governance has a stronger
effect on sophisticated investors, like financial
institutions and foreign investors, while large
domestic investors and individuals who are
board members do not base their investment
decisions on corporate governance grounds.
Corporate governance is therefore an important
aspect in understanding portfolio choices
across countries.27
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In its two years, the network has achieved the
goals it formulated at the start. It provided a
forum in which researchers from academia and
policy institutions interested in the evolution
of the European financial system regularly
meet to discuss their findings. It deepened our
understanding of European financial
integration by mapping the current European
financial market landscape. It also provided
theoretical underpinnings for many of the facts
observed. Finally, the network stimulated
research on securities settlement systems, a
research area that hardly existed before.
Based on these achievements, the network will
continue for three further years, refocusing
its priorities. Three priority areas have
been added: 1) The relationship between
financial integration and financial stability;
2) EU accession, financial development and
financial integration; and 3) financial system
modernisation and economic growth in Europe.
These three areas have become particularly
important at the current juncture, but have not
received particularly strong attention in the
past two years of the network. The three sub-
sections in this section show the motivation for
choosing the three additional priorities and list
specific questions that could be addressed
under them. Moreover, despite the results
found in the first two years of the network,
there are new developments in the earlier
priority areas that merit further exploration.
The Lamfalussy research fellowship program
has also been reconfirmed as a tool for
fostering research in the network’s priority
areas. Accordingly, five new fellowships have
been attributed for projects pertaining to the
new areas of the network described below (see
Section 3.2).
5 FUTURE STEPS: CONTINUATION OF THE
NETWORK AND OF THE LAMFALUSSY
RESEARCH FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM
5.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND
FINANCIAL STABILITY
While an integrated area offers more
opportunities to share risk and to allocate
capital, it might be less resilient to unexpected
and uninsurable shocks, as they may propagate
wider and faster. Moreover, it is of interest to
know whether greater integration could
increase the risk of cross-border contagion in a
financial crisis. With the integration of
European financial markets going forward, it is
important to understand what type of integrated
financial structure is the most resilient. The
ECB has an obvious interest in this, as in
accordance with Article 105(5) of the Treaty,
the European System of Central Banks shall
“contribute to the smooth conduct of policies
pursued by the competent authorities relating
to the prudential supervision of credit
institutions and the stability of the financial
system”. Furthermore, the ECB research
evaluators highlighted financial stability
research as an area deserving further
development.9
As explained in the October 2003 article of the
ECB Monthly Bulletin on the integration of
Europe’s financial markets, a comprehensive
review of the EU arrangements for financial
regulation, supervision and stability was
underway. The review, which should
contribute to the further integration of the EU’s
institutional financial architecture, was
initially triggered by the report of the
Lamfalussy Committee on the regulation of
European securities markets in 2001.10
The work of the research network on the
relationships between financial integration and
financial stability could therefore help shape a
view of what this new financial architecture
should be. Particularly important questions
9 Goodfriend, M., R. Koenig and R. Repullo (2004), External
evaluation of the economic research activities of the European
Central Bank, Frankfurt, ECB.
10Committee of Wise Men (2001), Final report of the committee
of wise men on the regulation of European securities markets,
Brussels, 15 February.28
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include: Are market-based or banked-based
financial structures more resilient to shocks?
How can financial regulations be designed so
as to be conducive to integration while still
ensuring financial stability? What is the link
between financial integration and contagion
risk? What are the mechanisms that can trigger
contagion and financial fragility? How and to
what extent do financial crises affect economic
activity? Finally, how does competition in the
financial services industry affect the ability of
the financial system to withstand shocks?
5.2 EU ACCESSION, FINANCIAL
DEVELOPMENT AND FINANCIAL
INTEGRATION
As expressed by the President of the ECB,
“Assessing the impact of EU enlargement on
the European economy is a complex question.
Despite the considerable complexity
surrounding this issue, one thing that is clear is
that EU enlargement will provide new
opportunities to trade and investment flows.
Many of these effects are visible because of the
high degree of economic integration already
reached between the present Member States
and the acceding countries.”11 Further financial
integration is likely to follow swiftly the
political and economic integration of these
countries in the European Union. There are
many ways in which this financial integration
can take place. One way, which currently
seems to be a dominant one, is that foreign
financial institutions acquire financial
institutions of new member states.12 Another
way would be the cross-border provision of
financial services. Clearly the first is likely to
be faster than the second and may develop
accession country financial systems faster as
well. The example of the “old” EU member
states suggests that there are many obstacles to
the direct provision of financial services
abroad, particularly in retail markets. The
heavy presence of foreign financial institutions
may, however, pose other challenges for the
new member countries, e.g., in the area of
financial stability and supervision. All these
developments will determine financial
structures, development and competition in
financial services across the enlarged
European Union.
Important questions for further work within
the network are therefore the following:
What factors explain differences in financial
structures across new and old EU member
states? What role is financial integration taking
in this development? What is the relation
between financial integration and financial
development? Who benefits from financial
development in the process of integration?
Are there any risks to financial stability during
fast changes in financial structures and
institutional arrangements? How will financial
integration among accession countries advance
relative to integration between accession
countries and the previous EU countries?
5.3 FINANCIAL SYSTEM MODERNISATION
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN EUROPE
The capacity of financial systems to promote
economic growth depends not only on their
level of integration, but also on their quality
and the efficiency with which they channel
savings into investment. In other words, when
tackling the issue of economic growth, it would
be too narrow to place the focus entirely on the
level of integration. While several financial
systems can be very financially integrated,
they may not be developed in such a way
as to achieve a greater volume or efficiency
of financial intermediation, and therefore
may not improve the growth performance of
the economy. Financial modernisation and
financial development, however, improve the
efficiency of financial intermediation, and the
process is influenced by many factors other
than financial integration. As the network has
so far contributed relatively little to issues
11 “The challenges for the European economy in 2004”, Speech
by Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central
Bank, Conference organised by Foro de la Nueva Economia
and The Wall Street Journal, Madrid, 29 January 2004.
12 See “Financial Sectors in EU Accession Countries” (Ed.
Christian Thimann), ECB, 2002.29
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regarding the link between finance and growth,
this topic has been added as a separate priority
area.
Work could focus, in particular, on the
following issues: How can one further improve
the structure of highly developed financial
systems? How can one measure a financial
system’s success in performing its functions?
What are the costs and the benefits of
modernising the financial system? What is the
best form of corporate governance? What are
the implications of uniform accounting
standards? What is the best way to incorporate
improvements in the structures of the financial
system? What is the most effective way to
enforce rules?ECB
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The ECB-CFS network is organised as a
“network of people” with a particularly light
structure. The present section describes its
character as a network of people and its internal
structure.
6.1  A “NETWORK OF PEOPLE”
The ECB-CFS network was conceived as a
“network of people”, based on the observation
that potential synergies between researchers in
NCBs, the ECB and the academic sectors were
hardly exploited. It provides a co-ordination
device for the best researchers to work together
in areas of special interest to the ECB. Hence,
a key feature of the network is a strong
interaction among all these researchers. A
“network of people” means that the goal is not
an exhaustive representation of institutions,
but rather a collaboration among the best minds
researching the network’s chosen topics,
irrespective of the institution or department in
which they work.
Contributions to the ECB-CFS network are
made through continuous active participation
in the its organised events. Active participation
can take several forms, be it as a panel
participant, a paper presenter, a discussant or a
session chair. The list of contributors to the
network during its first phase is available in
Annex I. Leading researchers from academia
and policy institutions joined the network to
benefit from the continuous interaction on a
theme of common interest. Participation in the
network implies a two-sided commitment. On
one side, the CFS and the ECB organise and
provide funding for meetings of the SC and for
workshops and conferences, establish a
network website and intermediate contacts
between academic and central bank network
participants. On the other side, researchers
produce original, publishable research in the
fields of the network, present it at the
workshops and conferences and make it
generally available on the network website.
The combination of these factors in the
framework of a network and the cross-
6 ORGANISATION OF THE NETWORK
fertilisation between researchers from
different institutions over time results in
synergies that lead to productivity and output
that goes beyond what can be expected from the
simple one-off organisation of traditional
seminars and workshops. While the purpose of
the network is to produce and stimulate
research in the particular fields mentioned
above, no attempt is made by the SC to
prescribe concrete research projects to network
contributors. Explicit priority areas, policy
panels and speeches are, however, used to
signal to contributors issues of particular
importance.
6.2 STRUCTURE
The network initiative was initially envisaged
for period of two years and has now been
extended for another three years. It is jointly
organised by the ECB and the CFS. This shared
organisation and the character of a “network of
people” had the consequence of keeping the
general organisational structure “light”, e.g.,
by sharing the administrative burden.
The network is headed by a Steering
Committee (SC). The SC is composed of two
ECB representatives, two CFS representatives
and leading academic scholars in the main
areas of the network. The composition of the
SC is reported in Annex J. Apart from
managing the network, the role of the SC is also
to co-ordinate the involvement of researchers
from Eurosystem NCBs and from other
European and overseas central banks, such as
the US Federal Reserve; and to liaise with
researchers in the academic sector. The SC
members located in Frankfurt meet regularly,
usually every 2 to 4 weeks. Consultation with
the outside SC members is conducted through
electronic mail.
Also, an NCB Contact Group and an ECB
Internal Contact Group were set up to ensure
the necessary information exchanges with
policy areas of the ECB and with NCBs. The
compositions of the two groups are detailed inECB
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Annex K. Members of the two contact groups
tend also to be involved in the activities of the
network. The existence of these groups, inter
alia, allows the network to benefit from a
stronger consideration of the relevant policy
context.32
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ANNEX A
The ECB-CFS research network on “Capital
Markets and Financial Integration in Europe”
aims at stimulating top-level and policy-
relevant research, significantly contributing to
the understanding of the current and future
structure and integration of the financial
system in Europe and its international linkages
with the United States and Japan. The present
document and associated table establish a
“roadmap” to help guide work under the
network. They (i)  define the scope of the
network, (ii) identify a set of research areas
and (iii) highlight concrete issues where new
research looks particularly promising and/or
necessary. From the “roadmap”, five specific
areas, listed below, are considered top priority.
These areas will feature as special themes in
network workshops, and papers on these topics
will receive special consideration for
presentation in those workshops.
Work under the network has to fulfil the usual
academic standard of being publishable in a
peer reviewed journal, while:
(1) dealing with European financial
integration, with financial system
structures in Europe or with financial
linkages between the euro area/European
Union, the United States and Japan;
(2) focusing on financial intermediaries,
financial markets (including the related
settlement infrastructures) or the
relationship between finance and the rest of
the economy; and
(3) providing a description of/measuring one of
the items mentioned under (1) above,
explaining driving factors behind these
items, discussing obstacles to integration or
deriving policy implications on the basis of
efficiency or stability considerations.
While the “roadmap” is geared towards applied
and policy-relevant questions, both empirical
and theoretical research are important and
welcomed.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The three criteria referred to above define a
large number of relevant topics, which are
summarised in the table. The five top priority
areas selected are:
(1) bank competition and the geographical
scope of banking activities;
(2) international portfolio choices and asset
market linkages between Europe, the
United States and Japan;
(3) European bond markets;
(4) European securities settlement systems;
and
(5) the emergence and evolution of new
markets in Europe (in particular start-up
financing markets).34
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The ECB-CFS research network on “Capital
Markets and Financial Integration” aims at
stimulating top-level and policy-relevant
research, significantly contributing to the
understanding of the current and future
structure and integration of the financial
system in Europe and its international linkages
with the United States and Japan.
The present document and the related table on
page 35 establish a “roadmap” to help guide the
work under the network. It has been produced
under the auspices of the network Steering
Committee. It particularly benefited from the
“agenda setting” talks given at the launching
workshop of the network, as well as from
comments by workshop participants and ECB
staff.
More in detail, the purpose of this “roadmap” is
(i) to define the scope of the network,
(ii) to identify a set of research areas and
(iii) to highlight concrete issues where new
research looks particularly promising and/
or necessary.
The document is structured as follows.
Section  2 summarises the structure of the
“roadmap”, thereby defining the scope of the
network. Section 3 provides brief descriptions
of the specific research topics from the
“roadmap”. Finally, section 4 defines a small
number of priority areas, which will feature as
special themes in the network workshops.
1 INTRODUCTION1
1 The views expressed in this document do not necessarily
represent the views of the European Central Bank (ECB), the
Eurosystem or the Center for Financial Studies (CFS). It has
benefited from comments by Franklin Allen, Ignazio
Angeloni, Claudia Buch, Giorgio Calcagnini, Mark Carey,
Vítor Gaspar, Reint Gropp, Hanna Hempell, Heinz Herrmann,
Peter Hördahl, Cornelia Holthausen, Harry Huizinga,
Stephane Kerjean, Stefanie Kleimeier, Jan-Pieter Krahnen,
Philip Lane, Guillaume Leclercq, Angela Maddaloni, Simone
Manganelli, Arnaud Mehl, Christina Metz, Cyril Monnet, Per
Nymand-Andersen, Steven Ongena, Charlotte Ostergaard,
Marco Pagano, Chryssa Papathanassiou, Enrico Perotti,
Harald Sander, João Santos, Martin Scheicher, Sandrine
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The “roadmap” is summarised in the table on
page 35, which has the following structure. It
has three broad dimensions: (i) the columns
describe the main broad research areas; (ii) the
rows describe the main segments of a financial
system; (iii) the large and shaded inner box
describes the main broad approaches and
factors that apply to all dimensions defined by
research areas (i) and (ii) above. Finally, the
cells of the table contain a selection of bullet
points, which highlight concrete topics or
issues that are of particular importance. Next,
the three broad dimensions will be described in
greater detail.
There are three distinct, but not unrelated, main
broad research areas: (i) European financial
integration, (ii) financial system structures in
Europe and (iii) financial linkages between the
euro area/European Union (EU), the United
States and Japan. For presentational reasons,
the first and the third areas have been put
together in the first column of the table, while
the second area has been put in the second
column. The first column describes the area of
research on financial integration and financial
linkages between different  geographical
entities. In other words, this dimension of the
work of the network deals with cross-country
or cross-regional linkages within the euro area/
EU and with linkages between the euro area/
EU, the United States and Japan. Financial
linkages are defined by relationships between
prices and by relationships between quantities
across the relevant geographical entities,
mainly countries. The second column describes
the area that deals with the structure of the euro
area/EU financial system as a whole in terms of
the importance of the different ways of
financial intermediation and the different
sources of funding. Depending on the ways
of intermediation and the sources of funding,
different types of financial systems can be
distinguished. Given that the financial systems
in different euro area/EU countries are not fully
homogeneous, this broad area also includes
comparative work on the structure of different
financial systems in various countries.
The main segments of a financial system are
traditionally differentiated by referring to
financial intermediaries, on the one hand, and
financial markets, on the other. Apart from
focusing on financial integration, linkages and
structure with respect to institutions and
markets, the network also intends to include
work on the interaction between the financial
system (in the narrow sense) and the rest of the
economy. Among the financial intermediaries,
banks should receive special attention, but the
network also intends to spur more work on
securities firms (such as mutual funds) and
insurance/re-insurance companies. In terms of
financial markets, the network covers fixed
income (bond and money markets), equity and
foreign exchange markets, as well as the
related securities clearing and settlement
infrastructures. As to the relation between the
financial system and the rest of the economy,
there is a special interest in the implications of
features of the financial system for economic
activity and the importance of goods market
integration for financial integration, and vice
versa. However, work on the non-financial
sectors of the economy only, without a primary
role for financial variables, would not be
considered.
There are a number of factors and approaches,
which are at the heart of the network and apply
to all sub-areas defined by the matrix of
dimensions of research areas and financial
system segments. They are summarised in the
large shaded box in the centre of the table.
First, there is interest in the exact measurement
of the degree of financial integration and in
precise descriptions of the type(s) of financial
system structures observed. For example,
financial integration may be measured on the
basis of the correlation or dispersion patterns
of asset prices or by the regional and
international scope of lending, financing and
investment activities. Financial system
structures may be described by the quantitative
documentation of the relative importance of
different sources of funding.
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Second, there is interest in the identification of
the factors that drive the process of financial
integration and the design of financial system
structures. These driving factors include
competitive market forces, co-operative
initiatives between market participants and
policy action by public authorities. For
example, how do market forces shape the
degree of financial integration and how can
policies be effective in healing market
imperfections? Needless to say that the role
Stage Three of Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) and the euro play as a force in this game
is of special interest to the present initiative.
Directly related is the interest in the
identification of obstacles to the integration
process or to the emergence of the best
financial system structure. Such obstacles are
often historically grown elements of financial
sectors that cannot be easily removed, e.g. for
political economy reasons. They include legal
differences between countries, regulatory
approaches, country-specific industry
standards (e.g. market conventions or IT
standards) or corporate governance systems. It
is important to understand how and to what
extent these obstacles hamper the process of
European financial integration and the
emergence of an efficient financial system
structure.
The shaded box closes with issues that add a
more normative perspective and, ultimately,
the derivation of policy implications. Across
all fields, the network is interested in the
assessment of the efficiency and the stability of
the structures observed. This should then
establish the link to growth and general
welfare. Consequently, the research conducted
in the context of the network should try to
deduce policy conclusions from its findings, in
particular in the areas of greatest relevance.
In summary, research papers that address
the areas defined by the “roadmap” table, as
described above, fit into the work programme
set for the network. In other words, a paper can
be considered under the network, if it finds a
match in the table regarding all three broad
dimensions discussed above. This means that it
should deal with at least one of the main broad
research areas, involve one (or more) of the
main financial system segments and address
one (or more) of the factors and approaches
mentioned in the shaded box of the table.
Papers that directly address one of the bullet
points enumerated in the non-shaded parts of
the table will receive special consideration for
future network workshops and conferences.
The next section describes some of these
special issues in greater detail, so as to better
explain what is behind those issues. Finally,
while the “roadmap” is geared towards applied
and policy-relevant questions, both empirical
and theoretical research are important and
welcomed.38
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The “roadmap” table described above contains
a selection of bullet points in the different
cells. These bullet points each refer to an issue
or a research topic of special importance to the
network. To clarify what is meant under these
brief entries, a list of short descriptions
follows.
3.1 EUROPEAN FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND
FINANCIAL LINKAGES WITH THE UNITED
STATES AND JAPAN
THE GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF BANKING AND
LENDING RELATIONSHIPS
Banking business has become more
international over the past few decades.
However, not all banking products are traded
globally. Many credit and deposit markets
regional in character, whereas securities and
foreign exchange trading is global. It is
important (for the institutional design of
supervisory structures, for instance, or for
competition policies) to understand the
regional and international scope of lending and
deposit taking. What is the “relevant market”
for a specific banking service? Does it cut
across borders or not? Are banks located in
different regions or countries competing with
each other? What are the implications for
market integration? Are long-term lending
relationships geared to home banks or host
banks, e.g. do they depend on the country of
origin? What are the lending and borrowing
linkages between banks? What are the
implications for contagion risk? Empirical
applications with a strong euro area/EU
component are highly desirable.
THE OPTIMAL DEGREE AND IMPLICATIONS OF
BANK COMPETITION
In the past, too much bank competition was
often regarded as undesirable, or even
dangerous. It was argued, for example, that
banks not earning monopolistic profits would
take excessive risks and therefore endanger the
stability of the financial system. Similarly, in
3 SPECIFIC ISSUES OF THE NETWORK
the past, many countries had some controls on
the credit process or on capital flows. Financial
liberalisation, lighter regulatory approaches
and also globalisation have recently increased
the role of competitive forces in the banking
sector, and reductions in government
ownership and government guarantees may
continue this process in the future. It is
important to understand what the implications
of this greater competition in the banking
sector are, in particular regarding risk taking by
banks and the availability of credit to firms, but
also in terms of the provision of financial
services more generally. A precondition for
this is a better understanding of the process of
competition in the banking sector as such, e.g.
from the perspective of industrial organisation
and information economics. This will have to
take account of the differences between the
various banking services. In the European
context, the relevance (or not) of cross-border
competition in the provision of banking
services seems to be an important issue, with
the situation potentially differing in wholesale
and retail business. The results will allow
policy-makers to better assess whether further
liberalisation and deregulation are advisable
and, if so, in which areas, or whether this
process has already gone too far. Empirical
applications to the euro area/EU are
particularly important. Possible additional
questions include: What are the implications of
increased integration for risks in banking, and
thus for banking supervision? How should
supervision be designed to allow for fair
competition and further banking market
integration within the EU?
DETERMINANTS OF BANK MERGERS
The past decade has seen a wave of mergers and
acquisitions (M&As) in the banking industry in
Europe and worldwide. Most of these M&As
involved banks established in the same
country. What are the reasons for this “home
bias” in financial consolidation? More
generally, research needs to clarify better what
motivated these bank mergers and which
policies are likely to increase or reduce merger39
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activity in the banking sector. What
characteristics are shared by the few banks that
are successful in entering foreign markets? Of
special importance are theoretical and
empirical analyses explaining why there have
thus far been only a smaller number of cross-
border bank mergers in the euro area/EU and
whether this is likely to change.
IMPLICATIONS OF BANK CONSOLIDATION
Bank consolidation tends to increase
concentration in lending and deposit markets,
but it may also foster integration. Would more
cross-border consolidation be desirable for the
financial landscape, in particular banking
integration, in the euro area/EU? Would cross-
border consolidation be better for regional
competition than national consolidation? If the
answers to both these questions are yes, which
policies would facilitate cross-border
consolidation in European banking sectors? Do
the current forms of consolidation have adverse
effects on competition in loan and deposit
markets in the euro area/EU? Do potential cost
or profit efficiency advantages offset increases
in market power? Given that there are mainly
national bank mergers, special emphasis
should be placed on the effects of consolidation
on regional and national loan and deposit
markets, e.g. small business finance. How
important is bank consolidation for credit and
deposit market integration? How does
consolidation affect the liquidity insurance
provided by interbank markets and the
liquidity-providing function of banks? Is there
a risk that, beyond a certain level, they may
become less liquid and less able to smooth out
liquidity shocks to the banking system? What
do these effects imply for the liquidity
management of the central bank? Finally, how
does the consolidation process affect asset
diversification, the risk-taking behaviour of
banks and the risk of instability in the banking
system as a whole?
INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO CHOICES OF
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS/DETERMINANTS OF
INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO FLOWS
The largest asset portfolios tend to be managed
by institutional investors. Their behaviour thus
has a significant impact on international capital
flows and global asset price fluctuations.
Despite the high mobility of capital in world
markets, the home bias in portfolios remains
persistent. It is therefore important to better
understand the investment decisions of
institutional investors. Particularly valuable
would be portfolio choice analyses on the basis
of disaggregated, firm-level data, not only
within the euro area, but also globally (in
particular regarding “G-3” capital flows). This
could make it possible, for instance, to link
institutional investors’ choices to household
portfolios. Is the growth of the mutual and
private pension fund business continuing?
Does increasingly professional management of
portfolios reduce home bias in euro area
countries and increase financial integration?
What have been the implications of the removal
of currency-matching and other regulations
from investment portfolios? Has the
importance of cross-sector asset allocation
strategies relative to cross-country strategies
increased through these developments, thereby
reducing country effects in returns? What are
the market imperfections that lead to biases in
portfolio choices? How important are different
groups of institutional investors in countries’
portfolios (mutual funds, pension funds, hedge
funds, re-insurers, etc.)? What are the
implications for asset price volatility and
exchange rates?
ASSET PRICE AND VOLATILITY LINKAGES
ACROSS COUNTRIES AND THEIR CHANGES/
CONTAGION AND CRISIS LINKAGES
There is an increasing number of research
papers estimating asset market linkages across
different countries, both in “normal” times and
in crisis situations. This literature is important
for the network, but it needs to be extended and
deepened in various directions. First, cross-40
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asset linkages (e.g. between stocks, bonds and
money market instruments) should receive
greater attention. Moreover, it is increasingly
important to explicitly identify the factors that
determine the strength of return and volatility
linkages and their changes over time.
Methodological approaches that explicitly
model gradually shifting or regime-switching
correlations or other (non-linear) measures of
co-dependence are particularly interesting for
advances in those directions. For crisis
linkages, further developments of multivariate
extreme-value analysis are important, e.g.
when combined with regression-type analysis
adding explanatory variables. More conceptual
or even theoretical work needs to better clarify
the relationship between price/return
correlation and market integration. Other
measures seem to be needed. The recent
application of concepts such as β- and σ-
convergence (borrowed from growth theory)
seem (at least in part) to point in this direction
(β-convergence refers to the speed of
convergence of prices of the same asset in
different locations, and σ-convergence to the
evolution of asset price dispersion across
locations over time).
DETERMINANTS OF MARKET RETURNS/
DETERMINANTS OF INFLATION, LIQUIDITY AND
DEFAULT RISK PREMIA
EMU implied a change from a more nationally
oriented financial market behaviour to more
area-wide approaches. Therefore, analyses of
the factors driving financial market returns in
the euro area/EU should reassess their main
sources. Which fundamental variables drive
stock returns and bond yields? Are country-
specific data more important than area-wide
statistical releases, or vice versa? As European
stock markets become increasingly integrated,
thus affecting the pricing of the relevant risk
factors, how will this impact on the cost of
capital for firms? Does Europe need US-type
data release calendars with “lock-up
conditions”, etc.? Do euro area returns become
more independent of external factors outside
the euro area? What explains any change
identified? How important is the introduction
of the euro for these changes? Recent research
has found a diminishing role of country effects
in global equity returns and an increasing role
of sector effects. Is this a cyclical phenomenon,
potentially related to a contemporaneous boom
in the IT sector, or rather a persistent one? Has
EMU played a role for European developments
that go beyond the global trend? Which
economic explanations can be found for it?
Another task is the separation of different risk
premia for bond returns, in particular regarding
potential liquidity risk premia in contrast to
inflation and default risk premia. Are the
liquidity levels for different government bond
issues in the euro area uniform and, if not, why?
Moreover, better models of default premia in
corporate bond yields are needed.
LIQUIDITY IN SECONDARY MARKETS/
SUBSTITUTABILITY OF GOVERNMENT BONDS
FROM DIFFERENT SOVEREIGN ISSUERS
EMU has basically unified the unsecured euro
money market and acts as a catalyst for further
consolidation in other euro area financial
markets. This raises the issue of how liquidity
evolves in money, bond, equity and derivatives
markets. For example, financial market
microstructure analysis can be used to assess
various dimensions of liquidity, such as the
trading volume, transaction costs and the price
impact of trades and order flows. A related
question is the implications of liquidity
changes or differentials for market returns. To
what extent are differences in liquidity or
changes in liquidity priced as risk factors in
bond markets? Are there episodes where
liquidity dries up in the secondary markets?
When and why does this happen? How severe
are the consequences for market efficiency and
financial stability? Moreover, are there
different “liquidity pools” of assets within the
same euro area asset class (such as government
bonds) and, if so, why? For example, despite
relatively small default risk differentials,
government bonds from various euro area
countries do not seem to be fully substitutable.
How is the degree of substitutability of41
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government bonds from different sovereign
issuers affected by the existence and size of
derivatives markets tied to specific national
bonds? Particularly new areas are the liquidity
of secondary corporate bond and repo markets.
Liquidity issues have recently also been raised
for foreign exchange markets, where
consolidation in the corporate and financial
sectors as well as the introduction of the euro
have eliminated a portion of the trading
volume.
RESTRUCTURING OF SETTLEMENT
INFRASTRUCTURES
A barrier to further integration of euro area
financial markets is the current shape of the
securities clearing and settlement
infrastructure in Europe. Despite rapid recent
changes, including a large number of
horizontal and vertical mergers, the high
fragmentation of securities settlement systems
leads to high cross-border settlement costs,
hampering cross-border securities trading
within the euro area/EU. Moreover, banks
increasingly compete with traditional
institutions of the industry by offering in-house
trading, clearing and settlement services, while
central counterparty clearing is offered by
clearing houses. In light of this, a number of
important questions arise. A very important
one concerns the optimal securities settlement
system structure in the euro area, in particular
regarding the right degree of centralisation and
the right degree of horizontal and vertical
integration between firms and exchanges.
Another is the political economy reasons that
make the reform of these structures difficult
and, linked thereto, whether any policy or
regulatory interventions should be carried out
to facilitate reform. Third, how do the different
securities settlement channels (international
central securities depositories, national central
securities depositories, global custodians)
compete and co-operate with each other? Here,
recent theoretical work on competition within
and between networks has defined a starting
point. Linked to this question, an interesting
issue concerns the impact of the “insourcing”
of securities services by banks. Finally, there is
very little published research addressing the
cost and pricing of securities settlement
services. This whole field of the network is as
complex as it is important. Since there is hardly
any research literature available, work in this
field could be extremely topical and important.
CONSOLIDATION OF STOCK EXCHANGES
The introduction of the euro has brought to the
fore the large number of stock markets in
Europe. Meanwhile, various markets have tried
to merge or even staged take-over attempts. An
accurate cost-benefit analysis of the effects of
greater stock market consolidation is needed.
This implies assessments of economies of scale
and the effects of liquidity pooling, as well as
potential political economy reasons for
obstacles to greater consolidation. Is there an
“optimal structure” of stock markets in Europe,
and how can it be reached? Is this optimal
structure identical for all stock market
segments? Should the consolidation of listing
and trading be linked to the consolidation of
settlement procedures, and vice versa? Are
electronic trading links and joint ventures
substitutes for or complements to
consolidation?
FOREIGN STOCK LISTINGS AND THE ROLE OF
DEPOSITORY RECEIPTS
Another step towards more financial
integration is the increased listing of foreign
stocks in a country’s equity market. Some
markets seem to be more successful in
attracting foreign listings than others. What
drives the decision to list abroad, and what
drives the choice of where to list? What are the
advantages and disadvantages of doing so,
compared with a common market? An even
more direct way of integrating stock markets is
the issuance of depository receipts, such as the
increasingly important American Depository
Receipts (ADRs) used by US investors at home
to trade stocks listed abroad. How advanced is
the use of depository receipts in Europe? How
do they change the competition between42
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different exchanges? How do they compare to
other forms of integration? How important are
foreign listings/depository receipts as a vehicle
of cross-border capital flows? Do firms which
enjoy access to foreign exchanges face lower
costs of equity capital? Do they face different
relative costs of debt and equity capital? Does
their financial structure therefore change with
access to foreign exchanges? Does equity
capital raised abroad replace or complement
domestic equity sources? Hence, to what extent
does a foreign listing/depository receipt issue
imply competition for domestic suppliers/
intermediaries of equity capital and/or
domestic suppliers/intermediaries of debt
capital?
INTEGRATION OF REPO MARKETS/
SUBSTITUTABILITY OF GOVERNMENT BONDS
FROM DIFFERENT SOVEREIGN ISSUERS
Whereas the unsecured euro money markets
integrated very fast with the introduction of the
euro, the same did not happen with the repo
markets. Despite some recent growth in this
segment, various obstacles to its full
integration remain, such as the fragmentation
of securities settlement systems, the parallel
existence of different master agreements and
the imperfect substitutability of government
debt within the euro area. Nevertheless, with
few exceptions, this important market for
central banks has received very little attention
in academic literature. Therefore, theoretical
and empirical papers on the role of repo
markets and on how to create a unified repo
market in the euro area are important.
Moreover, do the impediments mentioned
above lead to significant arbitrage
opportunities? How does the microstructure of
the repo market work? And finally, what is the
importance of the further development and
relative size of the repo market, in comparison
with the unsecured money market, for financial
system stability.
CAPITAL FLOWS AND EXCHANGE RATES
The increasing size of international capital
flows has drawn the attention to their role in
determining exchange rates. This theme
figured highly in the discussions on the early
depreciation of the euro. The network
encourages further work on the influence
changes in stocks and flows of international
equity, bond and money market investment and
financing have on “G-3” exchange rates, in
particular on that of the euro. When doing so,
however, it is important that a number of
macroeconomic constraints are explicitly
accounted for. Obviously, a pre-condition for
such exchange rate research is a thorough
understanding of what moves capital between
the euro area, the United States and Japan in the
first place. Particularly important is
understanding how market participants form
expectations about the productivity and growth
potentials of the “G-3” economies, and about
relative fiscal and monetary policies.
DETERMINANTS OF COUNTRY INVESTMENT
PORTFOLIOS AND THE HOME BIAS
PHENOMENON
This heading would include research on the
observation that individuals hold too little of
their wealth in foreign assets, and therefore do
not optimally hedge risks across countries.
Related to this, macroeconomic literature has
identified a “consumption home bias”
phenomenon, meaning that output risks are not
optimally shared across countries, so that
domestic consumption is correlated with
country-specific shocks to domestic output. An
interesting question is whether, from a
European perspective, these two forms of home
bias may be related. How do the portfolio
choices of different groups of investors differ
and what does this imply for the causes of home
biases? Another topic that could be covered
under this heading concerns the role of real
estate in households’ wealth. This is a topic of
some significance with respect to
understanding investment decisions in the
economy, given that real estate is one of the43
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most important ways of saving for many
individuals. Finally, an important area is
“home bias at home”, analysing to which extent
biases in international portfolio changes are
any different from biases in regional portfolio
choices within countries. This issue could be
particularly relevant for assessing whether
EMU will significantly reduce portfolio biases
in the euro area.
GLOBALISATION AND THE INCREASING ROLE
OF CAPITAL FLOWS/SYNCHRONISATION OF
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS CYCLES
Previous research suggests that the various
types of capital flows differ in their impact on
the economy in terms of their volatility, for
instance, or in terms of whether they tend to
crowd out or complement domestic savings.
More research on the links between the
structure of cross-border capital flows and
economic activity (growth and volatility) is
needed. To this end, it is important to better
understand the link between financial flows
and the synchronisation of international
business cycles, as well as the determinants of
the structure of capital flows. One determinant
that has not received sufficient attention so far
is the domestic institutional environment,
including corporate governance rules. On the
one hand, it has been argued that domestic
demand for bank credit, debt and equity capital
is determined by the characteristics of
domestic industries and firms and by the
domestic institutional environment governing
agency costs in financing decisions. The
structure of foreign capital inflows would then
be expected to be similar to domestic financial
structures. However, firms might also opt for
foreign sources of funding with the aim of
taking advantage of corporate governance rules
that are better at reducing the (agency) costs of
certain types of financing. In that case, the
structure of cross-border capital flows would
be expected to differ markedly from domestic
financial structures.
GOODS MARKET AND FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
This heading would include research on the
interaction of financial integration and real
integration, including the direction of
causality. It would also cover research on the
role of financial integration for business cycle
transmission and, more generally, on the link
between financial integration and economic
growth. In addition to other channels, could an
increased integration of European capital
markets have a positive impact on economic
growth by increasing the attractiveness of
European markets for companies and investors,
including foreign ones? Moreover, this area
could include measurement issues of price-
based and quantity-based financial and goods
market integration indicators.
3.2 FINANCIAL SYSTEM STRUCTURES IN
EUROPE
BANK VERSUS MARKET FINANCING
In principle, bank and market financing are
complementary elements of any financial
system. Historically, however, the European
and Japanese financial systems have been
based on bank lending. The US financial
system, by contrast, has developed financial
markets much more rapidly and extensively. It
is of interest to the network to understand the
current state of bank and market financing in
the euro area/EU. Will the European financial
system develop over time into a structure very
similar to the one observed in the United States,
or will substantial differences remain? What
are the factors that drive the relative
importance of bank and market financing (legal
systems, political economy factors, etc.)? Are
there differences between more bank-based
financial systems in terms of the efficiency of
the resource allocation, the cost of capital and
economic growth or in terms of financial
stability? Bank-based financial systems tend to
be less well understood than market-based
financial systems in terms of how bank
intermediation contributes to risk sharing for44
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instance. Is there any substantial difference in
the riskiness of the average household’s asset
holdings in bank-based and market-based
systems? Is it true that markets better share
cross-sectional risk, while banks provide
intertemporal smoothing? One difference
between a further development towards a more
market-based financial system in Europe and
the situation in the United States could be the
greater involvement of universal banks in
Europe, as opposed to specialist financial
intermediaries.
THE RESILIENCY OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Experience with financial instabilities during
the past few years emphasises the importance
of the ability of financial systems to absorb
adverse shocks. This capacity of a financial
system is particularly important in the context
of a rapidly changing financial landscape, such
as that in Europe. In the context of European
financial markets, promising areas of research
for the network would address the following
questions. What is the relationship between the
type of financial system (e.g. bank versus
market-based) and the ability of the financial
system to withstand shocks? How can the
choice of accounting rules and standards
increase transparency, accountability and the
ability of marking to market, and thereby
strengthen the capacity of the financial system
to absorb shocks? How is the role of European
banks as providers of liquidity insurance to the
corporate sector evolving? What is the link
between financial fragility and contagion?
How important are contagion and financial
fragility in practice, and what mechanisms
trigger them? How and to what extent do
financial crises impact on economic activity?
Finally, does competition in the financial
services industry affect the ability of the
financial system to withstand shocks?
THE EFFICIENCY OF EUROPEAN BANKS
For a long time, Europe has been characterised
by a situation of “over-banking”, particularly
excessive numbers of branches. Consolidation
has solved this problem only partly. In
particular, previous empirical research has
shown that many larger mergers are often not
efficiency-enhancing. Better knowledge of
which mergers are efficiency-enhancing in
Europe, and which are not, would be important.
More generally, empirical studies on the
evolution of cost and profit efficiency in the
European banking sector are needed. Are there
differences between countries? What explains
these differences? What is the role of cross-
border competition in potential efficiency
improvements? Can efficiency also be assessed
on a product-by-product basis, instead of only
at the level of the overall firm? There is also an
interest in investigating the sources and
implications of structural differences in the
banking systems, such as differences in bank
market concentration, the number of bank–firm
relationships, branching, ownership
concentration and technology.
INSOLVENCY REGIMES
A special complication in the international
financial landscape is the heterogeneity of
insolvency regulations, also for financial
intermediaries. The Directive on the winding-
up of credit institutions has harmonised certain
conflict-of-law issues in cross-border
insolvencies of banks with several branches in
the EU. However, the treatment of bankrupt
affiliates in a group of companies remains an
issue. Furthermore, conflicts can arise between
insolvency regimes for banks located in and
outside the EU. The countries following the
“single-entity” approach (e.g. the United
Kingdom) pool all assets of a bankrupt bank
and its branches for the satisfaction of all
creditors. Other countries (such as the United
States) follow the “separate-entity” approach
that ring-fences local assets of a branch for the
satisfaction of the local creditors/depositors.
When these two approaches meet, there is no
answer how to solve the conflict. An analysis of
these problems could provide evidence for the
next generation of EU regulations and
solutions for EU authorities in the case of
financial crises. Contract and market-based45
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bankruptcies have gained momentum and they
could be a solution to ease tension created by
differences in legal regimes. An important
issue is whether the current situation creates
uncertainty for foreign equity and bond
investors as to what the priority of their claims
would be if the respective company were to go
bankrupt. Or, do differences in insolvency laws
imply distortions in international investments?
TECHNOLOGY AND FINANCIAL SERVICES
The development of new technologies is
drastically transforming the global financial
landscape. What impact will the internet have
on the provision of financial services in
Europe? Will it increase bank competition and
reduce over-branching? Under which
conditions will it do so? Search costs need to be
modelled and the effects of obfuscation-
friction strategies. In addition, the effects of
transparency on producers and consumers are
of relevance for assessing the impact of the
internet on markets for financial services. How
fast is internet banking evolving? Which
products are more affected by it, and which less
(deposit-taking and retail payments, lending,
securities trading, etc.)? Is the expansion of
financial e-commerce a concern in terms of
financial stability or consumer protection?
THE IMPORTANCE AND DETERMINANTS OF THE
BREADTH AND COMPLETENESS OF FINANCIAL
MARKETS/FINANCIAL INNOVATION
Another essential element of the network is the
number of financial products available in a
financial system. Which markets are missing or
still relatively illiquid in the euro area/EU?
What is the status of these markets and what are
the conditions under which they would emerge
and develop further? How important are
specific markets for risk sharing and financial
development? Studies on the following
markets in Europe seem particularly important:
(i) the European corporate bond market as a
whole and the breadth of the risk profiles in it,
(ii)  the market for asset-backed securities,
(iii) commercial paper markets, (iv) credit and
other derivatives markets and their links to
cash markets, (v) index-linked bond markets,
(vi) private equity and start-up markets, and
(vii)  markets for repurchase agreements
(repos). In this research, the euro area-wide
perspective (or at least some cross-country
dimension thereof) is particularly important.
ROLE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS
Recent literature has argued that the type of
legal system is a crucial long-term determinant
of the type of financial system in an economy.
What is the most adequate legal environment
for well functioning financial markets? Is
there a need to reconcile common law and
civil law approaches? How important is the
harmonisation of legal systems for the
development of the euro area financial system?
Is there a need to go beyond the legislative
initiatives launched under the EU Financial
Services Action Plan? Is there a need for legal
harmonisation to foster integration in financial
markets? What is the impact of the legal
systems of European countries on the
development of specific markets? To which
extent do laws influence cross-border capital
flows? Conversely, to what extent does the
elimination of obstacles to cross-border capital
flows create pressures for legal reform? To
what extent does it create room for “legal
arbitrage” and what would be the implications
(race to the bottom or to the top)? What is the
role/importance of the legal system as
compared to the influence from political
economy factors?
MARKET MICROSTRUCTURES/THE ROLE OF
ELECTRONIC TRADING PLATFORMS
The literature on the financial market
microstructure highlights the importance of
market design features in determining the
efficiency and liquidity of a given market.
More recently, microstructure-type analyses
have even been used to address rather
aggregate phenomena, such as exchange rate
developments, international currency uses,
monetary policy implementation, etc.46
ECB
Capital markets and financial integration in Europe
December 2004
Therefore, this approach makes it possible to
analyse important general issues about the state
of European financial markets in depth,
including market liquidity, informational
efficiency and the effects of news (price
discovery), transaction costs, trading
practices, high-frequency arbitrage
relationships and integration. In Europe, in
particular, electronic trading has gained an
ever greater market share in secondary
markets, especially in the stock and bond
markets, but to some extent also in the money
markets. This allows the functioning of
markets to be studied with increasing
“granularity” and precision. The design and
scope of electronic trading platforms is of
interest itself, since it to a large extent
determines the aspects enumerated above. For
example, is it advisable also to give retail
customers access to electronic platforms (open
systems), or should they be reserved for
wholesale interbank trading? What is the
optimal degree of transparency in those
systems? What is the role of inter-dealer
trading? How important is it that the same
system spans different countries?
THE ORGANISATION OF PRIMARY MARKETS/
EQUITY VERSUS DEBT FINANCING/PRIVATE
VERSUS PUBLIC EQUITY MARKETS/START-UP
FINANCING
The way primary bond and stock markets are
organised has an important impact on the cost
of debt and equity financing. Can important
changes be identified in the organisation of
bond underwriting business and initial public
offerings (IPOs)? What are the implications for
the relative cost of debt and equity financing?
In the euro-denominated international bond
markets, for example, a significant entry of
foreign book-runners could be observed with
the introduction of the euro and consequently
also a substantial reduction of underwriting
costs. By eliminating exchange rate risk, a
common currency may also modify companies’
choices between debt and equity, as has for the
first time been argued in a recent paper. Very
little is known about how private equity
markets work. How important are private
equity markets in comparison with regular and
start-up public equity markets? What
determines a company’s choice between
private equity and an IPO in the start-up
segment of the public stock market? What are
the important elements of venture capital and
private equity financing? What is the best way
to provide for the financing of new firms,
avoiding both under- and over-provision of
funds? How is European financing of
innovative start-up businesses developing?
Which policy measures could support efficient
start-up financing in Europe? Can any lessons
be drawn from the US experience? What
explains the large differences between
countries? Which financial intermediaries and
individual investors fund venture capital
firms? Further analysis is also needed of new
European public equity market segments, such
as the Neue Markt and the Nouveau Marché, in
particular a comparison with those in the
United States (notably the Nasdaq).
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CONTROL/
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES OF FINANCIAL
INTERMEDIARIES
Governance of industrial firms tends to be
diverse in Europe. For example, general
shareholder rights, take-over regulations and
observed board turnover can vary significantly
across countries. Activity in the market for
corporate control is not uniform either. Major
differences exist between the United Kingdom
(or the United States) and continental European
countries. What is the right balance between
harmonisation and competition between
systems? Is one system superior to the other in
terms of performance? What form does system
competition take (e.g. foreign listings versus
relocation of headquarters versus voluntary
firm-level commitments in response to
pressure from foreign shareholders)? What are
the implications of different forms of
competition (e.g. does a migration of
headquarters entail significant external
effects)? To what extent is there a danger that
either harmonisation or competition might47
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destroy the internal consistency of a corporate
governance system and lead to a worsening of
performance? There are also pronounced
differences in corporate structures. Is one
better than others in terms of innovations, for
instance? Are differences in corporate
governance more pronounced across national
borders or across different types of firms (e.g.
firms with and without access to international
capital markets, small firms versus large
firms)? Are different rules required for
different activities/types of firms? Should/will
harmonisation and competition play different
roles in changing the rules for different types of
firms (e.g. rely on competition for
internationally active firms, rely on
harmonisation for the others)? Finally, studies
of the ownership structures of financial
intermediaries are important, such as the
implications of different degrees of
concentration in ownership.
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTING RULES/
ACCOUNTING CONVENTIONS AND MARKET
VOLATILITY
The international harmonisation of accounting
standards has proven to be a difficult
undertaking. The importance of transparency
and accounting practices have recently been
illustrated by the Enron failure and other
corporate scandals. A largely unexplored area
is the extent to which differences in accounting
practices can explain differences in stock
market volatility across countries. Is more
transparency always better? What are the
implications of more transparency for
efficiency and financial stability.
THE SELECTION OF BENCHMARK BONDS AND
YIELD CURVES
Both fiscal consolidation in the United States
and EMU have reduced the role of the
government bond yield curve as a benchmark
on which to base the pricing of derivatives, for
instance. In Europe, the swap curve now
basically plays the benchmark role for
non-government bonds. How did that happen
and what determines the choice of benchmark
curve more generally (“benchmark-tipping
phenomenon”)? How does the choice of
benchmark affect the pricing in the market (if at
all)?
MARKET EXPECTATIONS AND THE
PREDICTABILITY OF MONETARY POLICY
Bond and money markets offer many
instruments to assess market expectations
about monetary policy. For example, potential
expectation errors on interest rate changes can
be derived. Moreover, the degree of market
uncertainty can be measured from implied
volatilities and risk-neutral densities. In
deriving market expectations and measures of
uncertainty, the measurement of risk premia
plays a key role, and should therefore be
investigated further. Research in this direction
can show how predictable monetary policy is
and how successful central bank
communications are in preventing an increase
in uncertainty in the market.
THE SIZE AND DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE
BOND MARKETS/WHICH LIABILITIES ARE
REPLACED BY CORPORATE BOND GROWTH?
A very visible and pronounced event around the
introduction of the euro was the significant
growth of primary corporate bond markets in
the euro area. How much of this can be
associated with the start of Stage Three of
EMU and how much is related to other
developments, such as corporate restructuring
and the financing of privatisation in
the telecommunications sector, etc.? More
generally, what are the macroeconomic and
microeconomic variables that determine bond
issuance volumes? Are they the same in the
domestic and international segments of the
market? Is the European corporate bond market
becoming more even in terms of the issuing
sectors or will banks continue to dominate this
market? How broad and stable is the high-risk
(“junk”) segment of the market? Which
liabilities are replaced by the growth of
bond issuance? Can further increases be48
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expected in the market size of asset-backed
securities (e.g. collateralised debt obligations),
optional credit instruments (e.g. spread
options, callable and convertible corporate
bonds), and other credit derivatives (e.g. credit
default swaps). How will the advancement of
such market segments affect the functioning of
financial markets as a whole?
THE MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE AND
EXCHANGE RATES
Recent research has underlined the importance
of order flows for the behaviour of exchange
rates. Order flows have been shown to have
permanent effects on currency prices.
However, apart from the dynamics of inter-
dealer trading, what are the transactions behind
order flows that make them so informative? Are
central bank foreign exchange operations
likely to be as informative as dealer order flows
and, therefore, more likely to have lasting
effects on exchange rates than previously
thought? How does the emergence of large
electronic broking systems, through which the
largest share of trading volume is channelled
today, affect the role of order flows? Has the
concentration process in the dealer community
and among non-financial firms had any adverse
effects on the efficiency of foreign exchange
trading?
DETERMINANTS OF THE COST OF CAPITAL AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH
The real implications of changes in financial
structures and integration are very important.
The overall efficiency of financial markets
determines the cost of capital. And the cost of
capital heavily influences investment activity,
firm growth (in terms of, inter alia, production
and employment) and, ultimately, economic
growth. An important area of work would be to
derive aggregate measures of financial market
efficiency and the cost of capital. Is there any
trend or structural change in the development
of financial system efficiency and the cost of
capital in the euro area/EU? Does the
increasing integration of financial markets in
the euro area lead to greater financial market
efficiency, as reflected in market spreads, for
instance? Are there signs of better access of
firms to external financing, which allows them
to grow faster? Based on the measures
mentioned above, how strong is the link
between the cost of capital and growth? What
will be the impact of current public reforms on
the cost of capital and which further reforms
could lower the cost of capital in the euro area/
EU? In particular, what are the links between
regulatory changes, their effects on the
functioning of various sources of funding and
the subsequent impact on the cost of capital for
firms? Finally, what is the impact of
globalisation on the equity cost of capital?
FINANCIAL INDICATORS OF UNDERLYING
ECONOMIC VARIABLES
Prices of financial assets provide a rich source
of information for markets and policy-makers
with respect to investors’ expectations about
future developments in underlying economic
variables, such as the economic growth
prospects, inflation and monetary policy.
Before the introduction of the euro, available
asset prices allowed information to be
extracted for each individual national
economy. Following the introduction of the
single currency, some markets and instruments
have been created that allow information for
the euro area as a whole to be obtained (e.g. the
EURIBOR spot and derivatives markets, the
EONIA swap market, and the euro-
denominated swap and swaptions markets). At
the same time, other prominent financial
indicators are still based on national financial
instruments, but are often used as indicators for
the entire euro area (e.g. German Bund futures
and options and, until recently, the French
index-linked bond market). The rapid
evolution of financial markets in the euro area
necessitates research on what type of
information can be extracted from observed
asset prices, in particular with respect to euro
area-wide economic fundamentals. This also
requires careful analysis of factors other than
those purely related to expectations, which also49
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affect the pricing of the financial instruments
examined. In particular, issues linked to risk
premia, market liquidity, microstructure
effects and other market-specific factors need
to be considered carefully in this context.
Available financial indicators should also be
evaluated with respect to their ability to
forecast economic fundamentals or the degree
of uncertainty about such fundamentals.
Moreover, there is a need to assess the
information of specific national financial
indicators when these are used to provide
information about the euro area as a whole.50
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The list of important topics in Section 3 is
rather long. Although hints where given in each
paragraph as to whether the respective topic is
among those with very high importance or not,
it may be useful to repeat the limited number of
areas that have been given top priority. Each of
these few selected areas is envisaged to become
a special theme in one of the forthcoming
workshops (or has already been one in the
launching workshop of the network). Good
papers in these fields will be given priority in
the workshops.
The launching workshop of the network at the
ECB in April 2002 already had two main
priority areas, apart from the “agenda-setting”
that led to the present “roadmap”, namely
European debt market structures and
international financial linkages. The former
area featured, on the one hand, papers
addressing issues on the “Geographical scope
of banking and lending relationships”,
“Determinants of bank mergers” and
“Implications of bank consolidation for
interbank markets”. On the other hand, it
featured papers addressing the effect of the
euro’s introduction on the “Determinants of
bond market yields”, the choice between
“Equity and debt financing” and the
“Organisation of primary bond markets”. The
area of international financial linkages was
represented by papers on “Equity market
volatility linkages across countries”, the
“Determinants of equity market returns” and
the “Relative importance of country and sector
effects in equity markets”.
Areas that will continue to be given very high
priority in the network are bank competition
and the geographical scope of banking,
international portfolio choices and asset
market linkages between Europe, the United
States and Japan, as well as European bond
markets. In addition, the new areas of European
securities settlement systems and of the
emergence and evolution of new markets in
Europe (in particular start-up financing
markets) will receive top priority.
4 MAIN PRIORITIES
Work on bank competition and the
geographical scope of banking continues to
be very important, as the euro area is still
experiencing relatively few cross-border
mergers compared with domestic
consolidation, as supervisory structures and
regulatory approaches are being reformed and
as the “special” status of banks is being
questioned in a number of respects. Such work
should focus on “The optimal degree of bank
competition”, “Determinants of bank mergers”
(in particular regarding obstacles and drivers of
cross-border bank consolidation),
“Implications of bank consolidation” and the
“Efficiency of European banks”. The results
can be expected to provide important insights
regarding the development of integrated and
efficient banking markets in the euro area in the
context of global financial markets.
The past few decades have brought an
enormous expansion of international capital
flows. Linkages created by capital flows may
now have a far larger impact on domestic
economies than traditional trade linkages, for
example. They are, of course, intimately linked
to important asset prices, such as exchange
rates, government bond and stock prices.
However, knowledge about the driving factors
behind international financial flows is still
relatively limited. This is why priority was also
given to international portfolio choices and
asset market linkages between Europe, the
United States and Japan. Work on this area
should focus on “International portfolio
choices of institutional investors”,
“Determinants of international portfolio
flows”, “Asset price and volatility linkages
across countries and their changes”,
“Contagion and crisis linkages”,
“Determinants of market returns”, “Capital
flows and exchange rates”, “Market
microstructure and exchange rates”,
“Determinants of country investment
portfolios and the home-bias phenomenon”,
“Globalisation and the increasing role of
capital flows”. Work using disaggregated firm
and high-frequency data sets is especially
encouraged. At the methodological level,51
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approaches combining and integrating methods
from finance, open economy macroeconomics
and micro-macro capital-flow modelling seem
particularly promising. Work in this area is
likely to be important to explain recent swings
in the exchange rates between the euro, the
US dollar and the Japanese yen.
Work on European bond markets should
focus on “Liquidity in secondary bond
markets”, “Bond market microstructure”, “The
role of electronic bond market trading
platforms”, “Substitutability of government
bonds from different sovereign issuers”,
“Determinants of inflation, liquidity and
default risk premia”, “The size and
development of corporate bond markets”
(including explanations for the issuing boom
that occurred parallel to the introduction of the
euro), the “Organisation of primary bond
markets”, “Selection of benchmark bonds and
yield curves”, and bond yields as indicators for
monetary policy and other economic
fundamentals (“Market expectations and the
predictability of monetary policy”, “Financial
indicators of underlying economic variables”).
European bond markets have undergone rapid
changes in the past few years, including the
development of euro area-wide secondary
market trading platforms. Moreover, bond
markets constitute a key area from the point of
view of central banks, and research related to
this market is therefore likely to be highly
relevant from a policy perspective.
The fragmentation of the European securities
settlement industry, resulting in high cross-
border securities trading costs, may well
constitute the single most important obstacle to
further securities market integration. Work on
European securities settlement systems is
therefore of great importance. It should focus
on the optimal securities settlement system
structures (in particular the optimal degree of
concentration) and the “Restructuring of
settlement infrastructures” (in particular the
political economy of securities settlement
system reform, competition and co-operation
between different settlement channels, and
costs and pricing of securities settlement
services). The rapid changes that the structure
of the securities settlement industry currently
is undergoing and the relatively limited
research available on these topics so far, make
work in this area particularly important and
relevant to policy-makers.
An important difference between the US and
European financial systems is the greater
“breadth” of markets in the former. In other
words, the “financial architecture” of the
United States builds on a wider range of
financial instruments traded in more liquid
markets. On the other hand, new markets are
also emerging in Europe and some of them have
developed rapidly in the recent past. Given the
importance of the availability of a wide range
of funding and investment possibilities for
innovations and risk-sharing – and hence
ultimately for growth and welfare – the area of
new markets is also receiving a very high
priority. It would focus, in particular, on the
“Importance and determinants of the breadth
and completeness of financial markets”,
“Start-up financing”, “Private versus public
equity markets”, the “Organisation of primary
markets”. These topics cover “new” equity
markets and venture capital. Moreover, this
important topic also includes work on the
widening and deepening of credit markets,
such as asset-backed securities, credit
derivatives, commercial paper, and repo
markets. Finally, work on the evolution of
other new derivatives markets in Europe is
encouraged. Of specific interest are, for
example, the structure and liquidity of key new
markets, the driving factors behind their
expansion, the optimal number of markets and
welfare implications. Work with a euro-area
wide perspective would be favoured and work
on international comparisons (particularly
between the euro area and countries like the
United States and Japan) is specifically
encouraged.52
ECB
Capital markets and financial integration in Europe
December 2004
Day 1: Building an agenda – Issues and methods
Monday 29 April, 2002
14:00-14:30 Jan Krahnen (CFS), Welcome address
Keynote speech by Otmar Issing (Member of the ECB Executive Board)
14:30-15:30 1) The Structure of Financial Systems
Chair: Jan Krahnen (CFS)
Franklin Allen (University of Pennsylvania), The structure of financial
systems and financial stability
Eli Remolona (BIS), Debt securities market micro and macro structures
15:30-16:00 Coffee Break
16:00-17:00 2) European Financial Integration
Chair: Jean-Pierre Danthine (University of Lausanne)
Marco Pagano (University of Salerno), Measuring financial integration,
based on “Study to analyse, compare, and apply alternative indicators and
monitoring methodologies to measure the evolution of capital market
integration in the European Union” (January 2002), study for the Internal
Market Directorate General of the EU Commission by CSEF, University of
Salerno
Xavier Vives (INSEAD), Industrial organisation of banking, bank
competition and bank market integration
17:00-17:30 Coffee Break
17:30-18:30 3) Global Financial Linkages
Chair: Axel Weber (University of Cologne)
Philipp Lane (Trinity College Dublin), International financial linkages
Giancarlo Corsetti (University of Rome III), Empirical stylised facts of
international financial linkages
18:30-19:00 Philipp Hartmann (ECB) and Jan Krahnen (CFS),
ECB-CFS Research Network: a roadmap
20:00 Dinner speech by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (ECB)
Day 2: European debt market structures and international financial linkages –
First results
Tuesday 30 April, 2002
8:30-9:00 Chair: Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña (ECB)
Colin Mayer (Oxford University), Corporate governance and legal structures
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9:00-10:30 Session 1.1: Law and Financial Markets
Harry Huizinga (Tilburg University and European Commission), Deposit
insurance and international bank deposits (with Gaëtan Nicodeme, European
Commission)
Tuomas Takalo (Bank of Finland), Law or finance: Evidence from Finland
(with Ari Hyytinen and Ikka Kuosa, ETLA)
10:00-10:15 Discussant: Kostas Tsatsaronis (BIS)
10:15-10:30 Open discussion
Session 1.2: Nominal Convergence and Financial Integration
Chair: Harald Hau (INSEAD)
Giorgio Calcagnini (University of Urbino), Financial convergence in the
European Monetary Union? (with Fabio Farabullini, Banca d’Italia, and
Donald Hester, University of Wisconsin)
Stefanie Kleimeier (University of Maastricht), European financial market
integration (with Harald Sander, University of Cologne)
10:00-10:15 Discussant: W. Jos Jansen (De Nederlandsche Bank)
10:15-10:30 Open discussion
10:30-11:00 Coffee Break
11:00-13:00 Session 2.1: Bank Competition, Credit Market Integration and Public
Policy
Chair: Xavier Freixas (Pompeu Fabra)
Giovanni Dell’Ariccia (International Monetary Fund), Competition among
regulators and credit markets integration (with Robert Marquez, University of
Maryland)
Reint Gropp (ECB), Contestability, technology and banking (with Sandrine
Corvoisier, ECB)
Giancarlo Spagnolo (University of Mannheim), Bank mergers, competition
and liquidity (with Elena Carletti, University of Mannheim, and Philipp
Hartmann, ECB)
12:30-12:45 Discussants: First two papers Elena Carletti (University of
Mannheim), last paper Cornelia Holthausen (ECB)
12:45-13:00 Open discussion54
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Session 2.2: The Effect of the Euro on Bond Markets
Chair: Marina Emiris (National Bank of Belgium)
Roberto Blanco (Banco de Espana), The euro area government securities
markets: Recent developments and implications for market functioning
Yrjo Koskinen (Stockholm School of Economics), Capital structure and the
euro (with Arturo Bris and Mattias Nilsson, Yale School of Management)
João A. C. Santos (Federal Reserve Bank of New York), The cost of barriers
to entry: Evidence from the market for corporate euro bond underwriting
(with Kostas Tsatsaronis, BIS)
12:30-12:45 Discussant: Christian Upper (Deutsche Bundesbank)
12:45-13:00 Open discussion
13:00-14:00 Lunch
14:00-16:00 Session 3.1: Regional and International Scope of Banks and Credit
Markets
Chair: Mark Carey (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System)
Claudia Buch (Kiel Institute of World Economics), Cross-border bank
mergers: What lures the rare animal? (with Gayle DeLong, Baruch College)
Luigi Guiso (University of Sassari) Does local financial development matter?
(with Paola Sapienza, Northwestern University, and Luigi Zingales,
University of Chicago)
Steven Ongena (Tilburg University), To what extent will the banking industry
be globalized? A study of bank nationality and reach in 20 European nations
(with Allen Berger, Fed Board, Qinglei Dai, Norwegian School of
Management, and David Smith, Fed Board)
15:30-15:45 Discussant: Olivier de Bandt (Bank of France)
15:45-16:00 Open discussion
Session 3.2: International Financial Linkages
Chair: Stijn Claessens (University of Amsterdam)
Lieven Baele (Ghent University), Volatility spillover effects in European
equity markets: Evidence from a regime switching model
Robin J. Brooks (International Monetary Fund), Firm-level evidence on
global integration (with Marco Del Negro, Fed Atlanta)
Paul Ehling (University of Lausanne), The EMU and strategies of asset
allocation (with Sofia B. Ramos, University of Lausanne)
15:30-15:45 Discussants:Stijn Claessens (University of Amsterdam) and
Daniela Klingebiel (World Bank)
15:45-16:00 Open discussion
16:00-16:30 Coffee Break55
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16:30-18:00 Plenary Session
Chair: Vítor Gaspar (ECB)
Alberto Giovannini (C.E.O., Unifortune Asset Management), The work of the
Giovannini Group and implications for research
Jesper Berg (ECB), The Eurosystem’s work on euro area financial structure
David Wright (European Commission), The status of the implementation of
the Financial Services Action Plan
18:00-18:30 Keynote speech by Sirkka Hämäläinen (ECB)
Vítor Gaspar (ECB), Concluding remarks and future initiatives of the
“Capital Markets and Financial Integration in Europe” Research Network56
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On 29-30 April 2002, the European Central
Bank (ECB) and the Center for Financial
Studies (CFS) hosted a workshop at the ECB to
launch their network initiative aiming at
promoting research on “Capital Markets and
Financial Integration in Europe”. The research
network aims at co-ordinating and stimulating
top-level policy-oriented research that
significantly contributes to the ECB’s
understanding of developments in European
financial structure and the linkages between
European financial systems and those in the
United States and Japan. The format is a
network of people and its key feature will be a
strong interaction between researchers in the
ECB, other Eurosystem central banks, other
official institutions and academia. This
document summarises the launching
workshop.
The workshop combined research “agenda
setting” talks, research paper presentations,
keynote addresses by ECB Executive Board
Members and a plenary panel discussion.
Prominent academics presented their views on
the state of the literature and provided advice
on future research agendas in three key
research areas: 1) the structure of financial
systems; 2) European financial integration; and
3) global financial linkages. During the second
day, research papers selected through a call for
papers on European debt markets and
international financial linkages were presented
and discussed. The second day ended with a
panel discussion that included David Wright,
the Director Internal Market of the European
Commission, and Alberto Giovannini, who
chairs an advisory group of financial market
participants. Three ECB Executive Board
members, Otmar Issing, Tommaso Padoa-
Schioppa and Sirkka Hämäläinen, gave
keynote addresses at the workshop.
INTRODUCTION
Jan Krahnen (CFS) welcomed workshop
participants and introduced Otmar Issing
(member of the ECB Executive Board), who
delivered the opening keynote speech entitled
“Monetary policy in an environment of global
financial markets”. In it, Issing stressed how
financial markets are essential for the
transmission of monetary policy. Monetary
policy sets only the current short-term interest
rate, but for today’s investment decisions
future refinancing conditions are also relevant.
In this context, the monetary policy strategy is
crucial to provide the markets with a reference
against which new information can be
consistently evaluated. The more predictable
monetary policy is, the smoother its
implementation will be, since the market can
adjust interest rates in anticipation of policy
actions. Therefore, understanding of the
determination of asset prices needs to be
widened and deepened. This is especially true
for financial markets in the euro area, which
have seen the most remarkable pace of change
of all the developed financial markets over the
last few years. Issing encouraged new research
in the field of financial linkages, global trends
and other factors determining the evolution of
financial markets in Europe. In addition, new
ways to extract market information and
expectations as well as a better understanding
of the propagation mechanism of monetary
policy to economic activity through financial
markets are highly relevant questions for
policy-makers.
1) THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
This session was chaired by Jan Krahnen
(CFS) and started with Franklin Allen
(University of Pennsylvania) presenting his
views on “The Structure of Financial Systems
and Financial Stability”. Allen started by
pointing out how the comparison between the
Anglo-Saxon market-based system and the
German-style bank-based system is the central
theme of the research agenda on the structure of
BUILDING AN AGENDA – ISSUES AND
METHODS
DAY 157
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financial systems. The focus of theoretical and
empirical research has been on market-based
systems; more work is needed on the
advantages and disadvantages of the bank-
based system. Issues that need to be addressed
fall into four categories. First, the organisation
of the financial system influences risk-sharing
by households. This raises questions about the
risk of the average household’s portfolios in
bank-based and market-based systems.
Second, the relationship between the
availability of information and the allocation
of resources in bank-based systems deserves
more attention. Third, market-based systems
seem more successful than bank-based systems
in financing new firms. This raises the question
about the best way to finance start-ups. Finally,
the relationship between financial integration
and the euro is an important topic for research.
The proposed research agenda on financial
stability contains four categories as well. First,
the relationship between the type of financial
system (bank vs. market-based) and financial
stability is of great relevance. For example, to
what degree are market-based financial
systems susceptible to financial crises (e.g.
Long Term Capital Management)? Or is the
regulation of banks a desirable way to ensure
financial stability? Second, the large and rapid
effect of financial crises on the real economy is
an important topic. Third, the link between
financial fragility and contagion needs to be
explored further. How important are contagion
and financial fragility in practice and what
mechanisms trigger them? Finally, is
competition in the financial services industry
compatible with financial stability?
In the second part of the session, Eli Remolona
(Bank for International Settlements) presented
his paper “Micro and macro structures in fixed
income markets: The issues at stake in
Europe”. He discussed issues related to the
effects of the euro on market functioning (in
providing liquidity and forming prices) by
distinguishing between size and structural
effects. A clearly interesting research topic in
this field is the measurement of liquidity in
European fixed income markets (e.g. the price
impact of trades, focusing on the role of private
information). The assessment of the structural
differences between European and US markets
is important as well. This includes differences
in the mix of major players, the market
microstructures, the benchmarks, the
information structures and the way the central
bank operates in the markets. The second part
of Remolona’s talk focused on the competition
between various market microstructures.
Understanding the mechanisms of this
competition would be helpful to come to grips
with such issues as the advantages of electronic
trading, the optimal level of transparency, the
role of inter-dealer markets and the formation
of benchmarks. Finally, the extent to which
prices in fixed income markets reflect
fundamentals (factors that affect asset values
but are exogenous to the process of providing
liquidity), including fundamentals about the
underlying economy and about credit risk, is
important as well. The top three research issues
for Remolona are: 1) the role of inter-dealer
markets (trading among dealers plays an
essential role in the price discovery process);
2) the benchmark tipping process (the trading
process leads to a critical level of activity in
one of the instruments, so that it is used as a
pricing reference); and 3) the behaviour of
default risk premia.
The talk by Colin Mayer (Oxford University),
“Corporate governance and legal structures”,
was originally scheduled for the first day,
together with Allen’s and Remolona’s. Due to
Mayer’s scheduling conflicts, this talk had to
be postponed until the following day. For
coherence, we summarise it under this section,
rather than with the submitted papers, as
indicated in the programme. Mayer reviewed
the developments in corporate finance, starting
with complete markets models, moving
through incomplete contract models up to the
political economy of finance. He focused on
how theoretical developments and empirical
evidence have shaped the research agenda in
this field. Starting from a point of view where
finance decisions do not matter (Modigliani
and Miller theorem), corporate finance has now58
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expanded in many directions, including
financial institutions, corporate governance,
law and finance. Great attention has been given
to the role of law in the development of a
financial system. The significance and quality
of the legal system was emphasised by the
introduction of incomplete-contract models.
One prediction of this branch of literature is
that whenever the legal system performs poorly
non-market processes play a more prominent
role. On the other hand, the political economy
of finance stresses that law and regulation are
an outcome of lobbying, and therefore cannot
be treated as exogenous. What emerges from
the empirical literature is that there is no
convincing evidence that favours one theory
over another in explaining differences in
financial systems. Nevertheless, further
understanding of these issues is of utmost
importance, not least for policy-making.
According to Mayer, if one shares the view that
different systems are best suited for different
activities, the implication is that policy should
be enabling rather than restrictive or
prescriptive. According to him, the ECB-CFS
Research Network can play an important
function in terms of identifying a research
agenda, facilitating research activities in this
area through workshops, and particularly
encouraging exchanges of data as well as ideas.
Due to time constraints, there was no
discussion after Allen’s and Remolona’s
presentations.  Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña
(ECB) asked Mayer’s view about the conflict
between harmonisation and competition, in the
context of the European Union. In particular,
he was worried that competition might hamper
the purposes of regulation. According to
Mayer, harmonisation is important, especially
in the regulation of certain parts of the financial
system. However, provided there is good
standardised information disclosure, and
provided that the systemic risks associated
with bank failures are not present, one can
argue quite strongly for differences in
regulatory structures and competition between
different systems. Jan Krahnen (CFS) pointed
out that most of the empirical work is carried
out on German and UK data. He asked whether
there is a need for more analysis also focusing
on other European countries. Mayer thinks that
this is precisely the sort of requirement that
arises in this area of research. There has been
very little serious international comparative
work that tries to use standardised data banks
and techniques across countries.
2) EUROPEAN FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
Jean-Pierre Danthine (University of
Lausanne) chaired this session. The first
speaker,  Marco Pagano (University of
Salerno), talked about “Measuring Financial
Integration”. His talk was based on a report
prepared by the Centre for Studies in
Economics and Finance for the European
Commission: “Study to analyse, compare, and
apply alternative indicators and monitoring
methodologies to measure the evolution of
capital market integration in the European
Union” authored by himself, Klaus Adam,
Tullio Japelli, Annamaria Menichini and Mario
Padula. He evaluated the degree of European
financial integration by looking at indicators
in four broad categories: 1) indicators of credit
and bond market integration; 2) indicators
of stock market integration; 3) indicators of
integration based on economic decisions
of household and firms; and 4) indicators
of institutional differences. Some of these
indicators are based on asset returns and prices,
others on asset quantities (either flow or stock
measures). When theoretical benchmarks
are available, he uses the concepts of
β-convergence and σ-convergence of returns.
These indicators are taken from the economic
growth literature. b-convergence regresses the
average growth rate on the initial level of the
variable of interest and interprets a negative
correlation as a sign of convergence. This is
interpreted as a measure of the speed of
adjustment of single countries towards the
long-run benchmark value. σ-convergence
measures if countries tend to become more
similar over time in terms of deviations from
the benchmark, and it is computed as a cross-
sectional standard deviation of a variable.59
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Pagano’s preliminary conclusions suggest that:
a) Convergence in credit and bond markets
should be achieved soon. It is important to
monitor the evolution of the share of foreign
assets held by the national banking sectors in
order to get a measure of the home bias and
therefore of the degree of market segmentation
of European credit markets; b) Monitoring of
stock market integration should be done by
using quantity-based indicators, such as the
share of equities managed by equity funds
with an international investment strategy;
c) Indicators based on household decisions are
rather volatile and hence unreliable. One
should focus instead on indicators based on the
decision of firms, such as those based on
merger and acquisition activities.
Xavier Vives (INSEAD) talked about
“Industrial organisation of banking, bank
competition and bank market integration”. He
started by pointing out how, over the last sixty
years, the banking system has moved from
regulation, intervention and stability towards
liberalisation and greater instability. This
resulted in an increase in competition,
disintermediation, market integration, financial
innovation and financial fragility. Adding to
these factors, technological change in
information technology and communications
paved the way for a radical transformation of
the banking sector. The banking business
witnessed a major consolidation wave and
moved from taking deposits and granting loans
to the provision of services to investors and
firms. Such developments pose key questions.
Is too much competition in the banking sector
potentially harmful, causing greater
instability? Does the consolidation wave pose a
threat to competition? Is the internet and
globalisation making banking contestable, thus
reducing the scope for public intervention and
competition policy? What is the impact of
mergers? Modern industrial organisation and
financial intermediation analysis may provide
useful tools to answer these questions. What
emerges is that there is a danger of both
excessive competition and excessive market
power. The reason is that banking is a multi-
product industry, with different levels of
competition in different product markets. Thus
the optimal level of competition depends on the
institutional characteristics of regulation and
on bank soundness. The implication is that
different countries may have different optimal
levels of competition intensity. Countries with
a sound legal structure can benefit from
vigorous rivalry. By contrast, economies with
weak institutional structures and high social
costs of failure should moderate the intensity of
competition.
In the discussion, Philipp Hartmann (ECB)
pointed out how the current literature is divided
about the desirability of competition in
banking. One line of thought, based mainly on
empirical contributions, supports it for
efficiency reasons, while the other, based more
on theoretical arguments, is against it for
stability reasons. He asked whether the speaker
would feel that the current situation in banking
suggests more attention to competition or
stability. Vives responded that the period in
which banks were strictly regulated implied
huge efficiency losses. The key question we
need to answer is: what is the optimal degree of
competition? His impression is that banking
can take quite a bit of competition as long as it
is regulated appropriately. Marco Pagano
(University of Salerno) stressed the difficulty
of defining integration in banking. He
suggested that it would be a sign of integration
if a company could issue debt and take credit
from banks in different countries on the same
terms. He then asked the following questions:
How to make this definition operational at the
data level? Can we ever measure integration?
Vives thinks that these are very important
issues, but that there are no clear-cut answers.
For example, in retail, deposit and services
markets there may be differences in
preferences and culture that explain variations
in conditions. The consequence is that these
differences need not be sub-optimal. The law of
one price might not make sense for some of
these products.60
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3) GLOBAL FINANCIAL LINKAGES
The last session of the day was chaired by Axel
Weber (University of Cologne). Philipp Lane
(Trinity College Dublin), “Global Financial
Linkages: Some Theory and Empirics”,
stressed the importance of gross asset trade and
net trade flows for the link between global
financial integration and macroeconomics.
While according to the theory gross asset trade
is driven by international diversification and
risk sharing needs, reported net trade flows
would be the result of efficient capital
allocation and consumption-smoothing
objectives. Concerning gross asset trade,
global factors like different risk aversions by
different types of investors determine asset
pricing and could be used to explain systemic
risk events and contagion effects. International
financial exposure also gives rise to
international wealth effects, which are the
focus of recent international macro research.
Lane also mentioned the importance of
improving the data situation in terms of cross-
border stocks and flows. Due to the increasing
importance of valuation effects, net foreign
asset positions are very difficult to measure.
Using the accumulated current account as a
proxy can be highly misleading. Caution is also
warranted when deriving data on net
investment income. The reverse sign of average
net foreign asset positions and net investment
income for many countries is the result of asset
returns exceeding (falling short of) liability
returns for debtor (creditor) countries. Detailed
data are thus essential to analyse the effects of
net trade flows. As topics for future research,
Lane suggested analysing international
monetary policy co-ordination from the
perspective of incomplete risk sharing, looking
at non-fundamental explanations for capital
flows, reconsidering the issue of exchange rate
misalignments and further investigating global
financial panics and contagion events.
Giancarlo Corsetti (University of Rome III),
“Global Financial Linkages and Open-Macro
Models”, provided an overview of the new-
open macroeconomics literature stressing the
importance of cross-border goods market
segmentation. The recent literature follows
earlier developments in international finance
by showing that market imperfections provide
the foundation for new cross-border spillover
effects, which here are represented by relative
price adjustments in the goods market, i.e.
movements in the terms of trade. Empirical
evidence suggests that there is a need for
models with both goods and asset market
segmentation. This should lead to a rethinking
of the determination of exchange rates and their
role in the international transmission
mechanism. This international transmission
channel will affect optimal policy rules as well.
There are many approaches to model goods
market segmentation. Corsetti mentioned
simple shipping costs, diverse cross-country
preferences for home and foreign goods,
nominal rigidities such as firms deciding
whether to price their goods in their home
currency (producer currency pricing) or in the
export market’s currency (local currency
pricing), and distribution costs paid in local
currency. He advocated a new and promising
approach for modelling goods market
segmentation – vertical integration between
firms located in different markets (according to
some estimates 70% of international trade is
intra-firm). This modelling approach is able to
reproduce several attractive features, including
local price discrimination, an incomplete
exchange rate pass-through, high exchange rate
volatility and the possibility of multiple
equilibria. Corsetti suggested that future macro
research should continue to increasingly rely
on industrial organisation results and focus on
the vertical integration of firms, taking into
account their location decisions.
In the discussion, Harald Hau (INSEAD)
pointed out that at first sight the two
contributions in this session appear quite
“orthogonal” to each other, the first stressing
the importance of capital flows and the second
claiming more attention for the micro-structure
of goods market segmentation. This focus of
the recent theoretical literature was considered
odd due to the fact that trade flows only explain61
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a minor share of today’s capital flows.
Giancarlo Corsetti (University of Rome III)
argued for patience, as researchers are trying to
extend the finance part of the new-open macro
models, in the same way as the finance
literature had been improved like previously
the finance literature had been improved by
incorporating the real side of the economy.
Axel Weber (University of Cologne) stressed
the similarities between international macro
theory and international finance as both
continue to further explore the importance of
frictions in their respective fields.
After the agenda-setting presentations, Jan
Krahnen  (CFS) gave a short presentation
about the status of the preparations of a
“roadmap” to guide the future work of the
ECB-CFS Research Network. Krahnen
suggested a first list of topics that the network
could cover over the next two years. These
topics will be grouped by area of interest and
will form the basis for the future calls for
papers, announcing the next workshops and
conferences. The detailed roadmap of the
network is discussed in a companion document:
ECB-CFS research network on “Capital
Markets and Financial Integration in Europe”:
a roadmap.
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (member of the
ECB Executive Board) delivered the dinner
speech,  “Competition, co-operation, public
action: three necessary drivers for European
financial integration”. He pointed out how the
euro can be considered not only as the crowning
achievement of the European Single market,
but also as the beginning of a deeper integration
process. By increasing price transparency,
reducing transaction costs, and ultimately
stimulating competition, the single currency is
acting as a powerful catalyst for financial
integration. As the title of his speech suggests,
Padoa-Schioppa thinks that the completion of
the financial integration process requires
interaction between three (equally necessary)
drivers: i) competition, ii) co-operation and
iii) public action. Free competition across
borders permits market forces to push towards
greater integration. Co-operation is needed to
overcome situations where the optimal
outcome is not achieved by the simple
interaction of independent individual
decisions. Public action should intervene
whenever a public good is at stake or when a
market failure occurs. One example where
interaction between the three drivers is needed
is the securities settlement systems. Since, in
the short run, some market participants may
benefit from its fragmentation, they lack the
incentive to change. Competition by itself
cannot work and some form of co-ordination is
required. In these circumstances, public action
could act as a catalyst for change. He ended his
speech by encouraging further research on how
the interaction between co-operation and
competition can work towards the selection of
an efficient market structure.
DAY 2
EUROPEAN DEBT MARKET STRUCTURES AND
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LINKAGES – FIRST
RESULTS
LAW AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña (ECB) chaired the
session. Harry Huizinga (Tilburg University
and European Commission) presented the
paper  “Deposit insurance and international
bank deposits” (jointly with G. Nicodeme,
European Commission), which examines how
international depositors respond to national
deposit insurance policies. The authors find
that international non-bank depositors appear
to favour banking systems covered by explicit
deposit insurance, and they are attracted to
systems with co-insurance, a private
administration, and a low deposit insurance
premium. The sensitivity of non-bank deposits
to deposit insurance policies opens up the
possibility of international regulatory
competition in this area. They considered as an
example the EU deposit insurance directive of
1994, which requires minimum standards for
national deposit insurance policies, but not on62
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the level of deposit insurance premium. This
directive thus may not preclude regulatory
competition in the area of deposit insurance in
Europe.
In the presentation “Law or finance: Evidence
from Finland” by  A. Hyytinen (ETLA), I.
Kuosa (ETLA) and Tuomas Takalo (Bank of
Finland), the authors study the changes in
Finnish corporate governance and financial
systems for the period 1980-2000. During this
period, Finland experienced simultaneous
financial and currency crises, and a large-scale
change in industrial structure. Takalo
described how the crises and the structural
change occurred at the same time as a thorough
reform of Finnish corporate governance was
implemented. In the paper, the authors explain
the development of the financial system in the
light of this corporate governance reform.
Following the law and finance literature, they
equate corporate governance with the legal
mechanisms by which  outside investors are
protected. Their measures of shareholder and
creditor protection reveal that shareholder
protection has been strengthened, whereas
creditor protection has been weakened. They
find that Finnish firms have substituted equity
for debt on a significant scale. Indeed, the
weakening of creditor rights provides an
explanation for the gradual contraction in
corporate lending during the 1990s. Finally,
the authors find that the changes in investor
protection have to some extent preceded the
reorganisation of the Finnish financial market,
while changes in creditor rights occurred in
parallel with market developments.
In the discussion of the first paper, Kostas
Tsatsaronis (BIS) wondered whether deposit
insurance limits are too low to be relevant for
international depositors, such as big
corporations and banks. Moreover, deposit
insurance should have a second order effect,
because other factors should dominate the
behaviour of depositors (location of trade,
international capital flows, etc.). He thinks the
paper provides an interesting stylised fact (i.e.
asymmetry in the behaviour of banks and non-
banks), but the interpretation of the results is
puzzling. Regarding the second paper, he found
that it documented very well the legal
framework in Finland. The paper lays a good
foundation for future work, such as the
response of Finland to the introduction of the
euro. Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña (ECB) asked
how it is possible to measure creditors’ or
shareholders’ protection across borders in the
euro area. Takalo answered that the measure
they apply in the paper had been used in other
studies, and that therefore he did not see any
problem in extending their measurement
criterion to other EMU countries.
NOMINAL CONVERGENCE AND FINANCIAL
INTEGRATION
This session, chaired by Harald Hau
(INSEAD), started with Giorgio Calcagnini
(University of Urbino) presenting his paper
“Financial convergence in the European
Monetary Union?”,  co-authored with Fabio
Farabullini (Banca d’Italia) and Donald Hester
(University of Wisconsin). The paper reports
results from three types of tests of financial
convergence. The first type, σ-test, is borrowed
from the growth literature. This test was also
mentioned by Marco Pagano in his talk on the
first day of the workshop. It examines whether
the standard deviations of a set of cross-
sectional measures of series that are believed to
be converging diminish over time. There is
evidence of convergence in inflation rates,
short-term nominal interest rates, but not for
real per capita GDP, relative to a group of non-
EMU countries. The results from this test
generally support the hypothesis that European
integration has led to convergence in financial
markets. A second type of test looks at
convergence in the banking industry structure
by comparing levels and trends in interbank
claims and non-interest income at banks (such
as fees and commissions). One would expect
these flows to increase as barriers are removed.
The results show that interbank claims were
larger at EMU banks than at banks in other
countries, but no clear trend emerged. The final
test investigates the convergence of marginal63
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rates of return on assets and marginal costs of
liabilities. The main conclusion is that within
the group of six biggest EMU countries, a
single market for banks started to emerge in the
last two years of the sample (1997 and 1998).
The second paper, by Stefanie Kleimeier
(University of Maastricht) and Harald Sander
(University of Cologne), was entitled
“European Financial Market Integration”.
The focus of the paper is on integration in retail
banking markets. The authors argue that
looking simply at the law of one price could be
misleading, because of the high heterogeneity
of the products exchanged in these markets.
Therefore, they suggest a co-integration
analysis to study the emergence of a uniform
banking market. They postulate the existence
of a long-run relationship between the national
interest rate of a country and the interest rate in
the rest of the euro area. While in the short run
deviations from the equilibrium relationship
are possible, in the long run these deviations
should die out. They find very limited evidence
for co-integration before the introduction of the
euro. They also find that the relationship of
national lending markets with the remaining
euro area lending markets exhibits strong signs
of structural changes at the moment of the
introduction of the euro. According to the
authors, this is a clear indication that euro area
credit markets are changing dramatically,
although more evidence is needed before
drawing conclusions on the integration of these
markets. There are some tendencies towards a
more uniform corporate lending market, while
consumer lending markets are still more
fragmented. Finally, they find that the pass-
through process (i.e. the impact of monetary
policy decisions on lending rates) is still far
from perfect and exhibits strong asymmetries
across countries, thus pointing again towards
lack of integration.
The discussant Jos Jansen (De Nederlandsche
Bank) asked how two papers on the same
subject could arrive at such different answers
to the question of whether the banking sector is
integrated or not. Apart from sample periods
and other differences in the data, the answer
lies in the different methodologies applied. A
problem with Kleimeier’s approach is the short
sample available. Co-integration analysis
typically requires a relatively long time series.
In addition to this, extensive structural change
and, presumably, parameter instability
characterised the times over which the analysis
is performed. Hence care must be exercised in
the interpretation of the results. Regarding
Calcagnini’s paper, Jansen found it puzzling
that the sample ended in 1998, as we are
particularly interested in what happened
afterwards.  Christian Upper (Bundesbank)
made a similar point, saying that retail interest
rates were prices of different assets before the
introduction of the euro and thus no conclusion
about integration could be drawn using pre-
EMU samples. Francesco Papadia (ECB)
asked whether similar results on convergence
would be obtained by applying the same tests
on average retail interest rates on bank deposits
and loans. Calcagnini replied that, since no
such analysis had been performed, he had no
answer to the question.
BANK COMPETITION, CREDIT MARKET
INTEGRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
The chairman for this session was Xavier
Freixas (Pompeu Fabra). The first contribution
was by Giovanni dell’Ariccia (IMF). He
presented a joint paper with Robert Marquez
(University of Maryland) entitled
“Competition among regulators and credit
market integration”. The objective of the paper
is to analyse and compare the regulatory
equilibria that emerge in several countries
when the banking regulation decision is
centralised with the one that exists when
regulators are separate and independent across
countries. The underlying trade-off is between
efficiency and flexibility. Independent
regulators fail to take into account the positive
externalities of their own regulations and
therefore tend to under-regulate compared with
centralised regulators. In other words,
centralised regulators internalise positive
externalities. However, a centralised regulator64
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who faces the constraint of imposing a single
set of rules on different countries necessarily
loses the flexibility that each national regulator
was enjoying and might not fulfil country-
specific needs. Therefore, the conclusion of the
paper depends heavily on the degree of
asymmetry among the countries concerned.
Countries with similar financial systems will
benefit from a centralised regulator. However,
the existence of multiple financial links matter,
as they create a free rider problem: a country
envisaging joining a single regulatory union
might prefer free riding on the existing
regulatory framework of its financial partners,
while still benefiting from the flexibility of
having an independent regulator.
Reint Gropp (ECB) presented the paper
“Contestability, technology and banking”
written with Sandrine Corvoisier (ECB). The
objective of the paper is to analyse whether
internet banking increased contestability in the
banking market. The authors test a relation
derived from a simple model of market
contestability for banks. This relation
expresses the post-entry equilibrium interest
margin – a proxy for the degree of competition
– as a function of market concentration,
internet penetration and costs. The authors also
conjecture that internet technology has reduced
sunk costs for deposits more than for loans.
Using semi-aggregated data for a group of 9 of
the 12 euro area countries, they claim to find
strong support for an increase in contestability
in time deposit markets. However, effects are
more moderate for loan markets. The results
also show that banking markets in Europe are
not perfectly contestable, which suggests that
physical bank structures continue to matter.
Giancarlo Spagnolo (Mannheim University)
presented joint theoretical work with Elena
Carletti (Mannheim University) and Philipp
Hartmann (ECB): “Bank Mergers,
Competition and Liquidity”. The objective of
the paper is to analyse the joint consequences
of consolidation on loan rates, reserve holdings
and interbank market liquidity. The model
features stochastic withdrawal shocks on
deposits, which banks can finance either with
reserves or by interbank market borrowing, and
competition in differentiated loans. When
liquidity shocks are uncorrelated a merger
creates an internal money market saving
interbank borrowing costs for the two
institutions. Surprisingly, for most parameter
configurations this internalisation effect
dominates the diversification of liquidity risk,
so that merged banks increase reserve holdings.
As a consequence of the internal money
market, they also enjoy lower liquidity risk and
expect lower liquidity needs than competitor
banks. As to the loan market, merged banks
gain market power but also enjoy cost
advantages through lower refinancing costs
and potentially also through efficiency gains.
Loan rates increase when the market power
effect dominates. Finally, aggregate bank
system liquidity improves through higher
reserve holdings and deteriorates through an
asymmetry in deposit bases induced by loan
competition. Hence with uncorrelated shocks
the aggregate liquidity effects of a merger are
an empirical question, whereas with correlated
shocks they are unambiguously negative. The
results have policy implications for central
bank liquidity management, antitrust analysis
and financial stability.
Elena Carletti (University of Mannheim)
discussed the first two papers, while Cornelia
Holthausen (ECB) discussed the last one.
Regarding the first paper, Carletti pointed out
that the results were strongly dependent on
assumptions concerning preferences of
regulators that do not seem to be micro-
founded. She argued that the reduced form
equation used by the authors would need more
motivation. For example, it generates a trade-
off in the regulator’s objective function that
does not seem to be consistent with some
standard banking theories, such as the charter
value hypothesis. On Gropp’s paper, she asked
which technology is the relevant one. The
weaker effect of internet banking on loan
markets suggests that internet banking does not
have a significant impact on banks’ ability to
gather information about local markets.65
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However, other forms of technological
progress seem to have an impact and have made
it easier for banks to process and evaluate
information as well as to obtain information
about competitors. Vítor Gaspar (ECB) raised
a similar point. He remarked that, in the context
of the paper, it did not seem possible to
establish that the results found were coming
from contestability as opposed to other
consequences of technological progress. For
example, internet banking led to lower search
costs. In the last paper of the session, the
discussant  Holthausen  pointed out that the
assumption concerning the constant rate on the
interbank money market was unsatisfactory.
For instance, one can easily envisage the
central bank changing this rate in response to
merger activity. Gaspar (ECB) suggested
extending the analysis to allow for a corridor
for interest rates in the interbank market,
defined by the central bank’s standing
facilities.
THE EFFECT OF THE EURO ON BOND MARKETS
The session was chaired by Marina Emiris
(National Bank of Belgium). Three papers on
the effect of the euro on tradable debt markets
were presented in this session. The first
analysis conducted by Roberto Blanco (Banco
de España), “The euro-area government
securities markets: Recent developments and
implications for market functioning”, studies
the recent key developments in the euro-area
government bond markets. He finds that the
spreads over German bonds of previously high-
yield debt have narrowed significantly. By
contrast, the spreads of all other euro-area
sovereign debt have widened since the
introduction of the single currency. The author
argues that this could reflect an increase in
differences in both liquidity and credit risk
between German securities and other euro-area
sovereign debt. The author also shows that
market microstructure factors, such as relative
market liquidity, play a part in determining
relative prices. Finally, the analysis suggests
that the reduction in the relative supply of
government bonds, as a consequence of the
improvement in public finances, has had a
limited effect in the euro area, in contrast to the
evidence in the US market.
The second paper, “Capital structure and the
euro”, was presented by Philip Vermeulen
(ECB) on behalf of the authors, Yrjo Koskinen
(Stockholm School of Economics), Arturo Bris
and Matthias Nilsson (Yale School of
Management), since the planned presenter had
fallen ill. The paper studies the changes in
corporate leverage induced by the introduction
of the euro. Three hypotheses are put forward.
First, the diminished currency risks should
imply a lower likelihood of financial distress,
and hence should lead to increased corporate
leverage. Second, the euro should lower the
cost of capital, and as a result we should
observe decreased corporate leverage in the
firms of the countries that adopted the common
currency. Finally, in a fixed exchange system,
firms have an incentive to maintain excessive
leverage, as the government can bail them out
by devaluing the currency if they become
financially distressed. We then should observe
higher debt ratios prior to the introduction of
the euro for firms that benefited from currency
depreciation. The paper finds that the firms in
the euro area lowered their market-based
leverage after the introduction of the euro.
Moreover, this leverage reduction is stronger
for those countries with a history of currency
crises. They also show that firms in the euro
area have increased their equity issuance since
the advent of the euro. This supports the view
that the euro has lowered firms’ cost of capital
by enhancing equity market integration and by
eliminating currency risks within the countries
that have adopted the common currency.
Kostas Tsatsaronis (Bank for International
Settlements) and João Santos (Federal
Reserve Bank of New York) made a joint
presentation of the paper “The cost of barriers
to entry. Evidence from the market for
corporate euro bond underwriting”. The paper
shows that the arrival of the euro had an
important impact by reducing the underwriting
fees of international corporate bonds issued in66
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the new currency. The euro brought down the
costs of this funding source to levels similar to
those in the US. This finding is particularly
striking, given the fact that in 1994 the average
fee for bonds denominated in European
currencies was twice the corresponding figure
in the US. The paper also shows that the
reduction in the cost of corporate bond
underwriting was largely due to greater
contestability of the investment banking
business achieved with the introduction of the
euro. Therefore, one can conclude that the costs
of economic barriers to entry in the pre-EMU
market were significant, and their elimination
gave borrowers in the new currency a wider
range of options. A second finding of the paper
is that the elimination of market segmentation
increased the business of the larger
international investment banks, rather than
intensifying the links between euro area
borrowers and bankers from the same country.
This is interpreted as evidence that borrowers
put a greater weight on reputation than on
business relationships in the choice of an
underwriter.
Christian Upper (Deutsche Bundesbank)
acted as discussant. Regarding Blanco’s study,
he questioned the use of the premium of the on-
the-run bond as a proxy for liquidity. The on-
the-run bond, for the German market at least,
does not command a narrow spread, and hence
cannot be considered more liquid than other
bonds. This is likely to introduce some
measurement error in the analysis. Regarding
Santos’ and Tsatsaronis’ paper, Upper
mentioned that gross fees constitute only a part
of the costs of underwriting. This might have
some consequences in the interpretation of the
results, as a reduction in the costs of
underwriting should also include the discount
one actually gets on the market. Issam Hallak
(CFS) questioned whether the increased
demand for euro assets from US investors could
explain the reduction in underwriting costs in
Santos’ and Tsatsaronis’ paper. Marco Pagano
(University of Salerno) asked how many
companies gained access to the bond market for
the first time. In his opinion it would be
interesting to know the difference between
their yield and the normal yield in the same
sector. Santos answered that these are very
interesting questions, but their data set does not
have the detailed information to answer them.
Regarding the effective costs of the
underwriting,  Jan Krahnen (CFS) asked
whether the authors had discussed the issue
with market practitioners, in order to be sure
that competition really happens on the nominal
fees and not on something else outside the data
(similar to what is observed in credit markets).
Tsatsaronis spoke with a representative from
the Association of Bank Underwriters, who
agreed with the basic thrust of the paper, in the
sense that the corporate bond market has
become more competitive in the euro area.
REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SCOPE OF
BANKS AND CREDIT MARKETS
Mark Carey (Fed Board) chaired the session.
Claudia Buch (Kiel Institute of World
Economics, with Gayle de Long) in “Cross-
border bank mergers: What lures the rare
animal?” provides an empirical analysis on
the causes of cross-border bank mergers. The
authors use a novel data set of over 2,300
mergers that took place between 1978 and
2001. They study the impact of country
characteristics such as language, regulation, or
distance, on the likelihood of a merger between
a country pair. They also analyse changes in
merger behaviour over time, and study the
impact of selected regulatory changes on
merger activity. It is found that regulation is a
driving factor behind international mergers. In
particular, their results suggest that banks
operating in more regulated environments are
less likely to be the targets of international
bank mergers. Therefore, the authors conclude
that the lifting of regulatory barriers can spur
growth in cross-border bank mergers. Still,
informational barriers such as distance and
common cultural factors will continue to hold
back merger activity. The paper also provides
evidence that banks from developed countries
tend to take over those from developing
countries. Finally, the results in the paper67
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suggest that during the 1980s, bank mergers
tended to occur between banks from similar
countries, even if those banks were located in
different continents. In the 1990s, as eastern
European and Latin American countries
opened up, banks from western Europe and the
United States began to engage in cross-border,
intra-continental mergers.
Luigi Guiso (Ente Einaudi, with Paola
Sapienza and Luigi Zingales) in “Does local
financial development matter?” studies the
effects of differences in the development of
national financial institutions, when domestic
agents have access to foreign financial
markets. Rather than studying data from
several countries, the authors use Italian data at
provincial level, and argue that the results can
be interpreted as an upper limit to what
integration can achieve. An indicator of local
financial development is constructed, which
reflects the notion that developed financial
markets grant easier access to external funds to
domestic households and firms. By using this
indicator, the authors find that (local) financial
development enhances the probability that an
individual starts his own business, favours
entry, increases competition, and promotes
growth of firms. These results are interpreted
as evidence that even if financial markets
become increasingly integrated, domestic
financial institutions do not become redundant.
Furthermore, as predicted by theory, the results
indicate that large firms are more likely to seek
finance on the international market than
smaller firms. Overall, the results suggest that
local financial development is an important
determinant of the economic success of an area,
even in an environment where there is no
friction between capital movements.
Steven Ongena (Tilburg University, with
Allen Berger, Qinlei Dai, and David Smith),
“To what extent will the banking industry be
globalized? A study of bank nationality and
reach in 20 European nations” argues that the
banking industry may never become fully
globalised, even after adjusting to the full
effects of deregulation, technological progress
and increased cross-border non-financial
activity. The proper question is, rather, to what
extent will the banking industry be globalised?
The paper studies the importance of different
financial service providers (ranging from a
small bank located in the host nation, to a large
global bank in a distant financial centre) for the
provision of cash management to large
multinational corporations. The term cash
management refers to all short-term banking
needs (including liquidity management, short-
term lending, foreign exchange transactions).
The authors, using data on more than 2,000
foreign affiliates of these corporations in each
of 20 European nations, identify two distinct
dimensions of globalisation: bank nationality
and bank reach. The first refers to the location
of a bank’s headquarters. Bank reach refers to
the geographic scope and size of the bank. It is
found that for their local cash management,
most multinational affiliates choose a small,
local institution located in the country in which
the services are demanded, while only a rather
small percentage uses the services of a global
financial institution. Moreover, it is also found
that bank reach is strongly associated with bank
nationality, i.e. firms that use host nation banks
for cash management services are less likely to
use a global bank and more likely to use a local
or regional bank. The findings suggest that the
extent of future globalisation of the banking
industry is limited.
In his discussion, Olivier de Bandt (Banque de
France) emphasised the common theme of all
the papers in the session, namely testing
financial integration at national and/or
international level. The focus is particularly on
credit market integration, and the behaviour of
households and firms. All papers provided
some evidence of potential limits to
globalisation in the banking industry: local
financial institutions will continue to play a
role for domestic markets. Another distinctive
feature of the three papers is the use of novel
data sets. Concerning the paper by Buch, he
remarked that mergers are only one way to
penetrate a foreign market. To obtain a measure
of financial integration, other strategies such as68
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the number of foreign branches or subsidiaries
should be taken into account. One criticism
raised was the pooling of acquiring and
targeted banks in the sample. On the paper by
Guiso, de Bandt encouraged the authors to
provide a clearer interpretation of the newly
developed financial indicator. He also
criticised the lack of measures for the goodness
of fit in the estimations. Finally, he raised some
doubts about the stability of the results
obtained by Ongena, noting that more details
should be given to explain why variables linked
to eastern Europe were the only ones to be
significant in the empirical results. All in all,
he concluded that the analyses pointed to the
existence of two polar cases, which may be
related to the underlying strategy of clients:
regional banks or global banks.
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LINKAGES
Stijn Claessens (University of Amsterdam)
chaired the session. Lieven Baele (Ghent
University) presented his paper “Volatility
spillover effects in European equity markets:
Evidence from a regime switching model”. He
estimates the magnitude and the time-varying
nature of volatility spillovers from aggregate
European and US equity market indices to 13
local European equity markets. The ultimate
goal is to analyse the fundamental forces
driving volatility in European stock markets.
In the analysis, he allows volatility in the
different European markets to depend on a
purely country-specific shock, a regional
European shock and a global shock from the
US. More specifically, he investigates whether
the process of economic, monetary and
financial integration have fundamentally
altered the sources and intensity of shock
spillovers to individual European stock
markets. He uses a regime switching model to
distinguish between periods of high and low
spillover intensity, and high and low volatility.
He finds these regime switches to be very
important, which implies that shock spillover
intensity varies significantly through time. The
importance of EU shocks increased for most
markets during the 1990s, and has become
important for euro area countries and Denmark.
For countries like Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, the
importance of US shocks is still higher than
those coming from the EU.
Robin Brooks (International Monetary
Fund) presented his joint paper with Marco
Del Negro: “Firm-Level Evidence on
Globalization”. He argued that the degree of
co-movement across national stock markets
has increased dramatically in recent years. The
paper aims at exploring some of the causes
behind this phenomenon. It does so by
constructing a new firm-level data set that
covers monthly stock market data and annual
balance sheet and income statement
information from 1985 to 2002 for about
10,000 companies in 42 developed and
emerging stock markets. The authors find that
the ability of country-specific effects to
explain international variation in asset and
sales growth and returns on assets fell
significantly during the late 1990s, while the
explanatory power of global industry effects
grew and in some cases surpassed that of
country effects. Using this data set, they also
estimate a factor model, which decomposes
firm-level equity returns into a global, a
country-specific, an industry-specific and a
firm-specific component. Compared with the
previous literature, the factor model drops the
assumption that firms have the same exposure
to a given country or industry factor. Their
main finding is that country-specific shocks
play a smaller role in explaining the stock
return variation of firms that are diversified
internationally, while the country-specific
component plays a greater role for companies
that are more domestically oriented.
Paul Ehling (University of Lausanne)
presented his joint paper with Sofia Ramos
(University of Lausanne) entitled “The EMU
and strategies of asset allocation”. The
authors test two strategies for portfolio
allocation: country versus industry
diversification. They do this by testing whether
a set of industry portfolios can improve the69
ECB
Capital markets and financial integration in Europe
December 2004
ANNEX B
efficient frontier of country portfolios and, vice
versa, whether a set of country portfolios can
improve the efficient frontier constructed from
industry portfolios. They isolate the effects of
EMU by considering different kinds of
samples: euro area countries, European Union
but not EMU countries, and other European
countries. Their results show that since the
introduction of the euro, country portfolios
have provided equally good diversification
opportunities as industry portfolios. However,
mixing both strategies still offers
diversification gains. They do not find
significant differences between euro area
countries and different groups of non-euro area
countries. Therefore, the authors conclude that
either EMU is not responsible for the apparent
shift in the efficient portfolio frontier, or that it
has affected all the countries in Europe,
regardless whether they have joined EMU or
not.
Daniela Klingebiel (World Bank) discussed
Robin Brooks’ presentation. She raised some
doubts about the dependence of the results on
the particular data set used. The data set seems
to be heavily biased towards the U.S. Therefore
it is not clear to what extent the results really
hold across countries and globally. She is
particularly concerned about the situation for
emerging markets. She presented some results
of her own work, showing that during the 1990s
internationalisation in capital raising and
trading in foreign shares grew rapidly,
especially in middle income countries. In the
second part of the discussion, Stijn Claessens
(University of Amsterdam) pointed to the need
in the three papers for a well-defined asset-
pricing model. The papers use a single factor
asset-pricing model, running into the problem
that it becomes impossible to distinguish
between tests for lack of diversification and
tests for lack of integration. Only with a multi-
factor model can one explicitly test for the
sources of financial integration: is a higher
degree of integration the result of financial
convergence, real convergence or similar
concepts of economic policy? Further, he
stressed how these works suffer from being
partial equilibrium models. He pointed towards
a growing body of literature that shows how the
introduction of small transaction costs in a
general equilibrium model of international
asset pricing can generate a large deviation
from the optimal prices. This suggests the
inclusion of stock positions or flow side in
empirical analyses of this kind.
PLENARY PANEL SESSION
Vítor Gaspar (ECB) chaired the last session of
the workshop. In this panel, technical and
political experts were invited to give their
views about the status of the European
financial system and the way forward to
complete integration.
Alberto Giovannini (C.E.O., Unifortune
Asset Management) began his presentation,
“The work of the Giovannini Group and
implications for research”, by recalling the
mandate of the Giovannini Group and the work
it has performed so far. The group was set up
in 1996 and consists of financial market
participants. Its purpose is to advise the
European Commission on financial market
issues. Specifically, the group puts together
financial, economic and legal viewpoints, with
the aim of identifying inefficiencies and
problems in EU financial markets and
proposing possible solutions to increase
market integration. A key area where serious
barriers to integration exist is the clearing and
settlement area. Here, technical impediments,
as well as fiscal and legal cross-border barriers
are still in place. The group’s analysis found
that, as a result of this type of impediment,
cross-border transactions are subject to post-
trading costs 8–10 times higher than those for
domestic transactions. Giovannini argued that
the combination of widespread barriers and
high transaction costs paints a bleak picture of
EU financial markets in the near future. He also
discussed the potential role of policy-makers
in promoting EU financial integration. He
mentioned several problems policy makers
would have in tackling this process, including
powerful special interests, the information70
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disadvantages of policy-makers vis-à-vis
market participants, and the fact that it is hard
to describe and quantify the benefits of
integration. He concluded by raising a number
of questions. These included the impact of
eliminating barriers to integration on
individual national markets, the possibility that
increased integration may be destabilising, and
the role of regulators in an integrated EU
market.
Jesper Berg (Head Capital Markets and
Financial Structure Division, ECB) outlined
the ongoing non-research work of the ECB in
enhancing the Eurosystem’s analysis of
financial structures in the euro area in “The
Eurosystem’s work on euro area financial
structure”. The goal is to produce, within the
next few months, a report that will serve as the
main reference source in this area. A number of
reasons were given for the importance of this
work, including the need to improve the overall
structural analysis, to improve understanding
of the monetary policy transmission process,
and to better understand key determinants of
trends in financial structures. Berg mentioned
that while the Eurosystem has already
produced extensive work on financial structure
in the euro area, the current project focuses on
more general aspects of the euro area financial
structure. The envisaged output of the project is
a publication with 12 country chapters, as well
as a euro area chapter. Each of these chapters
will deal with the specifics of the sources of
financing, the markets/intermediaries, and the
uses of financing in each country and the euro
area. Berg advanced a few preliminary
conclusions that could be drawn from the
work done so far. For example, households
appear to be the main providers of funds
(through intermediaries), and non-financial
corporations are the main recipients of funds in
the euro area. A relatively clear trend in the
financial structure of the euro area is the rapid
internationalisation of the financial sector,
although more so in markets than among
intermediaries. In contrast to these findings,
which seem common across a majority
of countries, there appear to be substantial
differences between countries regarding the
ratio of external to internal financing for non-
financial corporations. Finally, with respect to
the household sector, housing loans seem to be
the major source of financing, although some
important differences between countries exist.
David Wright (Director Internal Market,
European Commission) discussed “The status
of the implementation of the Financial Services
Action Plan”. He described the progress made
to date on the Financial Services Action Plan
(FSAP) and reflected on future issues. The
FSAP, which was adopted in 1999 by the
European Commission, outlines the overall
policy of the EU for achieving integrated
financial markets. Wright reported that
important progress had been made and the work
is currently halfway through. There is
increasing support within the EU for deeper
financial integration, and therefore a growing
need for more resources in order to monitor
progress in the future. Despite the recent
progress in implementing the FSAP, Wright
noted that a large number of important issues
are still outstanding. For example, further work
is required on the Investment Services
Directive, ultimately depending on the choice
of trading structures in the EU. Cross-border
mergers are another important area that needs
further development. In particular, he
highlighted the need for a new directive on
takeovers and for common disclosure rules. He
also mentioned a number of legal issues,
including the need to harmonise and modernise
company law. More work is needed in the area
of settlement and clearing. The main concern at
the moment, according to Wright, relates to
pension funds, where no progress had been
made to date. Specifically, he raised the
question whether Europe’s markets could cope
with future expected pension flows. In the light
of these and other outstanding issues, Wright
discussed some areas where he believes future
research would be particularly valuable. He
mentioned the need for long-term monitoring
systems for the progress of integration in EU
financial markets. The role of EU enlargement
and its possible consequences and benefits was71
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also pointed out. He suggested that the
consequence of tax distortions in capital
markets should be studied more, in order to find
out whether these are important and whether
the market can be expected to circumvent such
distortions by itself. He also highlighted
information issues. Specifically, the potential
role of disclosure externalities and their impact
on market volatility and liquidity should be
investigated further, as well as the trade-off
between efficiency and supervision.
In the general discussion, the question was
raised about the ranking of the importance of
various barriers and impediments for financial
integration in the EU. Giovannini responded
that it is difficult to make a specific ranking of
such barriers. Moreover, he prefers to focus on
ways of disposing of integration impediments,
rather then ranking them. Relating to the
substantially higher cost of cross-border
transactions, as compared with domestic
transactions, Giovannini was asked what he
thought the real implications of this higher cost
were. Giovannini responded that he saw the
high cross-border costs as a prohibitive tariff,
resulting in fewer cross-border transactions
than would otherwise be the case. He expressed
the view that a number of additional market
functions could be carried out and a better
allocation of resources could be achieved if this
barrier were eliminated. Giovannini was asked
how his conclusions will be conveyed. He
responded that the final report will make
proposals on how impediments for market
integration can be eliminated. It will also cover
various legal aspects relating to this.
Furthermore, it will have an analysis of
different financial structures and their
properties with respect to efficiency. Wright
noted that while a large number of problems
have been identified in the area of cross-border
clearing and settlement, domestic clearing and
settlement within each EU country cannot be
described as inefficient. He expressed the view
that the market alone cannot be expected to
solve the current problems associated with
cross-border clearing and settlement, since
these involve legal, competition, and access
issues, among others.
Sirkka Hämäläinen (member of the ECB
Executive Board) delivered the concluding
keynote speech, “Consolidation in the
European securities infrastructure. What is
needed?”. She pointed out how the securities
infrastructure in the euro area remains highly
fragmented. A large number of stock and
derivative exchanges, and several national
clearing and settlement institutions still
survive, despite the consolidation process
triggered by the single currency. In order to
fully reap the benefits of the single currency in
financial markets, this problem must be solved.
The key question she posed is whether the
consolidation process of the securities
infrastructure will proceed without some form
of public involvement. It is true that in a
competitive environment market forces push
for the most efficient solution. But how
competitive is the European securities
infrastructure? And, in any case, will market
pressures be sufficient to overcome existing
national interests? Available analysis of the
business environment for securities trading,
clearing and settlement indicates the existence
of several sources of insufficient competition.
According to Hämäläinen, there are two main
fields in which public action can play a
prominent role: removing obstacles to
consolidation and ensuring an integrated
regulatory and oversight framework. She
concluded her speech by suggesting a few
topics for research: 1) analyse the economic
circumstances under which there is an
argument for public involvement in the
consolidation process itself; 2) what is the
optimal degree of concentration in the
securities industry?; and 3) what is the impact
of the “insourcing” of securities services on the
consolidation of the industry and on the
oversight, supervision and financial stability
functions?
Vítor Gaspar (ECB) closed the workshop,
stressing that the research network will cover72
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three broad topics: 1) European financial
integration; 2) European financial system
structures; and 3) financial linkages between
Europe, the US and Japan. The main purposes
of the network will be to provide a
comprehensive research agenda, provide a
“roadmap” identifying the topics to be covered
in future workshops and conferences,
encourage and facilitate exchanges of data, and
reserve a special role for young researchers.
Young researchers will be invited to submit
research proposals through a call for projects.
The most promising proposals will be selected
and funding will be available. All researchers
involved in the network are expected to
produce original research on relevant topics,
present it at the forthcoming workshops and
conferences, interact with other researchers in
the network, and eventually publish their
research in top academic refereed journals. He
announced that the summary proceedings of the
workshop and the research roadmap of the
network will be made available shortly and
posted on the network website. Dates and
venues of the next workshops will also be
announced on the network website.73
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Day 1 (Tuesday March 11)
8:45-9:15 Welcoming coffee
9:15-9:30 Sinikka Salo (Executive Board Member, Bank of Finland), Opening remarks
9:30-10:15 Steven Ongena (Tilburg University),
Key lecture on the impact of technology and regulation on the geographical
scope of banking activities: theory and evidence
10:15-10:30 Open discussion
10:30-11:00 Coffee break
11:00-13:00 Parallel sessions
Session 1.1: Bank consolidation and its implications
Chair: Rune Stenbacka (Swedish School of Economics, Helsinki)
Emilia Bonaccorsi di Patti (Bank of Italy), Winners or losers: the effects of
banking consolidation on corporate borrowers (with Giorgio Gobbi, Bank of
Italy)
Maria Fabiana Penas (Free University of Amsterdam), Gains in bank mergers:
evidence from the bond markets (with Haluk Unal, Robert H. Smith School of
Business, University of Maryland)
Dag Morten Dalen (Norwegian School of Management), Regulatory
competition and multi-national banking (with Trond E. Olson, Norwegian
School of Economics and Business Administration)
12:30-12:45 Discussant: Jukka Vesala  (ECB)
12:45-13:00 Open discussion
Session 1.2:  European equity markets and corporate governance
Chair: David Mayes (Bank of Finland)
Yrjo Koskinen (Stockholm School of Economics),  The euro is good after all:
corporate evidence (with Arturo Bris, Yale School of Management, and
Matthias Nilsson, Stockholm Institute for Financial Research)
Thomas Gehrig (University of Freiburg), Cross-listings and the geography of
firm’s ownership (with Thierry Foucault, HEC)
Mariassunta Giannetti (Stockholm School of Economics), Which investors
fear expropriation? Evidence from investor stock picking (with Andrei
Simonov, Stockholm School of Economics)
ANNEX D PROGRAM AND SUMMARY OF THE
SECOND WORKSHOP
HOSTED BY THE BANK OF FINLAND IN HELSINKI,
MARCH 11-12, 200375
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12:30-12:45 Discussant: Leo de Haan (Dutch Central Bank)
12:45-13:00 Open discussion
13:00-14:00 Lunch break
14:00-14:45 Tullio Jappelli (University of Salerno)
Key lecture on financial market integration, corporate financing and economic
growth
14:45-15:00 Open discussion
15:00-15:30 Coffee break
15:30-17:30 Parallel sessions
Session 2.1: Financing structure of firms; theory
Chair: Jan Krahnen (Center for Financial Studies)
Xiaoyun Yu (Indiana University), Informational efficiency and liquidity
premium as the determinants of capital structure (with Chung Chan, University
of Minnesota)
Tuomas Takalo (Bank of Finland), Equilibrium in financial markets with
adverse selection (with Otto Toivanen, Helsinki School of Economics)
Thorsten Koeppl (ECB), Limited enforcement and efficient interbank
arrangements (with Jim McGee, University of Western Ontario)
17:00-17:15 Discussant: Leo Kaas (University of Vienna)
17:15-17:30 Open discussion
Session 2.2:  Integration of equity markets
Chair: Harry Huizinga (Tilburg University and Economic Advisor to the
European Commission)
Michael Haliassos (University of Cyprus), Household stockholding in Europe,
Where do we stand and where do we go (with Luigi Guiso, University of Sassari
and Tullio Jappelli, University of Salerno)
Eric Theissen (University of Bonn), Competition between exchanges: Euronext
vs. Xetra (with Maria Kasch-Haroutounian, University of Bonn)
Miguel Angelo Ferreira (ISCTE School of Business), The importance of
industry and country effects in the EMU equity markets (with Miguel Almeida
Ferreira, ISCTE School of Business)76
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17:00-17:15 Discussant: Simone Manganelli (ECB)
17:15-17:30 Open discussion
19:30 Dinner
Benn Steil (Council on Foreign Relations, New York),
Dinner speech on building a transatlantic securities market
Day 2 (Wednesday March 12)
8:00-8:30 Coffee
8:30-9:15 Geert Rouwenhorst (Yale School of Management)
Key lecture on international financial linkages
9:15-9:30 Open discussion
9:30-10:00 Coffee break
10:00-12:00 Session 3: International portfolio choice and asset market linkages
Chair: Philipp Hartmann (ECB)
Helene Rey (Princeton University), Exchange rates, equity prices and capital
flows (with Harald Hau, INSEAD)
Michael Ehrmann (ECB), Interdependence between the euro area and the US:
what role for EMU? (with Marcel Fratzscher, ECB)
Charlotte Ostergaard (Norwegian School of Management), International
diversification in bank asset portfolios (with Claudia Buch, Kiel Institute for
World Economics, and John C. Driscoll, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System)
11:30-11:45 Discussant: Yigal Newman (Stanford School of Business)
11:45-12:00 Open discussion77
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12:00-13:30 Policy panel
The future of exchanges: competition or consolidation?
Moderator: Juha Tarkka (Bank of Finland)
Niall Bohan (European Commission, Brussels)
Peter Gomber (Deutsche Boerse AG, Frankfurt)
Hannu Halttunen (Nordea, Finland)
Andre Went (Euronext, Paris)
13:30-13:45 Vítor Gaspar (ECB), Concluding remarks
13:45-14:45 Lunch78
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On 29-30 April 2002, the European Central
Bank  (ECB) and the Center for Financial
Studies (CFS) hosted a workshop at the ECB to
launch their network initiative aiming at
promoting research on “Capital Markets and
Financial Integration in Europe”. The research
network aims at co-ordinating and stimulating
top-level policy-oriented research that
significantly contributes to the ECB’s
understanding of developments in European
financial structure and the linkages between
European financial systems and those in the
United States and Japan. The format is a
network of people and its key feature is a strong
interaction between researchers in academia,
the ECB, other Eurosystem central banks and
other official institutions. On the basis of the
discussions held during the Launching
workshop regarding the areas where research is
needed, five top priorities areas have been
selected: (1) bank competition and the
geographical scope of banking activities;
(2) international portfolio choices and asset
market linkages between Europe, the United
States and Japan; (3) European bond markets;
(4) European securities settlement systems;
and (5) the emergence and evolution of new
markets in Europe (in particular start-up
financing markets). Subsequent workshops
were designed to cover these different areas.
The second workshop of the network was
hosted by the Bank of Finland in Helsinki on
11-12 March 2003. The main priority areas
analysed in the course of the workshop were (1)
bank competition and the geographical scope
of banking activities; (2) International
portfolio choices and asset market linkages
between Europe, the US, and Japan and (5) the
European equity markets. The workshop
combined research key lectures, research paper
presentations, and a plenary panel discussion
on “The future of exchanges: consolidation or
competition”, that included Niall Bohan
(European Commission, Brussels), Peter
Gomber (Deutsche Boerse AG, Frankfurt),
Hannu Halttunen (Nordea, Finland), and Andre
INTRODUCTION
Went (Euronext, Paris). This document
summarises the second workshop of the
Network.79
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Juha Tarkka (Bank of Finland) welcomed
workshop participants and introduced Sinikka
Salo (member of the Bank of Finland executive
board), who delivered the opening remarks. She
recalled that many of the processes that are
shaping Europe today are closely linked to the
development and working of financial markets.
On the one hand, changes in Europe political
structures are reflected in its financial system.
For example, the most crucial change on our
continent at the present time is the enlargement
of the European Union. The challenge for
financial markets is the collection and transfer of
huge amounts of capital that is needed in the 10
new member states to enable them to catch up
with the living standards of the older member
states. It is most likely that, 10 years into the
future, the European financial markets will in
many respects be quite different from their
current situation. On the other hand,
developments in financial markets have a crucial
impact on how the EU can be renewed and how it
will develop in the years to come. Despite the
successful introduction of the euro and the single
monetary policy, EU financial markets are in
many respects still fragmented and national.
Finally, she recalled the result of several studies
showing that further financial integration can be
expected to have significant positive effects on
growth and increase market efficiency.
KEYNOTE LECTURE ON THE IMPACT OF
TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATION ON THE
GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF BANKING
ACTIVITIES
Juha Tarkka (Bank of Finland) then
introduced  Steven Ongena (Tilburg
University) who addressed two themes in his
key lecture  “The impact of technology and
regulation on the geographical scope of
banking”, (i) the implications of distance and
borders in banking and (ii) the effect of
technology and regulation on these
geographical barriers.
Ongena first clarified the concept of borders.
Economic borders arise endogenously from
information problems due to strategic
behaviour of market participants, e.g.
relationship lending can be seen as a barriers to
entry. Economic borders also have an
exogenous component, such as different
standards of legal origin, corporate governance
practices, supervisory practices, political
systems or languages.
He then reviewed the theory and evidence
related to distances and borders in four areas:
1) spatial pricing and rationing; 2) branching
and servicing; 3) segmentation and 4) entry and
mergers and acquisitions. In the first area,
theories on the effects of transportation costs,
monitoring costs or asymmetric information
predict that loan rates should be positively
related to distance to the closest competitor,
while it should be negatively related to distance
to the lender. These relationships are strongly
supported by the empirical evidence.
Regarding the second area “branching and
servicing”, Ongena reported that there is little
support that the strategy of banks to open
branches is affected by distance. Related
segmentation, there is convincing evidence
that banks over-invest domestically. The
existence of country-specific credit risk or the
fact that foreign banks may not be in a better
position than local lenders to extend credit to
borrowers than local lenders might explain this
fact. Regarding the fourth area, entry and
M&As, Ongena reported that cross-border
bank M&As are less frequent than cross-border
M&As in other industries or than M&As
between domestic banks. So borders are a
significant impediment to bank M&As.
Finally, on strategies of entry, the evidence is
mixed. Contrary to banks in the US, banks in
Germany e.g. appear to adopt a “follow-your-
customer” strategy. However, it seems
accepted in the literature that lower efficiency
in banking activities is related to borders and
not to distance.
Ongena then elaborated on the likely impact of
technology and regulation on distance and
borders, still focusing on the four areas listed
above. Regarding pricing, new technology like
on-line banking should spur competition thus
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reducing loan rates. However there is only little
evidence that this is the case. Indeed, there are
two forces at work. A better access to
information has a negative effect on loan rates,
but an improved ability to process information
increases loan rates and bank profits.
Regarding rationing, banks should face
increased competition from capital markets,
which might induce banks to lend across larger
distance. Ongena presented empirical support
for this claim, showing that the estimated
distance between banks and lender increased in
Belgium and in the US. Regulation has a larger
impacts on areas 3) and 4). In particular,
Ongena reported that while the integration of
the EU wholesale capital market was achieved,
there is still a long way to go in order to
integrate the retail loan market. In particular,
contrary to the US, the distance at which banks
lend internationally has not increased in
Europe. As a bottom line, while regulatory
“borders” in the EU have been removed, the
exogenous economic borders remain very
strong. Against this background, Ongena drew
two main policy implications. First, it appears
warranted  to facilitate cross-borders M&As
using for instance pro-active competition
policies. Second, it appears necessary to reflect
on the current status of the regulatory
framework, which might not be able to deal
with complex corporate structure arising from
cross-borders M&As.
In the discussion, Thomas Gehrig (University
of Freiburg) asked whether Hotelling’s
framework – a theory to analyse the choice of
location as part of a competitive strategy –
could be used to understand the pattern of bank
branching in Europe. In his view, an increase in
distance has a negative effect on the number of
branches opened and he invited the authors to
explore the interaction between information
and market structure effects. Ongena
responded that he and his co-author Hans
Degryse (Tilburg University) did not explore
yet the essence of local competition in Europe
but suggested that, to do so, it would be
necessary to explore the identity of banks that
are located nearby the lending institution.
Philipp Hartmann (ECB) then asked the
authors to elaborate further on the future of
bank supervision in Europe. In Ongena’s view,
supervision should become more integrated at
the European level so as to build up expertise as
European M&As proceed. At the same time
national supervisors should be maintained.
Regarding the impact of technology on banking
activities, Jukka Vesala (ECB) stressed that
the amount of loans granted by online banks is
low, possibly because of the informational
disadvantage these banks face. However,
Vesala wondered whether these banks will
become more serious competitors when they
will be able to receive deposits. Ongena replied
that ultimately technology will have an effect
on the competitiveness of online banks, but he
also emphasised that it will become more
difficult for them to compete when they will
engage in cross-border activities. Juha Tarkka
(Bank of Finland) invited the author to
elaborate further on the interaction between the
exploitation of economies of scale and
technological progress in banking. In his view,
because of the possibility to outsource many
operations, size does not really matter any
more. On this matter, Ongena referred to the
US experience where small banks outsource
many activities to information technology
providers but retain some aspects of their
business such as lending activities. The same
process is taking place in Europe, although at a
much slower pace. Then the authors were asked
to be more precise why they regard
transportation costs as important, given new
technologies. Degryse replied that in his view,
transportation costs are important for the
decision to take a loan as well as for the ease
with which a loan can be monitored. He also
emphasised that transportation costs are
related to “informational distance”. Finally,
the authors were asked their views on the
likelihood of a pan-European retail market.
Degryse answered that so far there is no
empirical evidence that retail markets become
pan-European. Hartmann further commented
that progresses on the retail side are limited on
a European-wide level because of the
exogenous borders underlined by Ongena.81
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There are some inherent limits to the
integration of retail business, some of which
may be impossible to overcome.
SESSION 1.1 BANK CONSOLIDATION AND ITS
IMPLICATION
The session was chaired by Rune Stenbacka
(Helsinki Swedish School of Economics). The
first paper, “Winners or losers? The effect of
banking consolidation on corporate
borrowers”, was presented by Emilia
Bonaccorsi di Patti (Bank of Italy) (co-author
Giorgio Gobbi, Bank of Italy). The paper uses a
rich dataset on Italian firms and banks to
investigate borrowing and lending behaviour.
The paper investigates the impact of bank
M&As from borrowers’ perspective, contrary
to the prevalent approach in the literature that
concentrates on the perspective of merging
banks. The main question is whether bank
M&As change borrowers’ credit availability
and investment capability because of a loss of
information in relationship-based lending. The
authors suggest that small firms with few bank
relations or high risk firms could be most
affected because of the dissipation of
information in bank M&As and the following
restructuring of the organisation. However, the
main conclusion of the paper is negative: None
of the different classes of borrowers are
adversely affected – not even the smallest or
weakest firms, or firms most dependent on few
banks.
The second paper, “Gains in bank mergers:
Evidence from the bond markets”, was
presented by Maria Penas (Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam) (co-author Haluk Unal,
University of Maryland). The paper documents
significant effects of US bank M&As on the
concerned banks’ bond returns and spreads.
Thus the authors conclude that banks are
different from non-financial firms as firms’
spreads are typically not affected by M&As.
The paper then analyses the determinants of the
positive bond returns and lower spreads
associated with bank M&A-announcements.
The main findings are that increasing risk
diversification increases returns and lowers
spreads as default risk is reduced. The most
striking finding is that the incremental size-
increase of the new banking organisations is a
significant factor. Notably, return increases
and spread reductions mainly occur for
medium-sized banks that become sufficiently
large through consolidation. If medium-sized
banks grow large enough (and become too-big-
to-fail), banks’ bond-holders will expect a
bailout by public authorities in case of trouble
to be more likely and thus they will demand a
lower risk premium.
The last paper of the session was presented by
Peik Granlund (Finnish Financial
Supervisory Authority), “Economic evaluation
of bank exit regimes in the US, EU and
Japanese financial centres”.  The paper
documents the legal frameworks for bank
protection and creditor rights in the different
financial centres and studies then the impact of
these legal features on banks’ bond spreads.
Banks’ cost of funds should be the lower the
greater creditor protection and the higher bank
bailout probability, as the risk premium would
be lower. The paper also investigates the
impact of shareholder protection on bank asset
growth and predicts a positive relationship.
The main conclusion is that banks seem to
enjoy lower spreads in more “protected”
regimes. The evidence as regards asset growth
is ambiguous.
Jukka Vesala (ECB) discussed the three
papers. He noted on the first paper that it would
help to articulate the underlying welfare
analysis more clearly. In particular, the paper
seems to focus on how producers’ surplus is
affected by bank M&A and what factors
determine how this is shared between
customers and the bank. But it is not
immediately clear how the focus on borrowers
fits into this. In addition, it would be
worthwhile analysing further why
consolidation should be an important influence
on bank-customer relations. Finally, some
suggestions were made about using two-stage
estimation techniques, inclusion of non-82
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performing loans, and robustness checks
concerning the measurement of “firm quality”.
Regarding the second paper, Vesala warned
against interpreting too sharply the
implications for the too-big-to-fail problem.
Under a full bailout expectations banks’
spreads would be zero (or amount only to the
liquidity premium), but in the sample, banks’
have significantly positive spreads (on average
90 basis points in the US) and the impact of
M&As is found at most at 16 basis points.
Another major suggestion was that since
finance theory predicts bond spreads to be non-
linearly related to default probability, spreads
should remain stable and close to zero for large
intervals and only react significantly relatively
close to the default point. Against this
background, the relatively large spread
reductions found for targets could suggest that
these banks were in a relatively weak condition
(and therefore targets) and this could be
usefully studied further. Comments on the last
paper largely focused on the empirical
analysis. Especially, the measurement of
financial assistance probability is quite
judgmental. Rating agencies’ “support ratings”
(measuring exactly the bailout probability by
public authorities or parent financial
organisations) could be used to increase
objectivity. Moreover, the credit spread (and
asset growth) analysis should preferably be
based on a larger sample of banks and on
instruments that are sufficiently liquid. It
should also be extended to multivariate
regressions (including bank-specific risk and
other determinants, market-specific factors).
SESSION 1.2 EUROPEAN EQUITY MARKETS
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The session was chaired by David Mayes
(Bank of Finland). The first speaker Yrjo
Koskinen  (Stockholm School of Economics),
presented the paper “The euro is good after all:
corporate evidence” (co-authored with Arturo
Bris, Yale School of Management and Matthias
Nilsson, Stockholm Institute for Financial
Research). The objective of the paper is to
determine the effects of the euro on corporate
behaviour since its introduction in 1997. The
analysis relies on  data at the firm level from
1995 to 2000, from 10 EU countries that
adopted the Euro, 3 EU countries that did not
join EMU, as well as Norway and Switzerland.
The authors analyse firms’ valuation and
investments in the sample. Large firms in EMU
countries increased in value, as measured by
Tobin’s Q, especially those in countries that
experienced currency crises. In itself this is not
enough to show the positive effect of the euro
as investment opportunities could also have
improved. However, the authors’ view is that
better investment opportunities were created
by the single market, much before the advent of
the euro. Given the assumption that all firms
face similar investment opportunities, one
should observe that firms with reduced cost of
capital would invest relatively more. Indeed,
the authors find that the introduction of the
euro had a positive effect on investments of
firms in the euro area. This justifies the claim
that the cost of financing decreased due to the
introduction of the single currency. However
the authors emphasised that the introduction of
the single currency implied the adoption of a
single monetary policy. Some firms could be
adversely affected by asymmetric inflation
shocks among EMU countries, which  are
impossible to overcome when a single
monetary policy is used. This effect could have
driven the cost of capital up. In this regard,
increased capital markets integration is key in
order to improve risk sharing opportunities in
Europe. Hence, the authors reached the
conclusion that the introduction of the euro has
lowered firms’ cost of capital by further
increasing capital markets integration in
Europe and by eliminating currency risks
among the countries that joined EMU.
Thomas Gehrig (University of Freiburg)
presented the paper “Cross-listings and the
geography of firm’s ownership”, co-authored
with Thierry Foucault (HEC). The objective of
this theoretical paper is to propose another
explanation for the increased cross-listings of
European stocks in the US. The authors argue
that cross-listing is a mechanism through83
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which market information is generated. They
consider a framework with two types of
shareholders: sophisticated shareholders who
can engage in multi-market trading and
unsophisticated shareholders who exclusively
trade in their domestic markets. Shareholders
might have private information on the value of
a firm. A firm facing the option to go public
might choose to cross-list or not, may choose to
allocate equities between different class of
shareholders. Cross-listing creates market
segmentation. This segmentation reduces
market liquidity for a firm’s shares. But the
authors show that it also forces informed
investors to trade larger quantities overall. As a
consequence, prices reveal more of the
information possessed by informed investors.
Therefore a firm faces a trade-off  between
liquidity and information. The benefits of
cross-listing are maximal if the allocation of
equities is judicious. In particular, firms must
allocate shares to unsophisticated investors in
both markets so as to create the information
effect. An interesting consequence of the
analysis is that firms and exchanges would not
necessarily benefit from market integration. As
the trade-off vanishes with markets
integration, firms will loose the informational
benefits of cross-listing. As a consequence,
revenues of exchanges from listings will
diminish. Hence, firms and exchanges might
oppose further markets integration.
Mariassunta Giannetti (Stockholm School of
Economics) presented the paper “Which
investors fear expropriation? Evidence from
stock picking”, co-authored with Andrei
Simonov (Stockholm School of Economics).
This paper investigates whether investors take
firms’ corporate governance into account in
their investment decision. To this end, the
authors use a data set that provides
comprehensive information on almost all
stockholders of companies listed on the
Swedish stock market. They find that fears of
expropriation in companies where the
extraction of private benefits is expected to be
greater, discourage investors who enjoy only
security benefits from buying shares. Their
analysis relies on the ratio of control to cash
flow rights of the principal shareholder. This
ratio is expected to be positively correlated
with the extraction of private benefits by a firm
and is therefore used as a proxy for bad
governance. The authors find that this ratio
matters, in the sense that the overall impact of a
marginal change in the ratio for a specific firm
on the probability that investors buy the stock
of this firm is negative and significant. The
effect of improved corporate governance is
found to be stronger for sophisticated
investors, like financial institution and foreign
investors, while large domestic investors and
individuals who are board members, do not
base their investment decisions on corporate
governance grounds. Hence, the authors find
that corporate governance is an important
factor in order to understand portfolio choices
across countries.
Leo de Haan (Dutch Central Bank) acted as
discussant. Regarding the Bris, Koskinen and
Nilsson paper, he questioned the result on the
ground that Tobin’s Q for non-EMU countries
decreased substantially in the early 1990s, as
they had been hit by a severe currency crisis.
He argued that in the aftermath of such a crisis,
the authors crude control for this event might
not take into account all of its consequences.
He also called for further explanation on why
the difference between EMU and non-EMU
countries’ Q is only significant until 1997.
Finally he questioned the finding that the euro
effect on Q appears in 1998 and is non-
recurrent and wondered why this is the case.
Regarding Foucault and Gehrig’s paper, de
Haan asked whether listing fees and trading
revenues could be set in such a way as to restore
investors’ incentives to promote financial
integration, instead of imposing regulation. He
also wondered how firms would do in practice
to allocate the proper amount of shares to
unsophisticated investors. Finally, given the
recent progress made in facilitating access to
exchanges, he enquired about the future of
cross-listings should unsophisticated
shareholders disappear. Regarding Gianetti
and Simonov’s paper, de Haan found it84
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surprising that the median investor holds
stocks from only a single firm. He questioned
the methodology on the ground that private
investors hold stocks mainly indirectly through
mutual funds, which are assimilated in the
paper to financial institutions. From the floor,
it was asked whether the results of Bris,
Koskinen and Nilsson’s paper are robust to
different specifications of Tobin’s Q. On this
question, Koskinen replied that they did not
perform any robustness checks yet. Also he
clarified that the euro effect on Q is not
temporary. Rather this effect is permanent and
does not revert after 1998. In his reply to de
Haan, Gehrig expressed the opinion that
regulation is unlikely to provide the right
incentives as long as benefits from cross-
listing are present. Although he reckoned that
the absence of unsophisticated investors would
change the results, as this would eliminate
any incentives of firms to cross-list. However,
he pointed out that the assumption of having
some investors tied to a specific market is
reasonable. Finally, Gianetti pointed out that
many empirical studies show that small
investors with brokerage account in the US
hold one stock or a few stocks only.
KEYNOTE LECTURE ON FINANCIAL MARKET
INTEGRATION, CORPORATE FINANCING AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH
Jan Krahnen (CFS) introduced Tullio
Jappelli (University of Salerno) who lectured
about “Financial market integration,
corporate financing and economic growth”.
His talk was based on a report prepared by the
Center for Economic Policy Research for the
European Commission by himself, Luigi
Guiso, Mario Padula and Marco Pagano. The
aim of the report is to determine the gains from
economic integration, the potential losers and
winners at the country and sector level. First
Jappelli reviewed the evidence on the link
between financial development and growth. He
concluded that financial development of a
country benefits more industries with high
dependence on external financing relative to
those using internal cash flow. Then he
exposed reasons why financial integration
might promote financial development. He
highlighted three main channels. Bank mergers
and increased competition facilitate access to
funds. Regulation might be improved and
financial integration might give laggard
countries access to financial markets.
However, he pointed out that the full effect of
financial integration on financial development
might be limited by the lack of convergence of
institutions or of their operation. In particular,
he emphasised that setting rules is of little help
unless they are well enforced. In addition, he
stressed the difficulty for foreign banks to
penetrate the local credit markets, which is the
ones that matter for most firms. In order to
empirically determine the effect of financial
integration on growth, the authors use an
international industry-level panel of 49
countries covering the period 1981 to 1995.
They regress the growth in value-added in a
given country and sector on three explanatory
variables. 1) Financial development, defined
alternatively as the combination of financial
activity  (private credit over GDP) or the size of
the financial sector (private credit plus market
capitalisation), multiplied with an indicator of
financial dependence (the degree of external
financing for each sector). If all countries were
fully integrated the effect of this variable
would be nil, because national (or local)
financial development should not matter for the
growth of national firms, whatever their
dependence on external finance. 2) A proxy for
financial efficiency, measured by an index of
accounting standards, is used as instrumental
variable for financial development. 3) Some
country-specific and sector-specific control
variables and fixed effects. The authors find
that the coefficient of interaction between
financial dependence and financial
development is positive and stable over time.
Furthermore, accounting standards matter for
growth. Results are similar for the period after
1991. Hence, Jappelli concluded that further
promotion of financial integration is warranted
as integration was only partial in the 1990s.
Based on these estimates, Jappelli then
presented the results of simulations of the85
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impact of financial integration in Europe.
There, two alternatives definition of
integration have been used. Financial
integration is either defined as a convergence
of European financial development to the level
of the US, or as convergence toward the level of
the best country in Europe. In the first case, the
impact of financial integration is a 1 percentage
point gain in EU GDP growth, while it is 0.75
percentage points in the second case. Jappelli
stressed that these numbers are lower bounds,
as the effect of financial integration on service
sectors was not considered. Furthermore he
pointed out that countries that are already
financially developed will benefit less from
further integration, while in countries that are
less financially developed, the financial sector
will in all likelihood lose market shares and
profits.
In the discussion, Jappelli was asked to clarify
whether state subsidies were taken into account
in the measures of financial development or
financial integration. Jappelli answered that
the use of country and sector dummies should
take care of this issue. Juha Tarkka (Bank of
Finland) asked whether transportation costs
and informational barriers were a limit to
financial integration and wondered whether
these barriers could be removed by regulation.
Jappelli replied that some determinants of
financial development can be modified by
policy makers. He reiterated that the main
difficulty resides in the implementation of
rules rather than in their adoption. Jan Krahnen
(CFS) wondered if the fact that the US has a
financial system which relies more on financial
markets relative to Europe can influence the
results. Jappelli answered that it is not clear
whether the composition between market-
based and bank-based finance matters for
growth. Rather, the overall size of financial
markets seems to be more important. Finally,
an alternative approach was suggested from the
floor, that would use fewer countries but longer
time-series so as to verify that the results are
not driven by time-series effects. Jappelli
reckoned that the analysis would be useful
although difficult to carry out. For instance, he
mentioned the fact that a time-series analysis
would require time-dependent indicators for
factors related to financial development and to
financial integration. Furthermore, analysing
fewer countries would necessarily add noise to
the data.
SESSION 2.1 FINANCING STRUCTURE OF
FIRMS; THEORY
Jan Krahnen (Centre for Financial Studies)
chaired the session. The first paper of the
session, “Informational efficiency and
liquidity premium as the determinants of
capital structure” by Chung Chang (University
of Minnesota) and Xiaoyun Yu (University of
Indiana), analysed the optimal capital structure
of firms when the firm’s debt and equity is
traded on secondary markets. A firm initially
decides to finance a project by issuing debt and
equity. Both instruments are traded later
among two types of investors that choose
whether to trade in the market for equities or
bonds: traders that use private – and unknown
to the firm - information concerning the value
of the project and traders that are uninformed
but need to obtain liquidity. At this stage, the
firm uses information that is revealed through
prices to decide whether to liquidate or finalise
the project. Yu emphasised that the leverage
decision of a firm determines not only how well
prices will reflect private information
concerning the project value, but also how
many liquidity traders are participating in the
equity market. On the one hand, increasing
leverage makes equity more sensitive to
information and, hence, increases the profit of
informed traders. On the other hand it reduces
the amount of liquidity trading in equity
thereby lowering profits for informed traders.
Based on this trade-off the authors derive the
following results. First, the optimal leverage is
such that debt is not any longer default-free, but
not so risky as to induce informed trading in the
bond market. Hence, there is only a default
premium on debt when issued but no liquidity
premium that compensates bondholders for
losses due to informed trading. Second, since
all informed trading takes place in the stock86
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market, at the optimal level of debt stock prices
reveal the maximum amount of information,
while the liquidity premium, required to
protect against informed trading, is minimised.
Finally, over-leveraged firms will not be able
to obtain information from securities prices
efficiently, and, hence, excessive debt can
involve costs beyond the costs associated with
financial distress.
The second speaker, Tuomas Takalo (Bank of
Finland) also emphasised the importance of
private information for optimal financial
decisions by firms in his paper “Equilibrium in
financial markets with adverse selection”
(joint with Otto Toivanen, Helsinki School of
Economics). The authors look at a standard
financing problem with adverse selection.
There are two types of entrepreneurs either
having a project with positive or negative net
return. When entrepreneurs have access to
funds from outside the economy, this unlimited
supply of funds leads to low interest rates and
inefficient pooling equilibria with over-
investment in projects. The authors depart from
this benchmark by allowing entrepreneurs to
invest their own funds. Entrepreneurs are then
also investors in the sense that they face an
initial choice whether to use their wealth to
finance their own or somebody else’s project.
The scarcity of funds leads to an increase in the
interest rate at which projects get financed. For
certain parameter values, this increase in the
interest rate allows to screen for entrepreneurs
with good projects and, hence, allows to re-
establish efficient outcomes in form of
separating equilibria. Within these equilibria,
the mode of finance is equity if the average
quality of projects is high and debt otherwise.
Finally, Takalo stressed that the model has
some counter-intuitive implications as far as
increases in wealth are concerned. First, when
wealth increases inefficient equilibria become
more likely since the supply of funds is
abundant. Second, while equity is only used to
finance good projects in wealth constrained
economies, increases in wealth make equity the
choice of finance for bad projects.
The final paper of the section, “Limited
enforcement and efficient inter-bank
arrangements” by Thorsten Koeppl (ECB)
and James MacGee (University of Western
Ontario), puts forward limited enforcement of
contracts as an explanation of financial
arrangements rather than private information.
Starting from some stylised empirical evidence
on co-operative arrangements between banks
in contemporary Germany and the historic US,
the authors try to assess whether banks can
mutually insure against their asset risk even if
there are no formal institutions to enforce
insurance transfers. In the model, banks face
two types of risk. The liability side of a bank’s
balance sheet is affected by random withdrawal
demands from depositors. Furthermore, banks
face default risk on their loan portfolios with
the aggregate size of default being stochastic.
Koeppl first pointed out that it is the interaction
between both types of risk that enables banks to
overcome limited enforcement. In the absence
of liquidity risk, insurance against asset risk is
not feasible since – in the absence of
enforcement – a bank that is called upon to
make a transfer has no incentive to do so after
the risk has materialised. When banks face
liquidity risk, however, the threat of being
excluded from liquidity provision when failing
to make a transfer is enough to enforce partial
risk sharing. The amount of risk sharing here
depends on the correlation between the two risk
factors with a negative correlation fostering
risk sharing. In the second part of his
presentation, Koeppl demonstrated that a
competitive market for liquidity can not
provide this insurance. While the price
mechanism is able to channel liquidity
efficiently between banks, it can never exploit
the correlation between the shocks to allow for
self-enforcing insurance arrangements
between banks. Finally, Koeppl stressed the
co-existence of liquidity provision and asset
insurance in the empirical examples. While
interpreting this fact as supporting evidence for
the paper, he emphasised, however, that the
findings of the paper go beyond the narrow
focus on inter-bank arrangements and apply
more generally.87
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Leo Kaas (University of Vienna) discussed the
papers. He saw the strength of the paper by Yu
in combining an optimal choice of financial
instruments with a friction arising from later
trade in secondary markets. He wondered,
however, how robust the findings were with
respect to the informational assumptions made
in the model. Traders can observe prices only in
the market where they trade, while the firm is
able to observe both prices. Furthermore, when
debt or equity are issued traders are not yet
informed while they are potentially informed
later. Regarding the paper by Takalo, Kaas
expressed concerns about the interpretation of
the model in light of financial development.
According to him, financial market integration
– via enhanced access to markets – lowers
financing costs and should per se have positive
welfare effects in general. Kaas attributed the
detrimental effect of a wealth increase in spite
of lower financing costs to the particular model
of adverse selection used. For the paper
presented by Koeppl, Kaas appreciated the
novel approach used to model and analyse
interactions between the asset and liability side
of banks’ balance sheets. He pointed out,
however, that – due to risk-neutrality and the
timing of the model – one should not use the
term “insurance”, but rather “ex-post trade”.
Furthermore, he asked Koeppl whether the
inefficiency of markets arouse only from the
fact that banks are required to be solvent when
trading on the market for liquidity.
In her response Yu pointed out that modeling
information acquisition – possibly in a
dynamic setting – could help to address the
comments, but was likely to increases the
complexity of the model tremendously. When
Elena Carletti (University of Mannheim)
remarked that the liquidation decision should
not be carried out by the firm, but rather by
investors, Yu stressed that it would be difficult
to introduce an agency problem within the
existing framework and that it was not clear
how results would change. Finally, Koeppl
explained that the solvency constraint for
banks in the market for liquidity is precisely
modelled to mimic the enforcement problem of
co-operative arrangements between banks.
This fact allowed for a sensible comparison
between different forms of liquidity provision.
Thomas Gehrig (University of Freiburg)
mentioned that the inefficiency of markets is
seemingly driven by the fact that prices are
restricted to be linear and that more general
pricing structures are potentially able to
implement efficiency via competitive markets.
SESSION 2.2 INTEGRATION OF EQUITY
MARKETS
The session was chaired by Harry Huizinga
(Tilburg University and European
Commission). The first speaker, Michael
Haliassos (University of Cyprus), presented
the paper “Household stockholdings in Europe.
Where do we stand and where do we go?” (co-
authored with Luigi Guiso, University of
Sassari and Tullio Jappelli, University of
Salerno). Haliassos started by documenting
how the 1990’s witnessed a significant increase
in households’ stock market participation in all
major European countries and in the United
States. Despite this common trend, persistent
differences across countries remain, with the
U.S., the British and Swedish households
having considerable more participation than
French, German and Italian ones. The key
contribution of the paper is to explain how
differences in stock market participation and
stockholdings across countries can be
attributed to households’ characteristics, such
as age, income, wealth and education. The main
finding is that there is a positive correlation
between the participation decision on the one
hand and wealth and education on the other
hand. However, wealth and education have
only a small effect on the portfolio shares of
stocks, among those households who do
participate in the stock market. The authors
argue that different participation rates are
consistent with the international pattern of
entry costs. More specifically, countries with
lower transaction and information costs are
those with higher participation rates. In
addition, since the lowering of such costs
brings into the markets less sophisticated88
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investors, the authors argue that this could
induce greater volatility in stock markets. For
example by reacting excessively to market
signals because of limited sophistication or
because of limited ability to withstand
financial pressure. This should prompt a
discussion about policies that could mitigate
these concerns, such as improving the access to
accurate financial information and ensuring
sufficient financial education to newcomers.
Eric Theissen (University of Bonn) presented
the paper “Competition between exchanges:
Euronext versus Xetra”, co-authored with
Maria Kasch-Haroutounian. The motivation for
the paper is that many exchanges in Europe may
soon face the decision to join one of the two
dominating continental European trading
systems, Euronext and Xetra. Euronext is a
common trading platform that originated from
the merger of exchanges in Amsterdam,
Brussels, Paris and (in 2002) Lisbon. Xetra,
instead, is the electronic trading system of the
Deutsche Börse AG, recently adopted by
Austria and Ireland. It is plausible to expect that
a factor leading to further consolidation of
exchanges in Europe should be the quality of
these markets, the more efficient ones having an
advantage over the others. The paper analyses
one of these factors, namely the execution costs
in Xetra and Euronext. The comparison is made
with a sample of 40 pairs of stocks, matched by
market capitalisation, trading volume and
volatility. Each pair consists of one French
stock traded on Euronext Paris and one German
stock traded in Xetra. The main finding of the
paper is that, although there are no significant
differences in quoted spreads, effective spreads
and their components as well as the realised
spread and the adverse selection component
are lower in Germany. Neither differences in
the number of liquidity provision agreements
(i.e. the existence of sponsors or liquidity
providers for stocks), nor differences in the
minimum tick size can explain the higher
execution costs in Euronext. The authors
conclude that investors in Euronext are less
protected against informed traders, and that
Euronext offers lower operational efficiency.
Miguel Almeida Ferreira (ISCTE School of
Business) presented the paper “The importance
of industry and country effects in the EMU
equity markets”, co-authored with Miguel
Angelo Ferreira (ISCTE School of Business).
This paper uses the methodology developed by
Heston and Rouwenhorst to test the relative
importance of country effects versus industry
effects in the euro area. This is relevant for
financial integration, because when previously
segmented markets start to integrate, gains
from diversification through a country-based
approach should decrease with respect to those
one could obtain through a sector-based
approach. Using a sample of 10 industry
indices and 11 EMU countries, the authors find
that country effects still dominate over
industry effects. However, although over the
whole sample country effects have been
relatively more important in determining
equity returns, the evolution of the national and
global effects through time reveals an
increasing relative importance of industry
effects. In particular, in the last sub-sample
period 1999-2001, industry effects are
becoming similar in size to country effects. A
comparison with 5 non-EMU European
countries shows that the increasing importance
of industrial influences is not limited to EMU
countries.
The discussant Simone Manganelli (ECB)
stressed how the three contributions of this
session could be viewed as different pieces of
evidence of ongoing financial integration in the
euro area. The paper by Haliassos – by looking
at households’ portfolio composition – shows
that country dummies still explain households’
decisions, after controlling for their age,
income, wealth and education. Manganelli
suggested to extend the time series of the data
set, and to look at how these results evolve over
time. Regarding the paper by Theissen, he
criticised the use of number of traded shares as
a proxy for traded volume, which is
subsequently used as a matching criterion for
French and German stocks. According to this
proxy, the same company would double its
trading volume after a 1:2 stock split. This is89
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obviously inadequate and casts some doubts on
the reliability of the results. The results of the
paper by Ferreira are difficult to interpret in the
light of financial integration, because
relationships in equity markets are highly time-
varying and therefore it is difficult to
disentangle cyclical movements from
structural changes. Philipp Hartmann (ECB)
asked whether the spreads in Theissen’s paper
were computed using daily or intra-day data, as
different definitions might produce very
different results. Theissen clarified that the
daily spreads are computed as averages of
intra-day spreads. He admitted the limitation of
the number of traded shares as a proxy for
trading volume. He speculated however that
this is unlikely to affect the results because the
descriptive statistics show that there are no
significant differences among the different
groups of stocks. Haliassos replied that the data
available for the United States as of 2001 show
a slight increase in stock market participation,
thus confirming the trend outlined in the paper.90
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KEYNOTE LECTURE ON INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL LINKAGES
Philipp Hartmann (ECB) introduced Geert
Rouwenhorst (Yale School of Management)
who gave a key lecture on “International
financial linkages”.  The main objective of his
talk was to illustrate the effects of globalisation
and integration on financial linkages. He first
recalled the common wisdom that globalisation
and integration of markets accentuate financial
linkages. As business cycles are more likely to
be synchronised, policies and institutions will
be more co-ordinated so that asset prices will
move together. Furthermore, integration
should go together with a decrease in the “home
bias” of investors and the globalisation of
firms. All these effects will accentuate
financial linkages. However, other factors that
are due to further integration are likely to
temper financial linkages. Among others,
Rouwenhorst mentioned the greater
specialisation of countries which might favour
sector-related business cycles. In addition,
globalisation expands the set of investment
opportunities, which might allow greater
diversification and insurance. Also,
competition among exchanges might foster
greater efficiency. Overall, he concluded that
the net effect of greater globalisation and
integration on financial linkages is unknown.
Next Rouwenhorst presented empirical
evidence on the evolution of financial linkages.
He first presented a time-series plot of the
average correlation of four markets (France,
Germany, UK and US – the “core countries”)
from 1870 to 2000, which shows that there is a
general increase in correlation, but that the
correlation is generally very low (below 0.6).
He explained that this could not be the result of
perfectly diversified markets, as the
correlation between two diversified portfolios
is around 0.98. Furthermore using  pair-wise
correlation over time, he showed that the
average correlation is generally higher in
periods where markets are integrated than
when they are segmented.
DAY 2
Rouwenhorst then addressed the role of
emerging markets in financial linkages. He
showed that emerging markets have two
effects. First, they lower the overall correlation
between markets, as they are typically less
correlated to existing non-emerging markets.
Second, they increase the investment
opportunity set for investors. The overall effect
of emerging markets is an increase of
diversification opportunities, as measured by
the ratio of the market portfolio volatility over
the average market volatility. How do
correlations change as a consequence of
globalisation? Rouwenhorst presented
evidence that the country effect is still very
large. In a globally integrated market, firms’
location should not matter, i.e. from prices and
returns it should be impossible to tell a firms’
location. However, where firms are located
seems to still matter more than what they
actually produce, although there is evidence
that, in Europe, industry effects are gaining
some importance. Rouwenhorst concluded his
talk by saying that, although the world is not
yet fully globalised, there is some ground to
believe that international linkages are
becoming stronger. He also pointed out that the
expansion of the opportunity set should give
some compensation for investor who seek
diversification.
In the general discussion, Rouwenhorst was
asked whether the “home bias” of investors
will decrease in the long run. Rouwenhorst
answered that the home bias was extreme
because of restrictions imposed on financial
institutions. He added that even if these
barriers were removed, he expected the home
bias to persist, as he suspects behavioural
biases can never be overcome. Helene Rey
(Princeton University) pointed out that one
difficulty of sharing risks further is that it is
difficult to create new markets, such as markets
for bonds indexed on GDP. She then asked why
markets were so difficult to create.
Rouwenhorst replied that a successful market
must have demand and supply. Hence, the
willingness of an institution to create a market91
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is not sufficient, as it must generate enough
trades for the market to survive. Jan Krahnen
(CFS) questioned the assumption that the “core
countries” in 1870 are identical to the ones in
2000 and asked whether changing the
definition of “core countries” would affect the
result. Rouwenhorst acknowledged that this
would be a concern if average returns were
analysed. However, since average correlations
are looked at, the selection bias is not a concern
here. Hartmann remarked that European
government bond holdings by non residents
had increased by 10-20 percentage points in the
past, thus suggesting a decrease in the “home
bias” of investors.
SESSION 3 INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO
CHOICE AND ASSET MARKET
LINKAGES
The session was chaired by Philipp Hartmann
(ECB). The first paper,  “Exchange rates,
equity prices and capital flows” by Harald Hau
(INSEAD) and Helene Rey (Princeton
University), focused on explaining exchange
rate movements with macro fundamentals. The
main objective of the paper is to develop a
model that can bridge the gap between foreign
exchange market microstructure and
macroeconomic fundamentals. By developing
an equilibrium model in which exchange rates,
stock prices and capital flows are jointly
determined, the authors are able to derive a
number of testable implications for the joint
dynamics of these variables, which explicitly
depend on assumptions about traders’ degree of
risk sharing. In the most interesting case of
incomplete risk sharing, the model implies a
high level of exchange rate return volatility
(albeit lower than equity return volatility), a
negative correlation between foreign equity
returns in local currency and the value of the
foreign currency, and a positive correlation
between the value of a foreign currency and the
net equity flows into that market. Interestingly,
using data for OECD countries relative to the
US, the authors find these implications of the
model to be supported by the data.
Michael Ehrmann (ECB), presented the
second paper, “Interdependence between the
euro area and the US: what role for EMU?”,
which is co-authored with Marcel Fratzscher
(ECB). In this paper, the authors study the
degree of interdependence between the US and
the euro area from the viewpoint of financial
market participants, by examining the effects
of monetary policy announcements and
macroeconomic news on interest rates in the
money markets. Using pre-EMU German data
as well as euro interest rate data following the
introduction of the single currency, the authors
find that the interdependence of money markets
has steadily increased over time. In addition,
there is stronger evidence of spill-over effects
from the US to the euro area than in the
opposite direction. However, the authors also
find that euro area news have become
increasingly important for the euro money
market, suggesting that markets have
undergone a learning process about the
monetary policy of the ECB.
Charlotte Ostergaard (Norwegian School of
Management) presented the third paper of the
session, “International diversification in bank
asset portfolios” (joint with Claudia Buch, Kiel
Institute for World Economics, and John
Driscoll, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System). This paper analysed the
internationalisation of the banking industry,
focusing in particular on direct cross-border
lending, i.e. “international banking”. Using a
standard mean-variance portfolio model, the
authors estimate benchmark portfolio weights,
which they subsequently compare to the actual
“portfolios” of banks’ foreign and domestic
assets. Based on data from four major
industrialised economies, the authors find that
banks in general tend to over-invest
domestically, relative to the benchmark,
showing that there is a similar home bias for
bank credit, as there is one for stock
investments. In investigating the possible
reasons for this type of domestic over-
investment, they find that proxies for
information costs associated with foreign92
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investments did not seem to be important.
Instead, credit risk considerations appeared to
play a more important role, in that banks tend to
over-invest more in markets characterised by
high credit quality and also to invest even more
if credit conditions further improve.
The discussant of this session was Yigal
Newman (Stanford Graduate School of
Business). Newman first highlighted a very
strong feature of Hau and Rey’s paper: the fact
that it produced a number of clearly testable
implications, which turned out to be confirmed
by the data. He also noted that the implications
of the model and the empirical results related to
the correlation between equity returns and
exchange rate movements run counter to
“conventional wisdom”. He therefore urged the
authors to be more clear in the paper in
explaining the mechanisms in the model that
produce this result, and to also provide better
economic intuition for these findings.
Commenting on the paper by Ehrmann
and Fratzscher, Newman suggested that in
their investigation of money markets
interdependence prior to EMU, more European
markets could be examined than only the
German one. Furthermore, he also asked what
role the relative size of markets may play in
explaining interdependence between markets.
Finally, on the paper presented by Buch,
Newman noted that a nice feature of the paper
was the unique data set on cross-border claims
of banks in four major industrialised countries.
On the other hand, he questioned whether this
data set could be seen as fully representative,
since it excludes a number of markets (notably
emerging markets) that may represent
important investment opportunities for banks.
The discussant also suggested that the authors
should discuss the way banks choose to hedge
or not to hedge their international exposures, as
well as the reasons underlying these decisions.
In the general discussion, Philipp Hartmann
(ECB) argued that developments happening
around the time of the conference seem to
provide further evidence in favour of the
arguments in Hau and Rey paper. In particular,
one could observe rising US stock markets with
a depreciating dollar and declining European
stock markets with an appreciating euro.
PLENARY PANEL SESSION
Juha Tarkka (Bank of Finland) chaired the
concluding panel discussion of the workshop.
Participants were invited to give their views
about the future of exchanges: competition or
consolidation?
Niall Bohan (European Commission)
presented channels through which competition
is changing the economics of trade execution.
He first concentrated on competition between
exchanges and multilateral trading systems. He
recalled that these arrangements are the basis
for the price formation mechanism. The
dimensions along which exchanges can
compete with each other are many, ranging
from the initial listings fees, the increase of
liquidity on platforms thus reducing the bid-
ask spread, the reduction of trade execution
costs, to the vertical integration of exchanges
with clearing and/or settlement systems. In his
view, it is impossible to predict how
competition will shape the future of the
European trading landscape, although he
reckoned that consolidation is inevitable.
However, he stressed that from the standpoint
of regulatory authorities, one should avoid
favouring a preferred market structure while
still being concerned that the consolidation
process and outcome are not distorted by anti-
competitive strategies or behaviours that
would undermine the efficiency of the price-
formation process.
Then Bohan discussed the issue of trade
internalisation by banks. He recalled that 22-
25% of client orders of large houses are now
internalised. This increased internalisation was
the result of the steady concentration of client
brokerage accounts over the course of the
1990s combined with increased netting or
settlement capacity within large banks.
Internalised trading differs from exchange-
based trading as the system operator93
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determines the conditions of trades and
whether they are executed internally. This
feature implies that internalised trades do not
face the same regulation as “order book”
trades, while still competing with exchanges.
Bohan recalled that concerns were expressed
on the possibility that internalised trading
would siphon so much liquidity away from
exchanges that the price mechanism would
suffer. He admitted that there is little evidence,
as aggregate internalised order flows or the
types of orders that are internalised are
unknown. Therefore he concluded that the
regulatory authority should concentrate on the
risks pertaining to the combinations of
different systems in the executions of trades,
and ensure that trades are internalised only
where there is benefits for the clients. In this
way, the integrity and efficient price formation
of the overall market system can be preserved.
Andre Went (Euronext) then described the
business model chosen by Euronext, horizontal
integration and vertical efficiency. Euronext
offers local access to members and listed
companies, where markets are regulated
according to local jurisdiction. However, in
conjunction to this local presence, there is a
single central order book with single market
rules. Among the benefits offered by this
system are the international exposure and
liquidity for listed companies and cost
reductions for members. Members appear to
rationalise progressively their access by
making use of their direct access, while
investors pay fees on cross-border transactions
that are close to the ones charged for domestic
transactions. The system also exploits
economies of scale and synergies by removing
the duplication of systems such as the number
of clearing platforms. Went asserted that the
consolidation process will continue, as cross
border activities are bound to increase and
competition puts pressure on fees. He
concluded that ultimately further consolidation
is beneficial for shareholders and users, as it
will enhance liquidity and cut cost.
Peter Gromber (Deutsche Boerse)
concentrated his talk on two main topics. First
he asked about the efficient level of
consolidation. He observed that exchanges and
settlement systems in Europe are very
integrated: the four big exchanges (Deutsche
Boerse, Euronext, London Stock Exchange and
Nordic) represent approximately 78% of the
total market. In his view, the next step for
consolidation will soon occur and be headed by
one or more of the four exchanges. Cost
efficiency represents the main driving force of
consolidation. The growth in transactions
drives unit costs down and significantly
reduces the implicit trading costs for market
participants. Hence, Gromber concluded that
consolidation will continue. He then addressed
the issue of internalisation of trades and its
regulation. He called for implementing a
regulation that would protect investors’ rights
and establishes a high level of market
efficiency. In particular he suggested quoting
internalised trades in parallel in the open order
book as a solution to the problems created by
internalisation.
Hannu Haltunen (Nordea) began his
presentation by describing Nordea. It is the
largest bank covering the four Nordic countries
and resulted from the merger of four nordic
country banks. Linking these four nordic banks
are four separate but inter-linked settlement
systems with links also to European entities.
Haltunen then exposed his views on
consolidation. He predicted that further
economies of scale can be realised as well as a
higher level of liquidity. However, he asked
three issues related to consolidation. 1) Should
consolidation be vertical or horizontal?
2) What should the governance structure be,
for- or non-profit? 3) Should access be
exclusive or open?
Tarkka then invited the panel participants to
discuss the different views expressed. Bohan
reiterated that determining the risks of
internalisation should be a priority. Went said
that the current draft of the Investment Services
Directive (ISD) is covering most of the issues94
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highlighted so far. He further claimed that the
debate on vertical versus horizontal integration
is secondary, and that corporate governance
issues are less relevant as long as services are
provided efficiently to customers. Gomber also
noted that the debate on vertical versus
horizontal integration had calmed down.
Regarding internalisation, he emphasised that
it is key to find a solution that will preserve the
efficiency and integrity of the price formation
mechanism. Haltunen said that further
consolidation would entail high short term
costs that might temper the willingness of some
institutions to actually consolidate. In spite of
these costs, he expressed the view that
consolidation will continue, although the pace
and the new drivers of further consolidation are
uncertain. He finally asked Bohan whether,
from the point of view of customers, the
regulatory authorities were taking a stance on
this issue. Bohan replied that on the trading
side, the regulatory environment is taking
shape. However he saw a need to improve the
clearing and settlement sides, where vested
interests are very present. He called for further
actions from the public authorities to remove
barriers for cross-border clearing and
settlement, and to closely monitor the risks
inherent to clearing and settlements systems.
Tarkka then asked whether regulatory barriers
were of importance for further consolidation.
Went replied affirmatively and Gomber
highlighted the difference of regulatory
treatment between types of institutions
regarding, for instance, liquidity provision.
Philipp Hartmann (ECB) asked whether
internalisation can be seen as an indirect way to
reshuffle liquidity pools among exchanges,
with the aim of fostering consolidation. Went
said that the ISD still allows for internalisation
and expressed concerns that the price
formation process might be damaged if pre-
trade transparency is not required. He finally
claimed that pre-trade transparency is
compatible with  stronger competition, so that
this should not be a concern when adopting pre-
trade transparency.
CLOSING REMARKS
Vítor Gaspar (ECB) closed the workshop by
first thanking Sinikka Salo, Juhha Tarka and
their team at the Bank of Finland for their
organisation. He then reviewed the activities of
the ECB-CFS Research Network so far,
starting from the launching workshop which
took place in April 2002 in Frankfurt, and
looking at where the network stands and where
it will go. He recalled that a main output of
the launching workshop was the “roadmap”, a
document describing the scope of the network
and highlighting some areas that should receive
primary attention over the first two years of it.
He recalled that the chosen areas were (1) bank
competition and the geographical scope of
banking activities; (2) international portfolio
choices and asset market linkages between
Europe, the United States and Japan; (3)
European bond markets; (4) European
securities settlement systems; and (5) the
emergence and evolution of new markets in
Europe (in particular start-up financing
markets).  The launching workshop covered
parts of areas (2) and (3), the present workshop
addressed areas (1) and (2). Finally, the
forthcoming workshop at the Bank of Greece in
Athens in November 2003 will resume on topic
(3) and also cover areas (4) and (5). He
announced that the current phase of the
network will be concluded by a conference in
Frankfurt, in the late spring of 2004. He then
described some steps taken after the launching
workshop. To further the interaction in the
network and to facilitate the flow of
information on the topics of interest to network
participants, a web-site was made available
at http://www.eu-financial-system.org. Of
special interest is an online library of some
seminal published papers and many recent
working papers in the areas of the network.
Finally he mentioned the creation of the
Lamfalussy Fellowship by the European
Central Bank to stimulate further research on
the five priority areas of the network.95
ECB
Capital markets and financial integration in Europe
December 2004
ANNEX E
Day 1 (Thursday November 20, 2003)
9:30-10:00 Welcoming Coffee
10:00-10:15 Nicholas Tsaveas (Bank of Greece) Opening Remarks
10:15-11:00 Tour of the Exhibition Celebrating the 75th Anniversary of the Bank of Greece
11:00-13:00 Parallel sessions
Session 1.1: Government bond market microstructures; liquidity and
spillovers
Chair: Eli Remolona (Bank for International Settlements)
Avanidhar Subramahnyam (UCLA), An Empirical Analysis of Stock and Bond
Market Liquidity (with Goizueta Taurn Chordia, Emory University and Arsani
Sarkar, FRB New York)
Yui Chung Cheung (University of Amsterdam), Trading European Sovereign
Bonds: The Microstructure of the MTS Trading Platforms (with Frank De Jong,
University of Amsterdam and Barbara Rindi, Bocconi University)
Michael J. Fleming (Federal Reserve Bank of New York), Heat Waves, Meteor
Showers, and Trading Volume: An Analysis of Volatility Spillovers in the U.S.
Treasury Market (with Jose A. Lopez, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco)
12:30-12:45 Discussant: Albert Menkveld (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
12:45-13:00 Open discussion
Session 1.2: Topics in the governance and integration of european financial
markets
Chair: Charles Kahn (University of Illinois)
Mariassunta Giannetti (Stockholm School of Economics), Investor Protection
and Equity-holdings: An Explanation of Two Puzzles? (with Yrjo Koskinen,
Stockholm School of Economics)
Leo Kaas (University of Vienna) Financial Market Integration and Loan
Competition:  When is Entry Deregulation Socially Beneficial?
Cyril Monnet (European Central Bank) Guess What: It’s the Settlements! (with
Thor Koeppl, European Central Bank)
12:30-12:45 Discussant: Hans Degryse (University of Leuven and CentER)
12:45-13:00 Open discussion
ANNEX E PROGRAM AND SUMMARY OF THE
THIRD WORKSHOP
HOSTED BY THE BANK OF GREECE IN ATHENS,
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13:00-14:30 Lunch
P. Thomopoulos (Deputy Governor of the Bank of Greece)
Lunch Speech on Financial Liberalisation, The Greek Experience
14:30-15:15 Marco Da Rin (University of Turin, ECGI, and IGIER)
Key Lecture on European Venture Capital
15:15-15:30 Discussion
15:30-16:00 Coffee Break
16:00-18:00 Parallel sessions
Session 2.1:  Corporate bond financing and the cost of capital
Chair: Joseph Bisignano (Bank for International Settlements)
John J. Puthenpurackal (Ohio University), Security Fungibility and the Cost
of Capital: Evidence from Global Bonds (with Darius P. Miller, Indiana
University)
Yigal Newman (Stanford University), Illiquidity Spillovers:
Theory and Evidence from European Telecom Bond Issuance (with Michael
Rierson, CitiGroup)
João Santos (Federal Reserve Bank of New York), Why Firm Access to the Bond
Market Differs Over the Business Cycle: A Theory and Some Evidence
17:30-17:45 Discussant: Arnaud Mares (European Central Bank)
17:45-18:00 Open discussion
Session 2.2:  IPOs in new markets
Chair: Vicente Pons (Yale University)
Armin Schwienbacher (University of Amsterdam) Liquidity of Exit Markets
and Venture Capital Finance (with Grant Fleming, Australian National
University and Douglas Cumming, University of Alberta)
Tereza Tykvova (ZEW) Are IPOs of Different VCs Different? (with Uwe Walz,
University of Frankfurt and CFS)
Vicente Pons (Yale University), Who Benefits from IPO Underpricing?
Evidence from Hybrid Bookbuilding Offerings
17:30-17:45 Discussant: Wolfgang Bessler (Giessen University)
17:45-18:00 Open discussion97
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Day 2 (Friday November 21, 2003)
8:30-9 :00 Coffee
9:00-11:00 Parallel sessions
Session 3.1: Securities settlement systems
Chair: Vítor Gaspar (European Central Bank)
Jens Tapking (European Central Bank), Raising Rival’s Costs in the Securities
Settlement Industry (with Cornelia Holthausen, European Central Bank)
Karlo Kauko (Bank of Finland), Interlinking Securities Settlement Systems:
A Strategic Commitment?
Heiko Schmiedel (European Central Bank), Economies of Scale and
Technological Developments in Securities Depository and Settlement Systems
(with Markku Malkamaki, Bank of Finland and Juha Tarkka, Bank of Finland)
10:30-10:45 Discussant: Charles Kahn (University of Illinois)
10:45-11:00 Open discussion
Session 3.2: The determinants of VC invesments
Chair: Jan-Pieter Krahnen (CFS)
Douglas Cumming (University of Alberta), The Legal Road to Replicating
Silicon Valley (with   John Armour, University of Cambridge)
Tuomas Takalo (Bank of Finland), Investor Protection and Business Creation
(with Ari Hyytinen, University of California, Berkeley)
Giovanna Nicodano (University of Turin), What Drives the Structure of
Private Equity Investment? (with Marco Da Rin, University of Turin, ECGI, and
IGIER and Alessandro Sembenello, University of Turin)
10:30-10:45 Discussant: Heather Gibson (Bank of Greece)
10:45-11:00 Open discussion
11:00-11:30 Coffee Break98
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11:30-13:00 Policy Panel: European securities settlement systems
Moderator: Alberto Giovanninni (Unifortune)
Kenneth Garbade (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
Randy Kroszner (University of Chicago)
Joël Mérère (CEO, Euroclear France)
Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell (Member of the Executive Board of the European
Central Bank)
13:00-13:15 Concluding remarks
13:15-14:15 Lunch99
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On 29-30 April 2002, the European Central
Bank  (ECB) and the Center for Financial
Studies (CFS) hosted a workshop at the ECB to
launch their network initiative aiming at
promoting research on “Capital Markets and
Financial Integration in Europe”. The research
network aims at co-ordinating and stimulating
top-level policy-oriented research that
significantly contributes to the ECB’s
understanding of developments in European
financial structure and the linkages between
European financial systems and those in the
United States and Japan. The format is a
network of people and its key feature is a strong
interaction between researchers in academia,
the ECB, other Eurosystem central banks and
other official institutions. On the basis of the
discussions held during the Launching
workshop regarding the areas where research is
needed, five top priorities areas have been
selected: (1) bank competition and the
geographical scope of banking activities;
(2) international portfolio choices and asset
market linkages between Europe, the United
States and Japan; (3) European bond markets;
(4) European securities settlement systems;
and (5) the emergence and evolution of new
markets in Europe (in particular start-up
financing markets). Subsequent workshops
were designed to cover these different areas.
The third workshop of the network was hosted
by the Bank of Greece in Athens on 20-21
November 2003. The main priority areas
analysed in the course of the workshop were
(3) European bond markets; (4) European
securities settlement systems; and (5) Start-up
financing and new markets. The workshop
combined research key lectures, research paper
presentations, and a plenary panel discussion
on “European Securities Settlement Systems”,
that included Kenneth D. Garbade (Federal
Reserve Bank of New York), Randy Kroszner
(University of Chicago), Anso Thirè
(Euroclear France), and Gertrude Tumpel-
Gugerell (Member of the Executive Board of
the European Central Bank). This document
summarises the third workshop of the Network.
INTRODUCTION100
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Nicholas Tsaveas (Bank of Greece) welcomed
workshop participants with some opening
remarks on the three main topics of the
workshop, (1) venture capital finance, (2)
securities settlement systems and (3) European
bond markets. Regarding venture capital he
acknowledged appropriate timing of the
workshop, since it corresponds with the closure
of the EU’s Risk and Capital Action Plan that
aims at promoting precisely this form of
financing. In his views, Europe needs venture
capital firms for at least two reasons. First, the
application of the Basle II accord will erode
bank’s appetite for high risky high returns
investments. Second, with the forthcoming
boom in retirements, pension funds will also
become less and less willing to invest in these
types of investments. To promote venture
capital, he asked whether Europe should aim
for a pan-European market to list new firms or
whether venture capital is better served by
national or regional stock exchanges.
Regarding securities clearing and settlement
systems, Tsaveas wondered about the best form
of integration in this industry, calling for a
form of organisation that would leave some
space for competition and provide sufficient
incentives for service enhancements and lower
costs. To assess alternative models, he
proposed that concepts of interoperability and
harmonisation of procedures of the existing
infrastructures should be the guiding
principles. He finally warned about the
potential danger of reaching too high a level of
concentration, which although promoting
efficiency could also cause systemic risk
problems, and called for adequate supervisory
procedures.
Tsaveas then expressed his views on the
European bond markets. He first recalled that
bond markets are crucial for central banks’
monetary policy operations. However he
pointed out to some shortcomings of current
bond markets. First, bond markets are very
close substitutes for bank lending when things
go well: they enhance liquidity and improve the
monitoring of financial institutions by
allowing to “mark to market” their assets.
However, when things go badly, it may become
extremely difficult to raise funds in the bond
markets. Second, with new bond derivatives, it
is increasingly difficult to tell where bonds end
and equities start. This of course creates
difficulties for investors to pin down the risk
involved in each investment. Following these
few remarks and before starting the workshop’s
session, Tsaveas invited workshop participants
to a tour of the exhibition for the 75th
anniversary of the Bank of Greece.
SESSION 1.1 GOVERNMENT BOND MARKET
MICROSTRUCTURES; LIQUIDITY
AND SPILLOVERS
The session was chaired by Eli Remolona
(Bank for International Settlements). The
first speaker Avanidhar Subramahnyam
(UCLA), presented the paper  “An empirical
analysis of stock and bond market liquidity”
(co-authored with Goizueta Tarun Chordia,
Emory University and Arsani Sarkar, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York). Recent financial
crisis suggest that in difficult market
conditions, liquidity can decline or disappear.
To understand the determinants of market
liquidity, the authors consider the joint
dynamics of liquidity, returns, and volatility in
stock and Treasury bond markets. The
objective of the paper is to identify primitive
factors that induce correlated movements in
liquidity, such as the monetary stance of the
Fed or the flow of funds into stock and bond
markets. The authors use data from GovPX and
TAQ/ISSM in a 7 years window (1991-1998) to
measure quoted spreads, depths and order
flows in each of the two markets. To analyse the
data, they perform a vector autoregression with
liquidity, order flow, returns and volatility.
They find that stock and bond liquidity possess
similarities such as common calendar
regularities. Furthermore, there are cross-
market dynamics flowing from volatility to
liquidity. The authors also report that liquidity
and volatility shocks are positively and
significantly correlated across stock and bond
markets at daily horizons, indicating that
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liquidity and volatility shocks are often of a
systematic nature. Finally, the authors find that
an unexpected loosening of monetary policy, as
measured by a decrease in net borrowed
reserves, is associated with a contemporaneous
increase in stock market liquidity.
Yui Chung Cheung (University of Amsterdam)
presented the paper “Trading European
sovereign bonds: The microstructure of
the MTS trading platforms”, with Frank de Jong
(University of Amsterdam) and Barbara
Rindi (Bocconi University). This paper
investigates the microstructure of the MTS
Global Market System, the most important
European interdealer sovereign bond trading
systems. The institutional environment of
 the market for sovereign bonds can be divided
in 2 sectors. The primary sector decides on
the finance policy based upon the funding
requirement of each government. This sector
acts as the ultimate provider of liquidity. The
secondary market decides on the trading
environment: it determines the structure of
payments and settlements and the trading
facilities offered by brokers and market makers.
The MTS system operates on the secondary
markets. The MTS platform is constituted of
local platforms in each country member of MTS
and a pan-european platform, EuroMTS.
Participants in the MTS trading platform are
mainly investment banks, with a large variety of
banks. All trades are anonymous. The authors
used a detailed data set covering every
transaction of Italian, French, German and
Belgian government bonds being traded on the
MTS platforms from January 2001 until May
2002.  They find that the spreads are smallest for
the most actively traded issues. The MTS
domestic trading platforms offer slightly better
spreads than EuroMTS. The authors also
analyse the price impact of trades and trading
duration (the time elapsed between two trades).
They find that trading intensity plays a role: a
higher price impact of trades after long
durations, and lower price impacts when trading
activity is high.
The third paper of the session “Heat waves,
meteor showers and trading volume: an
analysis of volatility spillovers in the U.S.
Treasury Market” by Michael J. Fleming
(Federal Reserve Bank of New York) and Jose
A. Lopez (Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco) analysed the possibility for heat
waves and meteor showers across London, New
York and Tokyo’s U.S. Treasury markets. Heat
waves’ refer to the  fact that volatility has only
location specific autocorrelation, while meteor
showers’ refer to a situation when volatility
spills over from one centre to another. The
authors test for volatility spillovers in the U.S.
Treasury Markets using yields data from
GovPX, from a sample period running from
March 1992 to August 1994. They calculate the
change in intraday yield for each trading centre
and use a GARCH model to test for some form
of heteroskedasticity within centres. Assuming
no conditional mean dynamics in yield change
and applying the Engel, Ito and Lin (1990)
method, they examine whether information
from other trading centres impacts intra-market
variance and test whether lagged volume helps
explain volatility. They find that price
discovery occurs in all three trading centres.
Also, volatility persists in each of them. They
find evidence that the meteor shower
hypothesis holds for Tokyo and London while
New York is better characterised by heat wave
hypothesis.
Albert Menkveld (Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam), 2003 ECB Lamfalussy fellow,
acted as discussant and started by pointing out
that there is much to learn from the
microstructure of government bond markets.
He questioned Fleming and Lopez’s
assumption that prices reflect efficient pricing
in all trading locations on the basis that
London’s and Tokyo’s market are much thinner
than New York’s. He encouraged the authors
to decompose prices to take into account
temporary effects on London’s and Tokyo’s
markets. On the paper of Chordia, Sarkar and
Subramahnyam, he remarked that the use of
order imbalance (dollar value of buys minus
dollar value of sells) scaled by the total value of102
ECB
Capital markets and financial integration in Europe
December 2004
buys and sells is uncommon in microstructure.
He encouraged instead the author to use the
absolute value of imbalance as a driver of
liquidity. Finally regarding the paper by
Cheung, de Jong and Rindi, Menkveld was
puzzled by the fact that high intensity of
trading is associated with a smaller price
impact and larger persistence in order flow,
while the opposite is true in equity markets.
Menkveld suggested to take a more integrative
approach to the study of government bond
markets in Europe by decomposing national
yield changes into a European benchmark yield
level, yield spread for the various countries
relative to the benchmark and countries
specific innovations. The study of the effect of
countries’ order imbalance on yields would
then be possible.
Subramahnyam replied that scaling imbalances
take care of trading volume effects. Also, he
acknowledged the collinearity of absolute
imbalance and volatility and found similar
results when replacing volatility for absolute
imbalance. From the floor, Subramahnyam was
questioned on alternative measures of liquidity
such as yield maturity differential between on
the run and off the run bonds, and how these
would relate to the bid-ask spread. He replied
that although a very valid and insightful
comment, the problem would be to find an
analogue in the stock market. Giovanna
Nicodano (University of Turin) criticised
Subramahnyam’s paper on the ground that a
driving force of liquidity is information and
although the authors exploit innovations
in returns in their paper, the analysis still
remains incomplete as they do not differentiate
the type of information (e.g. macro news).
Subramahnyam answered that this concern is
partly taken care of by including dummies in
the estimation process. Cheung answered to
Menkveld’s comment by using the example of
low trade intensity. In this case, traders know
that if a trade occurs, it is more likely that it is
followed by even more trades. Hence, in order
to capture gains from trade, the price will be set
as highly as possible, thus increasing the bid-
ask spread which in turn materialises in a high
price impact. Fleming  replied that it would
indeed be a good idea to remove temporary
effects from prices. Menkveld further asked
why previous day volume would affect current
innovations and volatility. Fleming recognised
that the measure of volatility based on closing
yield may be too crude, in the sense that it does
not take into account changes that occur within
the day.
SESSION 1.2 TOPICS IN THE GOVERNANCE AND
INTEGRATION OF EUROPEAN
FINANCIAL MARKETS
Charles Kahn (University of Illinois) chaired
the session on “Topics in the Governance and
Integration of European Financial Markets”.
Mariassunta Giannetti (Stockholm School of
Economics) presented the first paper “Investor
protection and equity-holdings: An
explanation of two puzzles” (joint with Yrjö
Koskinen, Stockholm School of Economics).
The authors develop a theoretical model to
simultaneously explain two well documented
puzzles in portfolio theory, limited stock
market participation and home-equity bias. The
model consists of two countries where
investors face a portfolio choice problem
between risky and risk-free assets in both, the
home and the foreign country. Participation in
both markets for risky assets is subject to the
same fixed cost, but offers benefits from
diversification.  Investors have the possibility
to acquire a controlling stake in the domestic
risky asset which allows them – depending on
the quality of investor protection – to extract
private benefits to the detriment of minority
investors. Investment behaviour is driven by
the investor protection and wealth inequality.
The degree of investor protection determines
the attractiveness of participating in a market.
Unevenly distributed wealth enables investors
to acquire a controlling stake in the domestic
asset, which is the more profitable the weaker
investor protection. The interaction between
the effects of the degree of investor protection
and of wealth inequality drives the following
results. First, limited domestic stock market
participation arises if wealth in a country is103
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sufficiently unevenly distributed and investor
protection is poor. Second, home-country bias
in equity investment arises due to two facts.
Bad investor protection gives incentives to
obtain a controlling stake in the domestic risky
asset. Furthermore, domestic investors
participate in the domestic market if investor
protection is sufficiently good. Third, when
investors face relatively poor protection at
home they are more likely to access the foreign
market (good country bias). The paper
concludes by providing new empirical
evidence for the latter two results. In their
sample, they find a positive correlation
between stock market participation and
shareholder rights measured by the antidirector
rights index constructed by La Porta et al.
(1998). Also they find the mean level of foreign
equity shares is lower in countries with high
level of investor protection. The analysis
shows that the full integration of European
markets will necessitate a convergence in
investor protection.
The second paper, “Financial market
integration and loan competition: when is
entry deregulation socially beneficial” was
given by the 2003 ECB Lamfalussy fellow Leo
Kaas (University of Vienna).  This paper
addresses the consequences of entry
deregulation in a closed banking sector on
competition, bank stability and economic
welfare. In Kaas’ model, banks compete for
borrowers that differ in their quality. In order
to reduce their risk, banks screen borrowers,
but are nevertheless exposed to failure, as
screening yields imperfect information and
default probabilities are subject to aggregate
risk.  Banks incur a fixed cost of operation and
screening is costly. The paper assumes that
potential entrants are more efficient in
screening than incumbent banks. Finally,
capital requirements can secure banks against
failure. Kaas presented first the benchmark of
an equilibrium where entry cannot take place
and no failures occur. Bank failures are ruled
out as long as screening costs are high (strong
market power), screening is relatively efficient
and capital requirements are high. After
deregulation, entry occurs with or without
crowding out incumbent banks provided the
screening advantage is large enough and
capital requirements are not too high. Welfare
effects depend on whether entry causes
incumbents to fail. If there is no failure of
incumbents, entrants cannot reap all benefits
from their ability to screen better. Then, there
is too little entry resulting in an inefficient
market share for new banks. This result can be
reversed if entry causes incumbent banks to
fail. In this case, incumbents charge higher
rates, thus driving too many new banks into
the market. Finally, Kaas expressed the view
that, by limiting incumbents failure, capital
requirements may be detrimental to overall
welfare. However, deregulating access to a
closed banking sector is always beneficial.
Cyril Monnet (ECB) presented the last paper,
“Guess what: It’s the settlements!” (joint
with Thorsten Koeppl, ECB). The paper
analyses the role of vertical silos in securities
market organisation for efficient horizontal
consolidation between components of the silo,
i.e. exchanges and back-office operations such
as clearing and settlement. Monnet briefly
described the integration process among stock
exchanges and settlement structures in the euro
area. All mergers between exchanges were
accompanied by breaking up silos and followed
by consolidating clearing and settling within a
single entity independent of the exchange.
Starting from these facts the authors outline a
model where two firms that operate a silo can
realise gains from a merger. These gains arise
from increases in overall demand as well as
cost savings. Here, the authors assume that the
costs for settling transactions potentially differ
across firms and are private information. Using
tools from mechanism design, the paper shows
that it is impossible to achieve an efficient
merger, i.e. a merger where after the merger
settlement takes place at the lowest cost. This
is due to the fact that it is too costly to induce
the firms to truthfully reveal their settlement
costs. The second part of the paper presents
two solutions to this impossibility result. First,
a sufficiently high subsidy can realise all104
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benefits from lower settlement costs, but is
costly itself. Second, the authors offer a less
costly market solution. They show that firms
can achieve an efficient merger by each
outsourcing their own settlement operations to
an agent. Competition between the agents for
settling all trades of the merged exchange
reveals then the true cost of settlement. Hence,
they argue that fostering competition and open
access to securities settlement systems may be
required to enhance the efficiency of securities
markets.
The discussant, Hans Degryse (University of
Leuven and CentER), stressed the
commonality of the three papers. All papers
discuss different problems associated with
financial integration, ultimately giving a
rationale for some form of public intervention.
For the first paper, Degryse emphasised that
the model is novel in jointly explaining two
well-known phenomena: home-equity bias and
limited stock market participation. The model
itself, however, seemed too much contrived by
the assumptions. He, therefore, suggested to
relax some assumptions, in particular the
impossibility to take controlling stakes in
foreign stocks.  Finally, he expressed interest
in a dynamic version of the model to study the
interaction of changes in investor protection
and wealth. For Kaas’ paper, the discussant
highlighted the result that increased
competition leads to too little entry, which runs
counter to similar models of competition with
entry. He conjectured that this result is driven
by the fact that incumbents take all their
decisions before entry occurs. He also stressed
that – empirically – switching costs are more
relevant than efficiency differences between
banks. The final paper was criticised by
Degryse as too stylised, not taking into account
the full range of possible ways to consolidate
fragmented infrastructures in securities
markets. Furthermore, he suggested that the
authors should put more emphasis on the
advantages of vertical integration when
discussion splitting silos to achieve horizontal
consolidation. Monnet replied that the paper’s
main focus was not on reasons why exchanges
wish to consolidate but rather on the reasons
why consolidation is difficult to achieve.
LUNCHEON ADDRESS
Panayotis Thomopoulos (Deputy Governor of
the Bank of Greece) delivered a luncheon
address on “Financial liberalisation, the Greek
experience”.
KEY NOTE LECTURE ON EUROPEAN VENTURE
CAPITAL
Vítor Gaspar (ECB) introduced Marco Da
Rin (University of Turin) who lectured about
“European venture capital”. The author first
defined venture capital firms as a specialised
form of financial intermediation whereby small
local partnerships finance new ventures via
equity-like instruments. Venture capital firms
usually offer, as a package, funds, advice and
mentoring. The author then pointed to some
key facts of venture capital in Europe, using as
a proxy for the number of VC firms, the
memberships in the European Venture Capital
Association (EVCA). In terms of venture
capital fundraising over the 1990s, it seems
that European venture capital firms are
catching up with the U.S. However Da Rin
pointed out that this might be an illusion as
during the same period the level of investment
is at most 50% of the one of the U.S. The
difference is due to the fact that fundraising for
Europe also accounts for non-venture private
equity, which is not the case for investment.
Within Europe, there is a high heterogeneity in
terms of market size and intensity – a measure
of how important VCs are within an economy –
and Nordic countries have the most intense
venture capital industry. In other words, the
industry is not represented or active in all
countries.
Then Da Rin moved on to describe key issues
in the European venture capital industry.
(1) Based on a sample of 1200 VC-backed
companies, Da Rin finds that the European
landscape of VC firms is highly captive, with105
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an important presence of bank subsidiaries,
corporate VC firms and public VCs. This is an
important fact, as these types of VC firms
invest less in the early stages of projects and in
high-tech projects, provide less soft support to
private companies, and do not tend to monitor
companies actively, as they sit less frequently
on the board of companies relative to
individual VCs. (2) Da Rin then pointed to exit
strategies for VCs in Europe. In theory, exit
strategies are crucial for VCs, as additional exit
opportunities create further incentives for VCs
to invest. There is indeed evidence that
European VCs aim at selling their firms as
approximately a quarter of VC firms have been
involved in firms listed on the “New Markets”.
There is also evidence that the existence of
New Markets fostered the creation of VC firms.
(3) Based on a sample of 538 companies listed
on Europe’s New Markets, Da Rin then
reported findings that – contrary to what theory
predicts – European VC might actually not
make a difference for the companies they are
financing. While VC-backed companies raise
more capital at IPOs, they do not tend to grow
faster than others. However, the author also
pointed to a difference in the quality of the
VC firms, as some do better than others.
(4) Finally, Da Rin addressed the link between
human capital and venture capital in Europe.
As predicted by theory, and controlling for the
type of VC firms, more experienced partners
provide more support to companies, partners
with higher university degrees invest in earlier
stages of companies, and high-tech
investments are more often carried out by
partners graduated in sciences.
Da Rin then moved on to the state of financial
integration in the European VC industry. He
reported that this industry is not integrated
across borders. VC firms are investing very
locally and with very few exceptions have less
than 10% of their partners from foreign
countries. Also, the cross borders investment
of VC firms is very low (less than 2% of total
investment). Finally, less than a third of funds
originate from foreign investors. Most foreign
investors are from the US and are concentrated
in only a small number of firms. Da Rin argued
that this may be explained by the nature of the
VC industry, which is quite different from that
of other financial intermediaries: VC firms
make localised and undiversified investments;
VC is based on human rather than financial
capital; and VC has a small number of
investors. However Da Rin expects financial
integration to indirectly restructure the VC
industry through its effect on the allocation of
funds and through changes in the economic
structures of EU countries, notably on the
listing ability of new firms. In this regard,
financial integration may improve exit
channels for VC and reallocate talent and
human capital.
Gaspar then opened the floor for questions.
Joseph Bisignano (BIS) asked Da Rin about
the effects of pension funds as sources for VC,
which is not present in Europe but very much
so in the US, following the advent of the
“prudent man” rule. He also wondered about
the future of European VCs given the closure of
the German Neue Markt and asked whether
VCs could survive in a bank dominated
environment. Then the issue of the use of fiscal
policies to stimulate VCs was raised from the
floor. Da Rin reckoned the importance of
pension funds in having a larger pool of
investors going into VC. However, he argued
that letting pension funds invest is rather a
regulatory decision than an economic one. He
then stated that exit is crucial for VCs and that
there is definitely a need in Europe for
infrastructures allowing proper exit, whether
national or pan-european. He also elaborated
on fiscal issues, arguing that European fiscal
policies should be designed to foster an
entrepreneurial spirit by giving the right
incentives to start projects, as there are too few
good firms in which VCs can invest. Finally, he
did not believe that bank VCs are a necessarily
desirable outcome, as they have very different
incentives from private VCs. However he
argued that Europe is only in a transitory stage
and might mature to a different VC industry at
some point.106
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SESSION 2.1 CORPORATE BOND FINANCING
AND THE COST OF CAPITAL
Joseph Bisignano (Bank for International
Settlements) chaired the session. John
Puthenpurackal (Ohio University) was
supposed to present his paper  “Security
fungibility and the cost of capital: evidence
from global bonds”, co-authored with Darius P.
Miller (Indiana University), but he was unable
to travel to Athens due to visa issues. This
paper was therefore presented by the
discussant,  Arnaud Mares (ECB). Global
bonds have several characteristics. First, a
global bond can be traded in multiple markets
(such as the euro and dollar markets) without
restrictions. Second, they are sold
simultaneously at the same offer price. Third,
they have extremely large supply, in multiple
tranches of different size and maturity. Finally,
trading and settlement systems for global
bonds, are set up to encourage cross-market
trades. In particular, clearing and settlement
systems are integrated for global bonds, so that
cross-border transactions can occur more cost
efficiently. Using 87 global bonds issued by
U.S. firms in 1996-2001, the authors find that
issuing globally tradable securities brings
economically significant benefits. In
particular, the borrowing costs – as measured
by the yield to maturity in excess of treasury
bonds with the same maturity – is 15 basis
points lower than on comparable U.S. domestic
bonds. Moreover, issuing costs of global bonds
– as measured by underwriting spreads – are
0.13% lower than U.S. domestic bonds.
Therefore, global bonds reduce the cost of debt
capital. Furthermore, stock price reactions to
the announcement of global bond issuance are
positive and significant. The evidence that
global bonds lowers the cost of capital suggests
that consolidation and integration of securities
clearing and settlement systems and the
creation of a global clearing and settlement
solution would benefit firms’ capital raising
activities.
Yigal Newman (Stanford University), 2003
ECB Lamfalussy fellow, presented his paper
“Illiquidity spillovers: theory and evidence
from European Telecom bond issuance”, co-
authored with Michael Rierson (CitiGroup).
Using data from 347 bond issues in the
European telecom industry between October 1,
1999, and July 15, 2001, the authors document
that a firm’s new issues of corporate bonds can
temporarily raise the yield spreads of other
bonds in the issuing firm’s sector. Their
analysis is based on a measure of risk-adjusted
issuance, which consists of multiplying the
market value of the issuance by its duration.
They show that the yield spreads of other bonds
increases on average by 8 basis point on the day
of the issuance and then slowly decays over
time. Furthermore, the increase in yield
spreads begins well before the issuance date.
Their result is robust to the riskiness of
outstanding bonds and to the currency of the
new issuance. The temporary nature of the
effect and the fact that it picks up at the date of
issuance rather than at its announcement are
evidence that this effect is not due to new
fundamental information about the issuer that
may be revealed during the issuance process.
The authors also present a theoretical model to
explain this finding. In the model risk-averse
intermediaries need to absorb some of the
newly issued bonds, while holding other
positively correlated bonds. As intermediaries
are risk-averse, their incentive to hold all bonds
falls when their inventory is high, so that they
sell some of the already held bonds. As a
consequence, the price of these bonds declines.
Furthermore, this decline precedes the
scheduled issuance date by anticipation.
João Santos (Federal Reserve Bank of New
York) presented his paper “Why firm access to
the bond market differs over the business cycle:
A theory and some evidence”.  The author
argues that the cost to access the bond market
varies over the business cycle and that the
impact of recessions is not uniform across
firms, as access costs increase most for mid-
credit quality firms. He first presented a model
where rating agencies have to evaluate low,
medium and high firms that are subject to an
adverse selection problem. These agencies are107
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assumed to be more likely to announce a split
rating for mid-credit firms than for either high
or low credit quality firms. Also, when firms
issue in recessions, it is assumed that they are at
least as likely to get a split rating than when
they do so in expansions. If firms do not use
rating agencies, investors are not able to
distinguish their quality and they charge the
same average interest rate to each type of firm.
This asymmetry of information obviously
benefits the low type firms but makes other
firms worse off. This asymmetry can be
partially solved by hiring rating agencies.
However, as ratings become increasingly
uncertain in recessions, the information
becomes more asymmetric thus affecting the
cost of access to capital. Furthermore, low
quality firms will benefit from the additional
asymmetry, while mid-credit quality firms will
suffer most. The author then tests his theory
using data between 1982 and 2002 on corporate
bonds issued since 1970 in the U.S. by
American non financial companies. The results
of the analysis confirm the validity of the two
assumptions in the model. Furthermore, the
author finds that split ratings – the proxy for
increased asymmetric information – increase
the cost of bond financing in recessions. Also,
this impact of recessions on credit spreads is
not uniform across firms.
Arnaud Marès (ECB) acted as discussant. On
the first paper, he argued that underwriting fees
are lower for global bonds simply because
competition in the underwriting business in
Europe is fierce. Furthermore, he regretted that
the costs of maintaining a client relationship,
which are not small,  are not taken into account
in the analysis. Finally, he argued that while
liquidity is higher, firms issuing global bonds
seem to value the larger customer base in
overlapping trading hours between Europe and
the U.S., while they do not value so much the
relatively longer trading hours. On Newman’s
paper, Marès  wondered whether there would
not be a significant change in perception
regarding the liquidity risk of a firm issuing
long term debt to refinance short term debt.
Finally, he speculated that Santos’s paper
could be interpreted as an explicit criticism of
rating agencies.
Bisignano then opened the floor for question.
Regarding Miller and Puthenpurackal’s paper,
he  argued that 15 basis points may not be
so large a decrease in borrowing costs
for global bonds. Alberto Giovannini
(Unifortune) shared his experience with the
first issue of global bonds in Italy in fall 1993.
He explained that the benefits of issuing global
bonds was not so much the increased liquidity
than the perception that accessing the U.S.
domestic market increases the value of the
issuance. On Newman’s paper, Albert
Menkveld  (Vrije Universteit Amsterdam)
wondered why liquidity providers were
entering the market with positive inventories of
positively correlated bonds. Newman replied
that this assumption could probably be relaxed
without affecting the results of the model, as
the change in incentives to hold bonds is what
matters. On Santos’ paper it was argued from
the floor that asymmetric information may
decrease in bad times, as bad firms are less able
to sustain shocks. Furthermore, it was argued
that some assumptions are probably stronger
than necessary. In particular, it is most likely
that the result is robust to the assumption that
rating agencies can both agree on the wrong
assessment. However, the assumption that split
ratings are obtained randomly was questioned.
Vítor Gaspar (ECB) then suggested that the
author refers to the importance of moral hazard
in his interpretation of the result, as the absence
of rating agencies would probably increase it.
Santos replied that the data was dictating the
choice of assumptions. He also argued that
there is no doubt that rating agencies are
improving information in the model, while also
affecting the cost of access to capital for firms.
SESSION 2.2 IPOS IN NEW MARKETS
Vicente Pons (Yale University) chaired the
session and introduced the first speaker,
Armin Schwienbacher (University of
Amsterdam) who presented the paper
“Liquidity of exit markets and Venture Capital108
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finance”, co-authored with Grant Fleming
(Australian National University) and Douglas
Cumming (University of Alberta). The topic of
the paper is the effect of exit opportunities on
strategic investment behaviour of venture
capitalists. Indeed, in venture capital
investments, liquidity risk represents the risk
of not being able to sell the shares after a few
years and thus being forced either to remain
much longer in the venture or to sell the shares
at a high discount. Using data of VentureXpert,
a dataset of Venture Economics, the authors
randomly selected investments from 1985 to
2001, including three stages of investments.
They used the number of IPOs per year as a
proxy for liquidity. Controlling for industry-
specific risk, they found a positive relation
between liquidity of exit markets and the
likelihood of investing in new projects, as
compared to follow-up projects. However, they
also documented a negative relation between
liquidity and investments in new early-stage
projects. In the author’s words, “when liquidity
is high, they rush to exit by investing more in
new later-stage projects”. Finally, they
reported a decrease in syndicate size when
liquidity of exit markets is high. In such
circumstances, the investment is less risky and
thus there is less need for syndication of deals.
Similarly, when liquidity is low, venture
capitalists may prefer to syndicate more in
order to increase the screening of projects by
investing only if other also join after having
done their own screening of the proposal.
Tereza Tykvová (ZEW) presented the paper
“Are IPOs of different VCs different”, co-
authored with Uwe Walz (University of
Frankfurt). The paper analyses the impact of
different types of VCs on the performance of
their portfolio firms around and after IPOs.
Performance is measured in terms of long-run
returns, volatility and under-pricing. The
analysis is based on a hand-collected data base
including all IPOs on the Neuer Markt during
the period 1997-2002, which means public VCs
as well as independent and corporate VCs,
German and non-German VCs. The authors
reported that firms backed by bank-dependent
and public VCs have significantly lower
market value. Also, firms backed by bank-
dependent VCs have significantly higher book-
to-market ratios, while firms backed by
independent VCs have significantly lower
book-to-market ratios. Independent VCs also
implies significantly larger average abnormal
returns for firms, where abnormal returns are
defined as the difference between individual
returns and market returns. This is in contrast
with firms backed by public VCs who enjoy
negative abnormal returns. Finally, the authors
report that independent VCs hold firms for
a longer period before the IPO relative to
bank-dependent and public VCs.  Post IPO
performance of VC-backed firms are even more
striking. Firms backed by independent VCs
perform significantly better than the firms of
other VCs or non venture-backed ones. They
also have less risk, i.e. they display a lower
return volatility. As such differences were not
expected by market participants, the authors
suspect that these results can be due to the
rather young and immature aspect of the Neuer
Markt.
The third paper of the session, “Who benefits
from IPO underpricing? Evidence from hybrid
bookbuilding offerings” was presented by
Vicente Pons (Yale University). In this
empirical paper, the author uses a sample of
175 equity offerings, 137 IPOs and 38
secondary equity offerings, that took place in
Spain from 1985 to 2002. An important feature
of the Spanish IPO market is that the
distribution of the IPO between class of
investors – retail, local institutional and
foreign institutions investors – is stated in the
preliminary prospectus. That is the underwriter
assigns the issue to class of investors before
any investors is allowed to submit applications
for IPOs shares. Pons’ analysis concludes that
institutions receive nearly 75% of the profits in
underpriced issues, while they have to bear
only 56% of the losses in overpriced offerings.
Since superior information regarding first day
underpricing cannot completely explain the
abnormal profits for institutions, he argued that
underwriters are better informed about the109
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companies they take public and use this
information to favour their long term clients.
However, he finds that the preferential
treatment of institutions does not come at the
expense of retail investors, as they earn
positive profits from participating in the new
issues market. In fact, retail investors
subscribe more heavily to underpriced issues,
consistent with individuals being partially
informed. In particular, there is no evidence of
a winner’s curse on retail investors in the sense
that informed investors demand larger
allocations of hot offerings and smaller
allocations of those issues identified as
overpriced.
Wolfgang Bessler (Giessen University) acted
as discussant. On the paper of Cumming,
Fleming and Schwienbacher, he first wondered
about the optimal investment strategies for VC
firms when the value of the exit market and the
firm valuation are high. He pointed out that
VCs may prefer investing in later stage projects
in order to avoid overvalued early ones and
benefit from good exit conditions. In his view,
VCs should care more about the valuation of
the stock market than about its liquidity. He
also wondered whether there exists a trade-off
between the choice of technology and exit risk.
Regarding the paper by Tykvová  and Walz, he
first pointed out that it is recommendable to
control for industry effects. Then he wondered
whether analysing firms’ performance 2 years
after the IPO is not too long, as VCs influence
at Neue Markt is of limited duration
(approximately 6 months). Finally, he pointed
out that the results should be carefully
interpreted,  since there are only few public
VC-backed firms in the sample the authors
consider. Then, on the paper by Pons, Bessler
wondered whether underwriters are able to
recognise underpriced and overpriced IPOs. He
also asked why preferential allocations
concerned primarily foreign institutional
investors and not local investors? Finally, he
pointed out that high initial returns on the
market may be a possible explanation for why
retail investors did not suffer losses. Tykvová
replied that a sector decomposition was not
possible at this stage due to lack of data. She
also recalled that only long-run performance
was of interest to them.
SESSION 3.1 SECURITIES SETTLEMENT
SYSTEMS
Vítor Gaspar (ECB) chaired the session and
introduced  Jens Tapking (ECB) who
presented  “Raising rival’s costs in the
securities settlement industry”, joint work
with Cornelia Holthausen (ECB). This
theoretical paper describes a model of price
competition between two settlement service
providers, a national CSD and a custodian
bank. The CSD sets two prices, customers have
to pay a price q for having a securities account
with the CSD and another price p for settling a
transaction on such an account. The custodian
bank does the same. There are many other
banks that have to trade a security issued into
the CSD. Each of these “investor banks” trades
once. To settle its transaction, each investor
bank needs to have a security either with the
CSD directly or with the custodian bank.
Which of the two service providers an investor
bank chooses depends on the prices and on the
preferences of the investor bank for the
heterogeneous services offered by the CSD and
the custodian bank. The custodian bank itself
needs to have a securities account with the CSD
to settle transactions between an investor bank
with an account with the CSD and another
investor bank with an account with the
custodian bank. It is shown that the CSD can
raise the custodian bank’s costs in a subtle way:
As mentioned above, each investor bank trades
only once, i.e. investor banks with an account
with the CSD have to pay the price q once and
also the price p once to the CSD. The custodian
bank also has to pay q to the CSD once.
However, it has to pay the price p many times.
The CSD can raise the custodian banks costs
without changing the costs of its investor bank
customers by increasing – and decreasing – by
the same amount. It is shown that by this
strategy, the CSD can achieve a higher market
share than the custodian bank. However, it is
also shown that this market share is not110
ECB
Capital markets and financial integration in Europe
December 2004
necessarily too high from a welfare point of
view. The authors concluded saying that
regarding concerns about unfair practices by
CSDs toward custodian banks, the ECB could
discourage regulatory interventions favoring
custodian banks, as long as CSDs are not
allowed to price discriminate between
custodian banks and investor banks.
Karlo Kauko (Bank of Finland) presented the
paper “Interlinking securities settlement
systems: A strategic commitment?”. This paper
provides an explanation for why links between
CSDs are set up, but not often used. In the first
part of the paper, it is assumed that a CSD first
sets a price for settling primary market
transactions. Then investors and issuers agree
on primary market transactions and these
transactions are settled. Next, the CSD sets a
price for settling secondary market
transactions. Finally, secondary market
transactions are agreed upon and settled. It
is assumed that primary market transactions
and secondary market transactions are
complementary goods, i.e. there is little benefit
from primary market transactions without
secondary market transactions. Knowing this,
the CSD will set a relatively high price for
secondary market transactions. In expectation
of this, the investors and issuers trade on the
primary market only if the primary market
settlement price is very low. In the second part
of the paper, it is assumed that the CSD can set
up a link to another CSD so that secondary
market transactions can also be settled in the
other CSD. In other words, if the issuer CSD
chooses a very high secondary market price,
settlement will take place in the other CSD.
Hence, the issuer CSD can commit on lower
secondary market prices by setting up the link.
It now can choose a relatively high primary
market price and increase its profit. However,
the link is hardly used.
The last paper of the session was “Economies of
scale and technological developments in
securities depository and settlement systems”,
by Markku Malkamaki (Bank of Finland),
Juhu Tarkka (Bank of Finland) and Heiko
Schmiedel (ECB). This paper investigates the
existence and extent of economies of scale in
depository and settlement systems. The authors
show that settlement in Europe is 33% more
costly than in the US, as the average cost per
settled transaction is $3.86 in Europe and only
$2.90 in the US. This difference is partly
explained by the segmentation in the European
market as the average cost for operating an
international Central Security Depository in
Europe is $40.54, relative to $3.11 for a
domestic one, while it is only $2.90 in the US.
However, looking at the exploitation of
economies of scale in Europe and the US, they
also show that the latter is operating at a much
more efficient level. The European settlement
infrastructures show a strong potential for cost
saving: cost will raise by a factor of only 0.68
when the number of instructions increases by 1
– while the same measure for the US is 0.944.
Hence, Europe has a lot to gain from further
consolidation. However, given the level of
complexity in EU international securities
settlement systems, the effectiveness of
settlement industry infrastructure may benefit
from further regulations simplifying the
procedure for cross-border settlement as for
instance advocated in the second Giovannini
report (2002).
Charles Kahn (University of Illinois) acted as
discussant. In the discussion of Holthausen and
Tapking’s paper, he emphasised that if costs of
settlements are mostly fixed costs (or cost by
account or transaction) then CSDs should be
restrained from limiting rivals’ size, as there
would be no networking externalities.  He also
suggested to calibrate the different cost
structures to pin down the extent of the network
externalities, which in turn would make the
policy implications of the paper more precise.
The major point in the discussion of Kauko’s
paper was the question of whether the primary
market really plays an important role in the
pricing process, given that primary market
volumes are much lower than secondary market
volumes. In particular, Kahn questioned the
assumption that CSDs make most of their profit
from the primary issue of securities and,
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for this, are willing to trade-off their profit on
the secondary market.  Finally, on the last
paper, Kahn stressed the high quality of the
analysis carried out, despite data limitations.
He wondered whether conditioning on the
type of institutions owning the settlement
infrastructures could have affected the result.
Finally, other types of robustness checks were
proposed, such as dropping ICSDs from the
sample or measuring the output of CSDs using
the number of securities they handle.
Gaspar  suggested Malkamaki, Tarkka and
Schmiedel to consider whether there is
economies of scope inherent in securities
settlement activities, which would make this
industry a natural monopoly. He warned that
for such an exercise the output would have to be
carefully defined. He further commented on the
first two papers that it would be interesting to
distinguish the importance of the interaction of
the primary and secondary markets. Albert
Menkveld  (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
then asked about the relative importance of
securities settlement costs relative to other
costs of issuing a security, such as bid-ask
spreads, broker commissions, etc. From the
floor, comments were made on the level of
competition in the settlement industry, which
provides a service to brokers, and on the
competition from international CSDs. In this
respect, the question of the value-added of
internalisation was raised. On the last paper,
the audience also asked for clarification as to
whether fixed or variable costs are important
for economies of scale.
Related to the issue of competition, Tapking
replied that if there is more than one custodian
bank, the equilibrium market share of the CSD
might be too small from a welfare point of
view. In response to Kahn, he suggested that in
reality the variable costs of settlement might
not be as low as suggested by Kahn, as there are
several million transactions per year. However,
if these variable costs are assumed to be zero,
then the market share of the CSD will be higher
than socially optimal. He also replied that
endogenising behaviour on the primary market
would not affect their results. Finally he noted
that settlement prices can indeed matter,
especially when CSDs are profit maximisers.
Then Kauko commented that it is not clear that
CSDs’ strategy would be modified if they were
user owned, rather than for profit institutions.
Also, he clarified that investors always have
the choice whether to participate or not.
Therefore, issuers have to offer an interesting
enough deal to investors. Finally, Schmiedel
reckoned that GDP per capita was a very rough
proxy for inputs, but had to be used due to
limited data availability. He also took note of
the propositions for other output proxies.
SESSION 3.2 THE DETERMINANTS
OF VC INVESTMENTS
Jan-Pieter Krahnen (CFS) chaired the session
and introduced Douglas Cumming (University
of Alberta) who presented the paper “The legal
road to replicating Silicon Valley”, joint with
John Armour (University of Cambridge). The
authors consider whether legal reforms can
make a significant difference in the structure of
the VC industry. To carry out the analysis, they
use 13 years (1990-2002) of data from the
European Venture Capital Association
(EVCA), Venture Economics and the Canadian
Venture Capital Association, regarding private
equity investment from 15 developed
countries, with 195 overall observations. In
order to test for how law matters for the supply
of VC finance, the authors use an index of legal
and fiscal variables – such as the tax
transparency for domestic investors, or the
ability to avoid paying VAT – set out by the
EVCA. Using this index, they find that
favourable tax and legal environments increase
the supply of venture capital and facilitate the
creation of VC firms. Furthermore the authors
study the impact of personal bankruptcy laws
on the demand for VC finance. They find that
severe personal bankruptcy laws discourage
early stage entrepreneurs and therefore
significantly reduces the demand for VC
finance. Finally, Douglas Cumming reported
that government programs in favour of early
stage projects crowd out venture capital and112
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private equity investment by significantly
reducing overall industry profits per GDP. He
concluded that the road to establishing an
active private equity market is paved with
favourable tax laws and legal structures
favourable to VCs, appropriate bankruptcy
laws and only very small direct government
investments programs.
Tuomas Takalo (Bank of Finland) then
presented the paper “Investor protection and
business creation” (with Ari Hyytinen,
University of California, Berkeley). The
objective of this theoretical paper is to study
the effects of investor protection on the
creation of start-ups. More precisely, the
authors study the existence of a trade-off
between investors protection and business
creation. The source of the trade-off is that
investor protection, while increasing the
willingness of investors to lend, potentially
reduces the incentives of entrepreneurs to set
up firms. To make this point clear, the authors
use a theoretical model of search with moral
hazard. Search frictions can delay financing of
projects. There are two types of moral hazard:
entrepreneurs can choose between a project
yielding only private benefits with certainty
and a project yielding transferable benefits
with some probability; also, in case
entrepreneurs chose the latter, they can
misrepresent the outcome of this project.
Investors possess an audit technology at a cost
to monitor the result of the project. Audit costs
and private benefits are both declining in the
degree of investors protection chosen by the
government. By increasing investor protection,
entrepreneurs have diminished incentives to
enter the search market to set up a firm, thus
reducing the creation of companies. However,
investor protection favours a reduction in the
cost of finance, as audit costs are lowered.
Tuomas Takalo concluded stating that reforms
improving investors’ position can have very
different consequences depending on whether
they imply a reduction in audit costs or a
limitation in the choice of projects. In this
regard, the authors proposed that small
companies be liberated from many of the
investor protection regulations, but perhaps not
from transparency regulation.
Giovanna Nicodano (University of Turin)
presented the last paper of this session, “What
drives the structure of private equity
investment?” co-authored with Marco Da Rin
(University of Turin, ECGI and IGIER) and
Alessandro Sembenelli (University of Turin).
The paper studies the determinant of the
structure of private equity investments. The
authors provide first a model where demand
and supply factors affect the distribution of
financing between venture capital and non-
venture private equity, and between early stage
and late stage venture capital investments. The
model consists of a moral hazard problem à la
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), where
entrepreneurs can either invest in a good
project or a bad project that yields them private
benefits. Entrepreneurs have collateral they
can pledge and they can ask two types of
investors for funds. Uninformed investors and
investors that have access to an audit
technology at a cost. The authors associate the
latter type of investors with private equity
investors. They prove that the private equity
ratios fall in response to a reduction of both
project returns and private equity funds, when
the supply of uninformed capital is infinitely
elastic. Also, an increase in the supply of
private equity funds, when there is excess
supply of private equity, affects neither
aggregate nor private equity investments, nor
the private equity ratios. Using data from
EVCA for 17 Europeans countries for 14 years
(1988-2001), the authors find evidence that
was the possibility of an excess supply of
venture capital funds in Europe in the 1990s.
Also, they find that the opening of New
Markets in some countries in the mid 1990s
helps explain the increase in the share of early
stage and high-tech venture capital
investments. Finally, they find that public
expenditure in R&D is significantly positively
related to the share of high-tech investments.
Heather Gibson (Bank of Greece) acted as
discussant. On the paper by Takalo and113
ECB
Capital markets and financial integration in Europe
December 2004
ANNEX E
Hyytinen, she wondered to what extent the
principal-agent problem exists between
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists who have
a more “hands on” approach. She argued that
the information asymmetry could be more
stringent at the search stage, where VCs have to
identify the quality of the project before they
invest funds. On the paper by Armour and
Cumming, she noticed that the EVCA legal
index was only from 2003 and therefore no time
series analysis was possible. She wondered
whether this would matter given the recent
various initiatives, e.g. from the European
Commission. She also asked the authors to
clarify their interpretation that government
funds crowd out private investors because the
latter have to commit to projects before they
know how much public funds will become
available in the market. Finally, she wondered
whether results of the effect of the legal
environment and government finance on the
industry profit would differ if instead of
evaluating profit through stock market returns,
profit was evaluated using accounting data, as
in the M&A literature. On the last paper,
Gibson wondered to what extent the results are
driven by the period of interest which is
characterised by a rising stock market. She also
noted that no variables was capturing changes
in the legal environment that occurred during
the sample period. Finally, she asked Nicodano
about survey evidence pointing to the lack of
funds as being the problem rather than to the
lack of good projects.
Krahnen then opened the floor for further
questions. He started by asking Nicodano for a
possible explanation for the positive effects of
government funds, which contrasts with the
result of Cumming. Regarding the first paper, it
was asked from the floor whether local factors
could explain the phenomenon observed in
the Silicon Valley. Then Nicodano asked
Cumming to what extent measuring private
equity returns using stock market returns affect
the results.
Takalo acknowledged Gibson’s comment and
argued that information asymmetries related to
entrepreneurs’ behaviour could still persist ex-
post. Cumming argued that a time series
analysis on the basis of the legal index would
be quite involving as they would have to
compute the index for 15 countries across 13
years. As far as returns are concerned, he
explained that using alternative measures of
returns does not significantly affect the results.
Interestingly, he finds that the effect of returns
matter much for different stages of project
development. Finally, he explained that the
data are aggregated at such a level that it is not
possible to compare VC industries at the
regional level. Nicodano confirmed that they
controlled for the effect of the market bubble
and therefore would reject the claim that the
results on excess supply is driven by the
bubble. She reckoned that institutions have
been varying through time but explained that
they could not find any index capturing such
changes. She explained the claim that the
government subsidies reduce the supply of
funds: in equilibrium the supply of funds is not
observed, hence, this claim can be understood
as the government subsidies reducing the
equilibrium investment level.
PLENARY PANEL SESSION
Alberto Giovannini (Unifortune) chaired the
Policy Panel of the workshop and made a few
introductory remarks. First he noted a change
in attitudes of policy makers and market
participants with regard to financial
integration, which is not any more considered
as a threat to domestic financial systems.
However he noted that legislation put into
place to protect local providers are now
working in favour of large global providers,
emptying out local regions of financial
intermediaries that are needed to foster
progress there. Hence he remarked a move
toward legal harmonisation that would allow
equal access to capital across all regions.
Giovannini then recalled the three European
Commission’s objective in reforming post-
trading in Europe: (1) to maximise the benefits
of scale by creating one single post-trading
area, (2) to insure that the gains from scales are114
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available to all and (3) to maximise the risk-
benefits of scale by designing the most
efficient structure resilient to systemic risk. He
warned that while governments are taking
initiatives, it is also the responsibility of
private players to achieve a market solution
consistent with the three objectives. He then
introduced the four panel participants.
Kenneth Garbade (Federal Reserve Bank of
New York) asked whether financial market
reforms are only undertaken as a response to
crisis, elaborating on the case of the US
Treasury markets. He underlined three
episodes of failures that concentrated the
attention of policy makers on settlement issues
and prompted policy reforms in two of these
instances. (1) He mentioned first a back-office
crisis in the late 1960s caused by an unforeseen
increase in trading volume and settlement
processes based on settlement of trade with
physical delivery of bonds. Dealers were
reluctant to make trades with same day
settlement which threatened the execution of
U.S. monetary policy. As a response the Fed
created a security holding facility and
expanded its book entry system. (2) The second
episode is the destruction of several inter-
dealer brokers and the temporary loss of a
settlement system during the events of 09.11.
In his view, these events highlighted the
importance of back up facilities in dispersed
locations. Also, the loss of information on
anonymous trade commitments created the
need to maintain this information in an
electronic format that could be disseminated
rapidly. Most of the disrupted settlement
during these events where repurchase
agreements, illustrating the significance of the
market for Treasury securities. In addition,
failures can spread when investors do not lend
securities any more. The reluctance to lend on
the run issues to dealers that needed them to
cure settlement failures was only solved when
the Treasury re-opened the on the run 10 year
notes in early October, thus demonstrating its
willingness to take un-precedent actions to
solve the problem. (3) He finally mentioned a
problem involving the 10 year note auction of
May 2003. The demand to borrow the note to
deliver against short sales rose dramatically in
late June, when investors realised that the Fed
was unlikely to pursue any effort to reduce
future long term interest rate. The special
collateral repo rate for the May 10 year note fell
rapidly near zero, thus giving little incentive
for sellers to borrow the note to avoid failure.
Increasing failures left investors reluctant to
lend the note. The problem here originated
from the equilibrium dynamics of the market
and not from an exogenous shock. The better
solution would then seem to be a change in the
market structure than an action from the
Treasury.
Randy Kroszner (University of Chicago)
focused his remarks on the trade-off between
fragmentation or consolidation of securities
settlement systems and the resiliency of the
system. Fragmentation can provide sources of
diversification and competition as well as
redundancy in case of unforeseen events, while
consolidation can exploit economies of scale
but also can lead to a monopoly. With respect to
this trade-off, he emphasised that future
attempts to articulate or integrate Asian,
European and North American systems will
create important challenges for regulators.
However, Kroszner stressed that market forces
should not be underestimated in coming up
with solutions. To make his point, he took the
example of the early Chicago derivatives
market where the clearing house played an
important role in ensuring consistency of
contract terms and homogeneity in credit risk
in being the counterparty to all traders. Also,
market participants set up a regulatory
structure such as requiring capital minima. To
conclude, he pointed out that while regulatory,
fiscal and legal uncertainty barriers should be
brought down, it might not be desirable to force
excess uniformity from regulators as the
optimal solution might vary with time.
Anso Thiré (Euroclear) who replaced Joel
Mérère commented on the fragmentation of
the European securities infrastructures. He
recalled that the total cost of CSD and ICSD for115
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Europe represents 1.5 billion  euros in
operating expenses, i.e. 1.3 times the cost of
DTCC in the U.S. This proves that significant
scale economies can be realised. However, he
pointed out that it is difficult to implement such
gains, as most stock exchanges and CSDs are
monopolies in their own markets. Obviously,
costs could be brought down via further
competition. However Thiré said that most of
cross-border settlements take place in books of
a few large banks that operate for profit and that
CSDs are not active in this market. As a
consequence, he argued that a common
platform accessible by all could be a solution.
The drawback of this solution is that nobody
could force CSDs to participate in such a
platform. In the absence of competition, some
form of price regulation would be needed to
prevent service providers (including large
custodians) from abusing potentially dominant
positions. Finally, Mr Thiré highlighted some
positive features of user-owned governance
structures which, in his view, ensure that the
users’ needs are taken into account fairly well.
Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell (ECB) first
recalled the lack of integration in European
securities infrastructure. This is at the source
of many costs, such as linking different
settlement systems, that further consolidation
and/or more competition could reduce if not
eliminate. In her view, a process of reshaping
the current state of European infrastructure is
inevitable. In this regard, she argued that
public action may be warranted to foster the
process of integration in this industry. She
claimed that while it is clear that the
elimination of the barriers identified by the
Giovannini group is a necessary condition for
an efficient infrastructure to emerge, it is may
not be sufficient. Market failures can prevent
market forces to freely develop and an efficient
market infrastructure to emerge. For instance,
Ms. Tumpel-Gugerell pointed to the difficulty
in allocating the overall benefits that can be
reaped from the shift to a consolidated
infrastructure, or the vested interests of
custodian banks to maintain fragmentation.
She then recalled the ECB’s view that market
forces should drive the process of
consolidation. In this respect, she mentioned
that the ECB has been active as a catalyst for
improvement by encouraging discussions
among the relevant players, on harmonising
central banks procedures and operations, on
setting standards and co-operating  with the
Committee of European Securities Regulators
to ensure an integrated regulatory and
oversight framework. She finally called for
further research on several topics, such as
findings evidence of market power, or
determining the level of competition in the
European securities infrastructures.
Vítor Gaspar (ECB) asked the panel
participants to elaborate further on the balance
between the prospects for market failure and
the prospects for public intervention failure,
which could arise from e.g. information
constraints. He also wondered whether the
multiplicity of authorities with overlapping
competencies in Europe is a relevant problem.
Kroszner replied that characterising the trade-
off is an impossible task. He argued that this is
the reason for promoting flexibility as neither
the market nor the government have enough
information to design the exact solution.
Tumpel-Gugerell then intervened on the issue
of multiple regulators in Europe. She argued
that the problem is about the speed with which
decisions are taken and would favour public
accountability related to the decision process.
On the public intervention failure, she
mentioned that one problem is the actual
enforcement of regulations rather than
regulations. However she stressed the need for
harmonisation of regulations. On the
regulatory aspects, Thiré took the case of
Euroclear that has five subsidiaries in each of
the member countries, facing five different
regulators. Since there is no Europeans
regulator, national regulators sign a
memorandum of understanding, which relies
on the sharing of information. Arnaud Marès
(ECB) then asked whether there could be ways
to lower costs, such as user ownership.
Giovannini explained that advocating a
particular market model would appear116
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premature at this stage, although the
Giovannini Group developed three interesting
different scenarios. He also argued that giving
the right incentives to managers to reduce costs
is possible without a for profit structure. Thiré
recalled that markets have a private agenda and
regulators might have difficulties to have the
correct feedback on how the industry really
works. Related to this topic, Giovannini
proposed that a more formal and systematic
procedure of consultation between the
regulator and market participants be used.
Kroszner then advocated that incentives to
managers can be and must be set up right
whether in a corporation or a user owned
structure. Then Thiré reported that the bonuses
granted to managers in his company are
determined on the basis of a variety of factors,
out of which profit is only one element and not
even the most important one. More important
are factors such as customer satisfaction,
timely and effective implementation of
projects, staff turnover etc. Jan-Pieter
Krahnen (CFS) then asked the panel
participants their views on the tension between
competition and consolidation and why
customers could not choose between two
clearing systems.  Thiré replied that the answer
lies in cost savings for banks only, where one
provider suffices to settle. Regarding
competition, he argued that opening up
clearing and settlement systems will create
more costs for customers as netting
possibilities will be reduced and collateral
requirements increased. Related to the US
clearing situation where two big banks cleared
internally trades prior to the 09.11 events,
Joseph Bisignano (BIS) asked Ken Garbade
whether these events constituted a test to
determine which of these two banks were best –
given that one of this bank fared poorly in its
trading activities. Garbade replied that one
back-up facility indeed failed, but none of the
dealers that cleared through this bank switched
to the other bank. He also elaborated on
competition arguing that it does not appear as
price competition in this sector.
CLOSING REMARKS
Vítor Gaspar (ECB) closed the workshop with
some remarks. He first reviewed some of the
important findings of the papers presented in
the workshop in the three main areas on the
program, namely (1) European securities
settlement systems, (2) Start-up financing and
new markets and (3) European bond markets.
He mentioned that further consolidation is
warranted by the evidence of significant
economies of scale in this industry, noting the
fact that vertical integration can prevent the
efficient consolidation of trading and
settlement platforms as a striking result. He
singled out Marco Da Rin’s claim that there is
very little integration of the European venture
capital industry and wished that further efforts
be made in this direction. Finally, on corporate
bond markets he highlighted the differing
access of firms to the bond markets over the
business cycle, and the effects of monetary
policy on the liquidity of (government) bond
markets, as particularly relevant for central
bankers.
He then announced the Network will conclude
its first 2 years of existence with a final
symposium in Frankfurt on 10th and 11th of May
2004, covering all the three main areas of
interest to the Network, namely (1) the
implications of European financial integration,
especially for banking, the development of
important financial market segments, their
regulation and infrastructures, (2) Financial
system structures in Europe, in particular asset
securitisation, corporate governance and
control, and economic performance, and
(3) Financial linkages between Europe, the US
and Japan. The best papers presented at the
final symposium will be invited for submission
to a special issue of the “Review of Finance”.
Vítor Gaspar also announced that the next
phase of the workshop is already under
preparation.  In this next phase, more attention
will be geared toward financial system
modernisation and its impact on economic
growth in Europe. Also, the Network will seek117
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to foster research on the relationship between
financial integration and financial stability.
Finally, the development of the financial
systems of countries acceding to the euro area
will be of particular interest.
Finally, he thanked the local organisers,
George Tavlas, Panayotis Thomopoulos,
Nicholas Tsaveas, Heather Gibson and Tina
Kourkoutsaki for having hosted the workshop.118
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Day 1 (Monday 10 May, 2004)
8:30-9:00 Registration
8:45-9:15 Welcoming coffee
9:15-9:30 Vítor Gaspar (European Central Bank)
Opening Remarks
9:30-10:15 Alexandre Lamfalussy (Université Catholique de Louvain)
Keynote Speech on European Bond Markets
10:15-10:30 Discussion
10:30-11:00 Coffee break
11:00-13:00 Parallel sessions
Session 1.1: European government bond market microstructure
Chair: Ignazio Angeloni (European Central Bank)
Bruno Biais (University of Toulouse) Liquidity and the cost of funds in the
European treasury market (with Antoine Renucci and Gilles Saint-Paul,
University of Toulouse)
Marco Pagano (University of Salerno) Valuation, liquidity and risk in
government bond markets (with Carlo Favero, Università Commerciale Luigi
Bocconi and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, University of Lausanne)
Albert J. Menkveld (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) Euro-area sovereign yield
dynamics: The role of order imbalance (with Yiu C. Cheung and Frank de Jong,
University of Amsterdam)
12:30-12:45 Discussant: Eli Remolona (Bank for International Settlements)
12:45-13:00 Open discussion
Session 1.2:  Bank competition and its implications
Chair: Nicholas Tsaveas (Bank of Greece)
Steven Ongena (Tilburg University) The impact of competition on bank
orientation and specialization (with Hans Degryse, Tilburg University)
ANNEX F PROGRAM AND SUMMARY OF THE
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Elena Carletti (University of Mannheim and Center for Financial Studies)
Multi-bank lending: diversification and free-riding in monitoring (with Vittoria
Cerasi, Università degli Studi di Milano Bicocca, and Sonja Daltung, Sveriges
Riksbank)
Stefan Arping (University of Amsterdam) Playing hardball: relationship
banking in the age of credit derivatives
12:30-12:45 Discussant: Bruno Parigi (University of Padova)
12:45-13:00 Open discussion
13:00-14:30 Lunch
14:30-16:30 Parallel sessions
Session 2.1: International financial linkages – capital flows
Chair: Holger Wolf (Georgetown University)
Rui Albuquerque (University of Rochester) International equity flows and
returns: A quantitative equilibrium approach (with Gregory H. Bauer,
University of Rochester and Martin Schneider, New York University)
Jonas Vlachos (University of Chicago) Does regulatory harmonization
increase bilateral asset holdings?
Michael Halling (University of Vienna) Where is the market? Evidence from
cross-listings (with Marco Pagano, University of Salerno, Otto Randl,
University of Vienna and Josef Zechner, University of Vienna)
16:00-16:15 Discussant: Philip Lane (University of Dublin, Trinity College)
16:15-16:30 Open discussion
Session 2.2: Financial structures, competition and growth
Chair: Luigi Guiso (University of Sassari)
Stijn Claessens (University of Amsterdam) Competition in the financial sector
and growth: A cross-country perspective (with Luc Laeven, World Bank)
Solomon Tadesse (University of South Carolina) Financial architecture and
technology
Enisse Kharroubi (DELTA and Banque de France) Financial integration: For
whom can it be a wrong medicine?120
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16:00-16:15 Discussant: Yrjö Koskinen (Stockholm School of Economics)
16:15-16:30 Open discussion
16:30-17:00 Coffee break
17:00-17:30 Measures of financial integration (Lieven Baele, Ghent University, Annalisa
Ferrando, Peter Hoerdahl, Elizaveta Krylova and Cyril Monnet, European
Central Bank)
17:30-17:45 Discussant: Michael Melvin (Arizona State University)
17:45-18:00 Open discussion
19:30 Dinner
Otmar Issing (European Central Bank)
Dinner Speech on Asset Prices and Monetary Policy
Day 2 (Tuesday May 11, 2004)
8:15-8:45 Registration
8:30-9:00 Coffee
9:00-9:45 Robert Flood (International Monetary Fund)
Key Lecture on New Approaches to Assess Financial Integration
9:45-10:00 Discussion
10:00-10:30 Coffee break
10:30-12:30 Parallel sessions
Session 3.1: Topics in financial integration
Chair: Francesco Drudi (European Central Bank)
Mark Carey (Federal Reserve Board) Is the corporate loan market globally
integrated? A pricing puzzle (with Greg Nini, Federal Reserve Board)
Thomas Harr (University of Copenhagen)  Branch or subsidiary? Capital
regulations of multinational banks (with Thomas Roende, University of
Copenhagen)
Jens Tapking (European Central Bank) Horizontal and vertical integration in
securities trading and settlement (with Jing Yang, Bank of England)
12:00-12:15 Discussant: Harry Huizinga (Tilburg University)
12:15-12:30 Open discussion121
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Session 3.2: International financial linkages – comovements
Chair: Michael Binder (University of Frankfurt and Center for Financial
Studies)
Clara Vega (University of Rochester) Real-time price discovery in stock, bond
and foreign exchange markets (with Torben G. Andersen, Northwestern
University, Tim Bollerslev, Duke University and Francis X. Diebold,
University of Pennsylvania)
Robert Connolly (University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill) Commonality in
the time-variation of stock-bond and stock-stock return co-movements (with
Chris Stiversm, University of Georgia and Licheng Sun, Penn State Erie)
Philipp Hartmann (European Central Bank) The breadth of currency crises
(with Stefan Straetmans, Maastricht Universiy and C.G. de Vries, Erasmus
University of Rotterdam)
12:00-12:15 Discussant: Paolo Pasquariello (University of Michigan)
12:15-12:30 Open discussion
12:30-13:45 Lunch
13:45-15:15 Policy Panel: Drivers of european financial integration – markets or
policy?
Moderator: Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (European Central Bank)
Mario Draghi  (Goldman Sachs)
Alexander Schaub  (European Commission)
Jens Thomsen (Danmarks Nationalbank)
15:15-15:45 Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell (European Central Bank)
Speech on The Role of the ECB in Financial Integration
15:45-16:15 Coffee Break
16:15-18:15 Parallel sessions
Session 4.1: Firm financing and corporate governance
Chair: Jan-Pieter Krahnen (University of Frankfurt and Center for Financial
Studies)
Mihir Desai (Harvard University) Institutions, capital constraints and
entrepreneurial firm dynamics: evidence from Europe (with Paul Gompers and
Josh Lerner, both Harvard University)122
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Renée Adams (Stockholm School of Economics) A theory of friendly boards
(with Daniel Ferreira, SITE, Stockholm School of Economics)
João A. C. Santos (Federal Reserve Bank of New York) Identifying the effect of
managerial control on firm performance (with Renée Adams, Stockholm
School of Economics)
17:45-18:00 Discussant: Giancarlo Spagnolo (Sveriges Riksbank and
University of Mannheim)
18:00-18:15 Open discussion
Session 4.2:  Systemic risk
Chair: Garry Schinasi (International Monetary Fund)
Reint Gropp (European Central Bank) Bank contagion in Europe (with Jukka
Vesala, European Central Bank)
Grégory Nguyen (National Bank of Belgium) Interbank exposures: An
empirical examination of systemic risk in the Belgian banking system (with
Hans Degryse, Tilburg University)
Giulia Iori (Kings College, London) An analysis of liquidity and systemic risk
in alternative securities settlement architectures
17:45-18:00 Discussant: Kostas Tsatsaronis (Bank for International
Settlements)
18:00-18:15 Open discussion123
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On 29-30 April 2002, the European Central
Bank  (ECB) and the Center for Financial
Studies (CFS) hosted a workshop at the ECB to
launch their network initiative aiming at
promoting research on “Capital Markets and
Financial Integration in Europe”. The research
network aims at co-ordinating and stimulating
top-level policy-oriented research that
significantly contributes to the ECB’s
understanding of developments in European
financial structure and the linkages between
European financial systems and those in the
United States and Japan. The format is a
network of people and its key feature is a strong
interaction between researchers in academia,
the ECB, other Eurosystem central banks and
other official institutions. On the basis of the
discussions held during the Launching
workshop regarding the areas where research is
needed, five top priorities areas have been
selected: (1) bank competition and the
geographical scope of banking activities;
(2) international portfolio choices and asset
market linkages between Europe, the United
States and Japan; (3) European bond markets;
(4) European securities settlement systems;
and (5) the emergence and evolution of new
markets in Europe (in particular start-up
financing markets). Subsequent workshops
were designed to cover these different areas.
The Symposium took place at the ECB in
Frankfurt on 10 and 11 May 2004, and aimed to
conclude two years of work under the network.
It combined research key lectures, research
paper presentations on the five priority areas,
and a plenary panel discussion on “Drivers of
financial integration: market or policy”, which
was chaired by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa
(European Central Bank) and included Mario
Draghi (Goldman Sachs), Alexander Schaub
(European Commission) and Jens Thomsen
(Danmarks Nationalbank) as panellists. This
document summarises the network
Symposium.
INTRODUCTION124
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Vítor Gaspar (ECB) opened the Symposium
with some brief remarks. He first recalled that
the original idea of the ECB-CFS Research
network was to form a coherent group of
researchers with different backgrounds, linked
by their interest in the integration of European
financial markets. He noted that in his view this
had been achieved. He also noted that a major
achievement of the network was to kick-start
new research in the area of securities
settlement systems. He then went on to
describe the role of the euro in fostering
financial integration. It forced national
governments to adopt economic policies
geared toward price stability and balanced
fiscal positions. This led to a general
convergence of the economies of the euro area,
which was clearly reflected in the impressive
convergence of bond and money market yields
in the run-up to EMU. With the introduction of
the euro, a euro-wide money market was
created almost instantaneously. Country
spreads in the overnight interbank rate became
negligible and were driven to zero shortly
afterwards. He recalled that similar
developments occurred in the government bond
markets, although significant cross-country
differences remain. The elimination of
currency risks and the accompanying
harmonisation of financial regulations have led
at the same time to a drastic reduction in
transaction costs across euro area financial
markets. Also, he mentioned that the increase
in the number of potential investors and the
reduction in underwriting costs led to a
substantial increase in the amount of corporate
bond net issues.
He continued with the role of banks in the
European financial system. The traditional
function of intermediation between deposits
and loans has diminished, given the increased
importance of investment funds, pension funds
and insurance companies. For investment
banks, geographical national boundaries that
once limited their scope of activities have lost
meaning. Mergers and acquisitions, instead,
have been used to gain access to the retail
sector of foreign countries. Finally, he
concluded that the euro was a major force
fostering the development of European
financial markets, and that these profound
transformations have important real
implications in terms of growth.
Gaspar then introduced Alexandre
Lamfalussy (Université Catholique de
Louvain) who delivered a keynote Speech on
the European Bond Markets.
Mr. Lamfalussy tackled three problems in his
key lecture: (1) the impediments to further
integration and efficiency of the euro
denominated bond markets; (2) the evolving
regulatory structures in the European securities
markets; and (3) the existing co-movements
between US and euro area long-term interest
rates.
Regarding the first topic, Mr. Lamfalussy first
recalled that while the unsecured overnight
interbank market is almost perfectly
integrated, equity markets suffered the most
from a lack of integration, the euro
denominated government debt markets, lying
in between these two extremes. Despite the
progress toward financial integration, he
mentioned two barriers to further integration of
the government bond markets: the
segmentation in post trading arrangements and
the difficulty of creating a single issuer
instrument for government bonds. On the first
impediment, Mr. Lamfalussy evoked the work
of the Giovannini group, mentioning tax and
legal structures as a barrier to further
integration of securities clearing and
settlement systems. According to him, this
calls for further government action, as the
market cannot act upon these issues. He also
expressed his reluctance to adopt a model of
integration that would lead to a single CCP and
a single settlement platform in Europe. The
removal of legal barriers would be too lengthy a
process and full centralisation is not necessary
to achieve the full benefits of consolidation, as
techniques to interface the different systems
are now available. He would rather favour the
interconnection of the different settlement
DAY 1125
ECB
Capital markets and financial integration in Europe
December 2004
ANNEX F
systems  in real time. Although a difficult
endeavours, he would first recommend
spreading the techniques of electronic trading
platforms.
On the second impediment, Mr. Lamfalussy
recalled that a single issuer instrument for
government bonds would enhance the
efficiency of the government bond markets by
guaranteeing a much better liquidity than is
now the case. However he admits that a single
issuer for medium to long-term bonds is neither
feasible nor desirable, as there may be
substantial differences between countries.
However, he noticed that there are no rating
differences in the short-term end of the market
between countries. As a result, short-term
government bonds could be merged into a
single instrument. According to Mr.
Lamfalussy, this would substantially increase
liquidity and enhance the overall efficiency of
the government bond market.
Mr. Lamfalussy then moved onto describing
the evolving regulatory structure in European
securities market. He recalled that the
Committee of Wise Men advised to adopt an
open-ended solution on the issue of a European
regulator. This choice was driven by two
factors: first proposing a single regulator
would have slowed down the European
integration process, as some countries would
have opposed it strongly. Second, there was no
core European legislation in 2000-2001 on
which the action of a single regulator could be
based. However, things are now evolving fast.
The implementation of the FSAP will almost
certainly be completed in 2005 and will thus
provide a body of Europe-wide core legislation
providing the basic framework for the
functioning of financial markets.
However Mr. Lamfalussy recalled the
uncertainty surrounding the implementation of
the FSAP measures at the national level. The
successful implementation of the FSAP now
depends on CESR. He recalled that CESR
(Committee of European Securities
Regulators) worked out the implementation
details when dealing with the FSAP and will
now be in charge of overseeing the national
implementation.  However, CESR will have to
overcome very heterogeneous regulatory and
supervisory practices at the national level,
which will complicate its work as much
coordination among supervisors and regulators
will be needed.
Nonetheless, he noticed that reforms of the
regulatory structures at the national levels have
been taking place recently. New developments
are tackling the issue whether all financial
industry regulators should work on the same
roof or be separated, and the power that should
be granted to these bodies. Reforms reveal
national differences and create difficulties, as
they are not all going in the same direction.
Finally, Mr. Lamfalussy noted that the
ECOFIN extended the four level regulatory
process to banking and insurance. However,
further difficulties may appear, as in banking
and insurance prudential issues are key for
regulations while they are not so important for
securities. This raises the issue of micro versus
macro prudential policies, where crisis
prevention stops and crisis solution begins.
Difficulties may also be created by the
different roles of National Central Banks in this
process, as some are full macro-prudential
regulators while others are not. The basic
question is therefore: who should be in charge
and in what area? Regarding integration, he
recalled that better functioning markets bring
more growth but also tend to be less stable. He
would therefore encourage discussions on a
single regulator.
Finally, Mr. Lamfalussy tackled the question of
co-movements between US and euro area long-
term interest rates. Recent studies show
evidence that these long-term interest rates are
co-varying. He saw two possible explanations
for this phenomenon: 1) financial integration at
the world level and 2) an increased correlation
of the real economies and the lead of the US
economy over Europe’s. Mr. Lamfalussy126
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expressed the views that inflation expectation
triggered by much broader developments such
as oil prices may explain this phenomenon.
Gaspar then opened the floor for questions.
Christian Upper (Deutsche Bundesbank)
commented that a single issuer might cause
problems when or if the ratings for short-term
bonds, which are for the moment similar across
countries, diverge. Vítor Gaspar followed up
on this issue, questioning the ability of markets
to discriminate sovereign borrowers in terms of
credit risk. Marco Pagano (University of
Naples) pointed out that a way to monitor
individual countries in case a single issuer is in
place is to require them to issue T-bills in
parallel to the common issuance. In case the
ratings of the individual country issue
decrease, then the single issuer could choose
whether to keep this country in the common
issuance.  Bruno Biais (University of
Toulouse) remarked that it was not even
necessary to have a parallel issue for short-term
instruments as long-term instruments could as
well be used as monitoring device. Garry
Schinasi (IMF) asked what is the role of central
banks in crisis prevention and resolution. He
also asked whether central banks have a natural
role in ensuring financial stability. Mr.
Lamfalussy answered that neither is there little
doubt that the ECB should play a role in case of
a systemically important event, nor is there
many questions about its responsibility in
ensuring the proper functioning of the payment
system. However, he pointed out two
difficulties that may emerge in crisis
prevention/resolution. First, information needs
to flow without constraint from national
supervisory authorities (if any) to National
Central Banks to the ECB, for appropriate
measures to be taken. Second, crisis resolution
may require specific lending to take place, thus
requiring the involvement of governments. In a
world with multinational banks, proper and
speedy co-operation of governments may
therefore be needed.
Jing Jang (Bank of England) wondered
whether a fully integrated securities settlement
system always brings more systemic risk, and
whether a pure delivery versus payment system
would not to a large extent take care of this risk.
Mr. Lamfalussy underlined that to make a
system systemic-risk-proof is just a matter of
working out the details of the functioning of the
system. Rather, the reason why it looks riskier
is that it becomes the system, which may
require stronger security arrangements.
One question from the floor related to
consolidation in the European banking sector.
Mr. Lamfalussy is of the view that much
progress on consolidation has been made at the
domestic level in some countries, and there is
now an increasing potential for cross-border
initiatives. However these initiatives might be
discouraged if there is regulatory uncertainty.
Finally, related to a question on the lead
supervisor, he mentioned that this is a difficult
topic as the lead supervisor has an immediate
consequence on central banking assistance and
government involvement, for instance in terms
of deposit guarantees.
SESSION 1.1 EUROPEAN BOND MARKET
MICROSTRUCTURE
Eli Remolona (Bank for International
Settlements) chaired the session. He
introduced the first paper of the session
“Liquidity and the cost of funds in the
European treasury bills market” by Bruno
Biais, Antoine Renucci and Gilles Saint-Paul
(all IDEI, University of Toulouse). Using data
on yields and the amounts issued for Treasury
auctions in Belgium, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain between 2001
and 2003, the authors study how differences in
market microstructure across countries and
through time affect short-term yields in
government treasury auctions, and thus the cost
of funds for governments. To study their impact
on yields, they use macroeconomic variables,
such as the volatility of the stock market before
the auction and the ratio of public debt ratio.
They find that these variables have a
significant impact on yields. In particular,
large public deficit raise yields. Also, high127
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volatility in the stock market before the auction
reduces yields, thus allowing governments to
sell Treasury bills at relatively high price. They
also find that market microstructure affects
yields. For example, regularly issuing bills
significantly reduces yields. Also, when bills
are traded on a centralised, transparent
electronic limit order book such as MTS, their
liquidity rises and the yields significantly
decline. However, the authors find no support
for the hypothesis that the amount of bills
outstanding matters for yields. The main policy
implication of the paper is that governments
could enhance liquidity and reduce yields and
the costs of their funds by efficiently designing
the Treasury markets and securities. More
precisely, improving the microstructure of the
Treasury market – by using regular issuance
and a limit order book – increases yield spreads
relative to Euribor (from 2.9% to 6.2% for the
3 months maturity, for instance). This implies
that governments would raise euro 350.19
million more at the time of the auction.
Marco Pagano (University of Naples)
presented the paper “Valuation, liquidity and
risk in government bond markets” joint with
Carlo Favero (University of Bocconi) and
Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden (University of
Lausanne). This paper aims to explore the
determinants of observed yield differentials
between long-term sovereign bonds in the euro
area. The authors use daily data from Euro MTS
Group’s European Benchmark Market trading
platform for 5-year and 10-year maturities for
the period January 1992 to December 2003.
They show that there is a strong co-movement
among countries’ yield differentials between
sovereign bonds and German bonds. This
common trend appears to be highly correlated
with the differential between high-risk U.S.
corporate bonds and U.S. government bonds at
the corresponding maturity, a measure of the
international risk factor. In contrast, liquidity
differentials – as proxied by bid-ask spread
difference between the local and the German
relevant spread – display sizeable
heterogeneity and no common factor. This
suggests that liquidity is unlikely to have a
direct impact on yield differentials, while it
may have an impact through its interaction with
risk. The authors present a model in which
yield differentials should increase in both
liquidity and risk, with an interaction term
whose magnitude and sign depends on the size
of the liquidity differential with respect to the
reference country. Testing these predictions,
they find that the international risk factor is
consistently priced, especially for high-yield
countries and for longer maturities. However,
liquidity differentials are priced only for a
subset of five countries (out of a total of eight)
and their interaction with the risk factor is
crucial to detect their effect.
Albert J. Menkveld (Free University of
Amsterdam) then presented his paper “Euro-
area sovereign yield dynamics: the role of
order imbalance”, joint with Yiu C. Cheung
and Frank de Jong (both University of
Amsterdam). The project addresses the
behaviour of yields in the government bond
markets of Germany, France, Italy and
Belgium. Using data from Euro MTS, they
study daily changes in euro-area ten-year
sovereign yields by decomposing them into
benchmark (German) yield changes, common
yield spread changes, country-specific
changes, and temporary changes. They find
that none of the national order imbalances
influences benchmark yield innovations.
However, common yield spread innovations
are only driven by Italian imbalances. The
authors argue that dealers across Europe offset
any common yield spread exposure through the
highly liquid Italian market.
The discussant, Eli Remolona (Bank for
International Settlements) started with an
overview of the three papers, proceeding in
reverse order. On the paper by Menkveld, he
noted the striking result that order imbalances
have no effects on the benchmark yield
innovation. He also asked the author to
elaborate further on the role of information for
yield changes. In particular, how are yield
changes affected by the arrival of public
information? In particular, he mentioned the128
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well known reaction of European yields to US
announcements. Also, for order imbalances to
have a permanent effect, they must contain
information on fundamentals. Remolona
therefore concluded that it would be interesting
to know which fundamentals are driving the
Italian, Belgian and French imbalances. On the
paper presented by Pagano, the discussant
noted that the concept of liquidity used in the
model is not risky. He therefore suggested to
endogenise market liquidity by introducing
market makers in the model. Finally, on the
first paper, Remolona wondered whether the
design of the auction itself mattered for the
amount of funds that can be raised by
governments. He mentioned in particular the
case of the auction performed by ‘Google’.
Contrary to the usual practice of relying on
discriminatory auctions (where the winner
pays what she bids), they used a Dutch auction
(where the winner pays the cut-off bid).
Finally, he asked whether bank risk matters. To
control for market conditions, the authors used
the percentage spread against the Euribor,
which is an unsecured interbank rate. Most
banks in this market are AA rated banks, which
involves some risk in the long term. Hence,
controlling for bank risk may be advisable.
Eli Remolona then opened the floor for
questions.  Clara Vega (University of
Rochester) remarked that in the paper by
Pagano, the authors only look at country
specific risk and asked whether using a
common factor analysis to look at the
systematic liquidity risk would modify the
results.  On the same paper, Christian Upper
(Deutsche Bundesbank) wondered whether the
empirical implementation of the model would
be robust having a risky instead of a risk-free
benchmark bond. Finally, on the paper
presented by Menkveld, the result that Italian
order imbalances are important was
questioned. In particular, it was argued that
Belgian imbalances should have a more
prominent effect as this market is relatively
less liquid than the Italian one. Pagano replied
that the model and the results would generalise
to an environment with a risky benchmark
because the predictions are about the impact of
changes in relative risk. Menkveld
acknowledged the importance of public
information and reported that adding dummies
on announcements by the ECB did not change
the result.
SESSION 1.2 BANK COMPETITION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS
Nicholas Tsaveas (Bank of Greece) introduced
the first paper of the session “The impact of
competition on bank orientation and
specialisation” by Hans Degryse (K.U.
Leuven) and Steven Ongena (Tilburg
University). Using a data set containing bank
loans to over 13,000 Belgian firms, comprising
the entire loan portfolio of an important bank in
Belgium, the authors investigate the effect of
bank competition on bank branch orientation
and specialisation. Around 83% of the firms in
the portfolio are single-person business and
most borrowers obtain just one, relatively
small loan from this bank. To carry though the
analysis, the authors define relationship
banking as the situation where the bank is the
main bank of the firm (i.e. it has a monthly
turnover on its current account of at least
€2500 and it possesses at least two products
from the bank) and the relationship has been
ongoing for at least one year. Competition in a
given zone is proxied by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (the summed squares of bank
markets shares divided by the number of
branches in each zone of interest). The authors
find that an increase in the banks’
concentration index from 0.06 to 0.5 decreases
the probability of observing relationship
banking by almost 10%.  Hence they find that
bank branches facing stiff local competition
engage relatively more in relationship-based
lending. The effect of competition on industry
specialisation is much less pronounced, as the
authors conclude that branches of the bank
engage somewhat fewer borrowers in the same
industry if local market concentration
decreases. The effects appear rather modest,
both in statistical significance and economic
relevance. Finally, the authors report that the129
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probability of observing relationship banking
decreases significantly with the distance
separating the borrower from the lender.
Elena Carletti (University of Mannheim and
CFS) presented the paper “Multiple-bank
lending: diversification and free-riding in
monitoring” with Vittoria Cerasi (Università
degli Studi di Milano Biocca) and Sonja
Daltung (Sveriges Riksbank). The paper
analyses theoretically banks’ choice between
lending to firms in exclusive relationships and
sharing financing with other banks in a context
where both firms are subject to moral hazard
problems and bank monitoring is essential for
financing to take place. Firms need funds to
undertake projects and can decide whether to
exert effort and increase project success
probabilities. Banks can improve firms’ moral
hazard problem via costly and non-observable
monitoring. Banks cannot commit to monitor.
Their incentives to monitor depend on whether
they lend exclusively or share financing with
other banks. Multiple-bank lending entails two
effects. First it improves banks’ monitoring
incentives by allowing banks to finance more
projects and therefore achieve greater
diversification. Second, it entails free-riding
problems and duplication of efforts, thus
reducing banks’ incentives. Multiple-lending
is optimal whenever the first effect dominates
the second. The authors find that multiple-
lending is more attractive as the cost of
monitoring increases and less attractive for
large amounts of inside equity and project
profitability. Thus the model predicts a greater
use of multiple-bank lending when banks are
small relative to the projects they finance,
when firms are less profitable and when poor
financial integration, strict regulation and
inefficient judicial systems make monitoring
more costly.
Stefan Arping (University of Amsterdam)
presented the paper “Playing hardball:
relationship banking in the age of credit
derivatives”. Credit derivatives may reduce the
incentive for banks to monitor firms they
finance, as it reduces banks’ exposure to risky
ventures. In this paper, the author provides a
theory for the widespread use of credit
derivatives. He argues that credit derivatives
allow banks to improve on their oversight
duties by giving them an exit option, thereby
making it less costly to penalise misbehaving
borrowers by letting them fail. Therefore credit
derivatives strengthens banks’ commitment to
engage in timely intervention, thus giving
borrowers the proper incentives ex-ante. In
addition, he shows that by taking derivatives
that expire before loan maturity, banks provide
a termination threat. However, this threat is
only credible for those banks that are highly
capitalised as they are most able to sustain
losses. In this context, credit derivatives
facilitate the optimal dynamic management of
client relationships in banks’ core loan
business, thereby promoting value creation in
the real sector. In his setting, the introduction
of a viable credit derivatives market can create
value on purely incentive related relationship
management grounds that are unrelated to
capital or financial constraints at the bank
level.
Bruno Parigi (University of Padua) discussed
the three papers. On the first paper, he noted
that the sample was formed of very small firms
with relatively few alternatives to relationship
banking. An interpretation of the results could
therefore be that when competition increases,
the bank seeks to retain customers by
strengthening its relationship with them. He
regretted that loan rates were unavailable, as an
adjustment in loan rates would be expected
from an increase in competition. However,
research from the authors (Distance, lending
relationships and competition) suggests that an
increase in distance or competition decreases
loan rates. Together with the result that
relationship lending suffers from increasing
distance, one could surprisingly conclude that
relationship lending is associated with higher
loan rates.
On the second paper, Parigi noticed that banks
were modeled as being risk neutral, which
appears at odds with the interpretation of the130
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results in terms of diversification. He further
suggested making capital constraints and other
factors that might generate concavity in banks’
objective functions explicit. Finally, he also
pointed out that one implication of the model
may be that more leveraged banks may be safer.
In particular, bank’s lending was limited by the
introduction of capital constraints. By
decreasing this constraint, banks are able to
finance more projects and become more
leveraged. More leveraged banks are more
likely to enter into multiple lending and as a
consequence become more diversified and
safer. Simulations with different levels of
capital constraints were therefore encouraged.
On the third paper, Parigi noted that the model
assumed the payment of a fixed cost by the
bank to observe fully the effort level, so that the
proper incentive on effort can be provided at no
marginal cost. As a consequence, banks and
firms form a coalition at no cost. He therefore
asked whether a richer framework allowing
firms to choose riskier projects with higher
returns would modify the bank-firm coalition
choice of effort. In particular, he stressed that a
bank protected by credit derivatives may prefer
the firm to choose a riskier project. More
generally, he argued that, as shown in Arping’s
paper, credit risk transfer modifies problems of
asymmetric information between borrowers
and lenders in a way that deserves more
attention. Parigi concluded his discussion by
commenting on the recent scandals from Enron
and Parmalat. According to him, these events
point to pervasive conflicts of interest from
relationship banking, which are not yet fully
understood.
SESSION 2.1 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
LINKAGES – CAPITAL FLOWS
The session was chaired by Holger Wolf
(Georgetown University). Rui Albuquerque
(University of Rochester) presented the paper,
“International equity flows and returns: A
quantitative equilibrium approach”, co-
authored with Gregory Bauer (University of
Rochester) and Martin Schneider (New York
University). The paper tries to explain three
stylised facts typically observed in equity
markets. The flow momentum, according to
which a net capital inflow into a country
anticipates a net future inflow. The burst and
gross trading activity, which amounts to a
positive contemporaneous correlation between
gross purchases and sales. The return chasing,
i.e. if prices increase, the average foreign
investor buys shares from the average local
investor. They show that investors
heterogeneity is crucial in order to explain the
data on international portfolio choices. They
propose a model of international portfolio
choice with heterogeneous investors both
within country and cross-country. Their main
finding is that within country heterogeneity is
much more important than cross-country
heterogeneity as a model that match the data
well must have the property that cross-country
differences between average trades are much
smaller than within-country differences
between trades of sophisticated and
unsophisticated investors.
The paper, “Does regulatory harmonisation
increase bilateral asset holdings?”, was
presented by Jonas Vlachos (The Research
Institute of Industrial Economics, Stockholm).
The study explores the importance of
differences in securities regulation on asset
market integration. The estimation of an
empirical gravity model, where data recently
made available by the IMF are used, reveals
that cross-border asset holdings do increase
substantially with the harmonisation of
securities regulation. More precisely, the
authors construct an index of regulatory
differences, building on the work of Laporta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer (2003). The size
of the coefficient multiplying an index
measuring the improvement of domestic
securities regulation suggests that an increase
in this index by one standard deviation (3.77
points) will increase foreign portfolio holdings
by about 40 percent. Also a country that
improves its regulation and moves its
securities regulations by one standard
deviation towards all other countries’131
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regulatory framework would experience
another 150 percent increase in foreign asset
holdings. Although institutional or cultural
differences have negative impacts on bilateral
asset holdings, results for regulatory
differences are robust even after taking these
effects into account. Moreover, it seems that
regulation is used to protect domestic markets.
Michael Halling (University of Vienna)
presented the paper “Where is the market?
Evidence from cross-listings”, co-authored
with Marco Pagano (University of Naples
Federico II), Otto Randl and Josef Zechner
(both University of Vienna). Conventional
wisdom says that the integration of capital
markets has been steadily increasing over time.
However, this is inconsistent with the growing
number of companies listing their shares not
only in their domestic stock exchange but also
on foreign exchanges. The study investigates
whether frictions such as trading costs,
informational barriers or regulatory obstacles
encourage cross listing. The research finds that
cross listing initially raises trading volume in
foreign markets, but a trend decline follows
(the so-called “flow-back” phenomenon).
Although this would suggest a return to the
dominance of the domestic market, for certain
companies the decline of foreign trading tends
to be quite slow. Foreign trade volume turns out
to be higher for export-oriented companies and
for companies which cross-list into foreign
exchanges with lower trading costs and better
insider trading protection. Also small, high-
growth and high-tech firms tend to have
relatively higher foreign trading activity.
Finally, the presence of strong inertia in trading
is also detected.
The discussant, Philip Lane (University of
Dublin, Trinity College) stressed that the
common denominator of the three papers was
the recognition of the limited degree of
international financial integration. The first
and third study paid special attention to
investor behaviour. Lane evidenced that the
first paper provides an interesting theoretical
underpinning, but the determination of asset
prices is entirely left to domestic investors,
while foreign investors are not influential. In
fact, national security prices are affected by
international factors. Moreover, the model
could incorporate the national differences in
private opportunity, consumption pattern,
labour income risks, and tax system. As for the
second paper, the discussant pointed out that
although it tackles the harmonisation of
regulations in a novel way, when measuring
harmonisation it applies weights to neither
individual regulation, nor to other control
variables. Furthermore, the role of factors such
as exchange rate volatility, currency unions
and tax treaties could also enter the analysis.
Lane highlighted that the third paper is an
important contribution to the extensive
literature on cross-listed shares. He would
include in the model time-zone differences, the
degree of return correlation in foreign versus
home markets and perhaps country fixed
effects to understand why firms list their shares
in foreign stock exchanges.
SESSION 2.2 FINANCIAL STRUCTURES,
COMPETITION AND GROWTH
The session was chaired by Luigi Guiso
(University of Sassari). Stijn Claessens
(University of Amsterdam) presented the paper
“Competition in the financial sector and
growth: A cross-country Perspective” with Luc
Laeven (World Bank). The authors test
empirically whether competition in the
banking sector is beneficial to economic
growth. Banking competition affects the access
to external finance, which has a positive effect
on economic growth. In theory, however, it is
not clear how competition affects the access to
external finance. On the one hand, more
competition may lead banks to offer more
credit and lower lending rates. On the other
hand, more competition decreases incentives
for banks to invest in information acquisition
or relationships with borrowers and, by doing
so, it tends to limit the access to external
finance. The authors use cross-country and
cross-sector data. They estimate the effects of
an index of the degree of competition in the132
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banking industry on the average industrial
growth rate over the period 1980-1997 for 29
countries. They control for heterogeneity
across countries and sectors and, in particular,
for the degree of financial development at the
country level, and for the degree of dependence
on external finance at the industry level. Their
results depend upon the degree of financial
development. In under-developed countries,
sectors that are financially dependent grow
slower when the financial system is more
competitive, while in developed countries
more competition is associated with higher
growth. More precisely, financially dependent
firms will grow by 1.5 percent per annum more
if the country’s financial sector is more
competitive. These findings support the view
that market power in banking systems might be
beneficial to less developed countries but not
for industrial countries.
In “Financial architecture and technology”
Solomon Tadesse (University of South
Carolina) explores empirically the impact of
financial structure (bank-based or market-
based) on technological innovation. The role of
financial architecture in fostering innovation
and technology is theoretically controversial.
On the one hand, the proponents of the bank-
based system argue that banks encourage
innovation by facilitating the financing of
small firms and long-term projects. On the
other hand, the proponents of the market-based
system underscore the advantages of markets
over banks in financing projects with uncertain
viability. The author uses a broad cross-section
of countries with a panel of industry. He
estimates the effects of an index of market
versus bank orientation on the rate of
technological progress over the period 1980-
1995 for 34 countries. He controls for
heterogeneity across countries and sectors and,
in particular, for the average size, age, and
level of financial dependence of the firms. The
findings suggest a nontrivial impact of
financial architecture on industrial innovative
activities. Market-based financial systems
have an overall positive effect on technological
progress. Regardless of their financial
dependence, this effect is common to all
sectors of the economy. However, the study
also finds evidence that financial architecture
has a heterogeneous effect across industries. In
particular, industries whose small and young
firms are relatively more dependent on external
finance fare better in bank based financial
systems. Hence, financial architecture not only
matters for long-term growth of a country, but
also plays an important role in shaping its
industrial structure.
Enisse Kharroubi (DELTA and Banque de
France) presented “Financial integration: for
whom can it be a wrong medicine?” This paper
studies theoretically how financial integration
affects economic growth. The author develops
a theoretical model of a small open economy,
where firms can undertake either a safe or a
risky project, which can be financed by local
and/or foreign banks. The two main differences
between these banks are that local banks can
observe which project is financed but have a
limited supply of funds, while foreign banks
cannot observe the quality of projects but have
an infinitely elastic supply of funds. The author
finds that financial integration may, under
some conditions, lower the growth rate of the
economy. The reason is the following. Local
firms undertake the safe projects when they
borrow from local banks, because the latter
have information about the quality of their
projects. This happens as long as firms do not
need to resort to foreign funds. When local
firms borrow (a relatively large amount of
funds) from foreign banks, however, an adverse
selection problem between foreign banks and
local firms arises, where firms take more risks
and the external finance premium is high. In
this case, local banks’ assets become riskier as
well, and local depositors require higher
deposit rates, therefore increasing further the
local lending rates and depressing economic
activity. It follows that financial integration
might be detrimental to growth for countries
whose domestic supply of funds is too low.
Yrjö Koskinen (Stockholm School of
Economics) discussed the three papers. On the133
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first paper, he mentioned that the degree of
competition may be determined by the ease of
obtaining information about firms, and
therefore on firm opaqueness. He therefore
suggested controlling for this effect, for
instance be adding a variable on accounting
standards. He also wondered how the presence
of stock markets would affect the results. On
the second paper, he suggested that the author
goes beyond the effect of financial architecture
on technology to study the interaction between
financial architecture, dependence and
development. He also proposed to use
alternative measures of how efficient a
financial system is, such as the relative number
of IPOs taking place in a single year. On the
paper by Kharroubi, he suggested two possible
extensions to the version that was presented.
First, the results may be modified if the return
on projects is dependent on exchange rates.
Second, as it is assumed that domestic
intermediaries cannot borrow from abroad, he
asked whether the results would hold if foreign
borrowing was allowed.
MEASURING FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN THE
EURO AREA
Annalisa Ferrando and Peter Hördahl (ECB)
presented the paper ”Measuring Financial
Integration in the Euro Area” (co-authored
with Lieven Baele, Ghent University,
Elizaveta Krylova, and Cyril Monnet, both
European Central Bank), which prior to the
Symposium had been released as an ECB
Occasional Paper. In the presentation, it was
pointed out that the purpose of the paper had
been to provide a comprehensive overview of
the state and evolution of financial integration
in five key euro area markets, namely the
money, government bond, corporate bond,
bank credit, and equity markets. In order to
measure the degree of integration, a careful
definition of the concept “financial
integration” was provided, according to which
a market is considered fully integrated if all
potential participants in this market faces a
single set of rules, have equal access to it, and
are treated equally when active in the market.
In the case of integration of euro area markets,
this would imply that there should be no
discrimination among market participants
based on their location/country.
A methodological framework for measuring
financial integration was then presented, in
which three types of measures were proposed:
price-based measures, which include simple
yield differentials and unadjusted or risk-
adjusted return differentials; news-based
measures, which measure the systematic
response of returns to common shocks or
factors; and quantity-based measures, which
include e.g. flows and home-bias indicators.
The first two types of measure, which make up
the bulk of the analysis in the paper, rests
largely on a key implication of the adopted
definition of financial integration, namely the
law of one price. The empirical evidence that
was presented confirmed that different market
sectors have attained different levels of
integration. The money market enjoys near-
perfect integration (even if e.g. the repo
segment shows signs of being less integrated
than the unsecured segment). The degree of
integration in the government bond market was
found to be high, but not perfect, although it
was pointed out that it is difficult to distinguish
between a remaining marginal lack of
integration and small but systematic effects
arising from differences in perceived credit
risk or liquidity risk among markets in different
countries. The corporate bond market was
deemed to be reasonably well integrated, while
the equity and bank credit markets were found
to be less integrated, although improvements
had taken place to some extent since the
introduction of the euro.
The discussant, Michael Melvin (Arizona
State University), started by commending the
authors for providing a comprehensive and
useful study of euro area financial integration.
One aspect of the study that he found
particularly appealing was that it used data that
is not publicly available, such as interest rate
transactions data reported by banks belonging
to the EONIA panel. He pointed out that due to134
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the confidentiality of this data, studies such as
this one provided an important source of
information. He urged the ECB to continue
work with this kind of data along the lines in the
present paper. The discussant then continued
by providing some questions and suggestions
relating to the analysis in the paper. He first
asked whether it was reasonable to place as
much emphasis on the law of one price as the
authors had done. He pointed out that even if
markets are fully integrated, returns need not
be the same across assets, and that country
effects can remain due to e.g. liquidity
differences, regulatory differences, or even
behavioural biases. Regarding the news-based
measures of integration, he called for
robustness checks, in which the effect of
important exogenous news (such as monetary
policy announcements) could be used to
measure the response in different countries,
rather than relying only on asset returns of a
benchmark country. Finally, he voiced the
opinion that capital flows may perhaps be a
more useful source of information on financial
integration than price-based measures.
However, in the ensuing discussion following
the presentation, Bob Flood pointed out that he
was sceptical of the usefulness of flow data for
this purpose. The reason, he explained, was
that he felt that it is very difficult to interpret
flow data in terms of integration. Sometimes a
very high degree of country-activity may signal
that markets are integrated, while in other cases
markets can be fully integrated even though
such activity remains very low or even non-
existent.135
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Jan-Pieter Krahnen (CFS) introduced Robert
Flood (IMF) who gave a Key Lecture on New
approaches to assess financial integration,
based on work with Andrew Rose (University
of California, Berkeley). The objective of the
Lecture was to propose an intuitive measure of
asset-market integration. According to the
authors, financial markets are integrated when
assets are priced by the same stochastic
discount rate. That is, security markets are
integrated if all assets on those markets are
priced according to the usual pricing equation
pt = Et ( MRSt+1χt+1), where MRS stands for
marginal rate of substitution and where prices
of a portfolio equal to the expected income
received by the owner of this portfolio
weighted by the intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution for income accruing in the future.
According to the law of one price for assets,
portfolios with the same risk and return
characteristics should have the same price.
This implies that the MRS for both portfolios
should be the same. Therefore if two asset
markets are integrated, any portfolios with the
same risk/return characteristics should have
the same MRS. As a consequence, a necessary
condition for asset markets integration is that
the two values of the first moment of the MRS
used to price the two portfolios are identical.
Flood and Rose propose a new test to check
whether this is the case. They only concentrate
on the first moment, as they argue it is rather
simple to measure, and cross-market
differences in estimated values of the first
moment allow them to use standard risk pricing
models.
Flood then described their methodology
and how it compares to the usual finance
approach. The asset pricing equation above
can be easily rewritten as
,
where  () z x E x t t t ) ( 1 1 1 + + + − = ε  is a normalised
prediction error, and δt = 1/Et (MRS t+1). In an
integrated market, δt is identical for all assets.
The traditional finance approach uses z=p t,
and ads two assumptions to the resulting
DAY 2
equation; 1) rational expectations, according to
which the residual is uncorrelated with
information available at time t and 2) a
covariance factor model such that,
                                                                where  f  is  a
vector of time varying factors. With these two
assumptions, the equation can be estimated.
However, currently available estimation
techniques do not allow identifying both the
asset-specific intercept and δt. Instead, the
usual finance approach sets one of these two
parameters to a fixed value. This is obviously
unsatisfactory. Flood and Rose rather propose
to set  z  pt, so as to be able to identify and
estimate  δt (for their purpose they choose
z=p t-1,). The idea is to choose something that
stabilises the data and preserves the
information in the current price, while still
delivering moments in the covariance term that
can be modelled as stable functions of a few
aggregate sources of risk. Then the test of
integration is simple. Estimating the equation
for a set of assets J and then repeating the
analysis for the same period of time with a
different set of assets K gives two sets
estimates of δ, a time-series sequence of
estimated discount rates. These can be
compared directly, using conventional
statistical techniques, either one by one, or
jointly.
Flood then presented results for the integration
of the S&P stocks priced in the NYSE and
NASDAQ, using daily data from the “US
Pricing” database of Thomsen Analytics,
covering April-May 1999. Using 20
constructed portfolios from the S&P, Flood and
Rose built two sets of 10 portfolios each to
estimate discount rates. Two striking features
emerge form their analysis. First the time series
variation in δ is high, which can be used to
reject the hypothesis that the MRS is equal to
the short t-bill rate as assumed by the finance
literature. Second, the estimates of δ from the
two sets of portfolios are statistically similar,
consistent with the integration of the S&P.
Several other periods were considered as a
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robustness check, reaching the same
conclusion. The same procedure was
conducted for the NASDAQ, grouping data
from 100 NASDAQ firms into 20 portfolios of
10 firms each. While the NASDAQ appears
generally integrated, integration is rejected for
October and November 1999, shortly before the
collapse of the NASDAQ. Then, the authors
checked whether the market for large stocks
(S&P 500) is integrated with the NASDAQ,
comparing the δ when estimated with twenty
S&P portfolios, twenty NASDAQ portfolios
and all forty portfolios pooled together. The
test results are grossly inconsistent with the
hypothesis that S&P and NASDAQ are two
integrated markets.
Jan-Pieter Krahnen then opened the floor for
questions.  Garry Schinasi (IMF) wondered
how the distribution, from which Flood was
extracting moments, differs from the
distribution generally used in finance.  From
the floor, it was remarked that the estimated δ
moves a lot over time and it was asked whether
the choice of daily data could generate these
large movements. Flood replied that, unlike in
finance, the noise is actually a good thing since
it helps them to nail down precisely the δ. It
was then asked whether the authors considered
stocks that were traded on both NYSE and
NASDAQ and whether Flood could elaborate
more on the distribution that the δ is capturing,
since the results are difficult to believe. Marco
Pagano (University of Naples) wondered
whether this methodology could be applied to
an environment with heterogeneous investors,
which would imply that the marginal investor
is different for different sets of instruments.
Flood replied that heterogeneity is perfectly
consistent with their methodology. Although
he reckoned that an important assumption is
that there is no restriction in trading, so that an
important first step in testing whether two
markets are integrated is to check the
institutional environment. He then continued
explaining that these measures of integration
are to be taken as an upper bound on the degree
of integration two markets can achieve, as it is
difficult to conceive two markets that would be
more integrated than NYSE and NASDAQ.
However, Flood also admitted that their
methodology could not tell the difference
between integration and liquidity.
SESSION 3.1 TOPICS IN FINANCIAL
INTEGRATION
Francesco Drudi (ECB) chaired this session
and introduced the first speaker. Mark Carey
(Federal Reserve Board) presented the paper
“Is the corporate loan market globally
integrated? A pricing puzzle”, with Greg Nini
(Federal Reserve Board). This empirical paper
provides evidence that prices of syndicated
corporate loans differ between the European
and U.S. markets. More precisely, using data
from Dealogic’s Loanware database from 1992
to 2002, the authors find that interest rate
spreads are, on average, 30 basis points smaller
in Europe than in the U.S. The authors tested
several hypotheses that could explain this gap.
First, different characteristics of loans and
borrowers differ across the sub-samples.
However, controlling for such differences, and
other factors such as non-price terms of loans,
asymmetric information or moral hazard, legal
regime, multi-product package pricing
practices and regulation, does not explain the
difference fully. The puzzle subsists even after
checking for potential errors in the data.
However, the authors cannot reject the
hypothesis that there is market inefficiency in
the sense of myopic behavior by market
participants. However, given the type of
lenders and borrowers participating in this
market, the authors disregard this possibility as
being very unlikely. The conclusion from the
results of the paper is that the syndicated loan
markets in Europe and the US might not be
fully integrated, and the authors presume that
the explanation for the home bias they observe
in the data may be an important factors to
understand the pricing difference.
Thomas Harr (University of Copenhagen)
presented a theoretical paper “Branch or
subsidiary? Capital regulations of
multinational banks” with Thomas Roende
(University of Copenhagen). It looks at optimal137
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capital requirements for multinational banks
with an information advantage over the
regulator. (The bank knows better than the
regulator how risky it is.) The bank can choose
a branch structure or a subsidiary structure.
Before the bank selects its structure, the
regulator chooses a capital requirement for
banks that select a branch structure and another
capital requirement for banks that select the
subsidiary structure. It is shown that there
exists an optimal screening mechanism in
which the regulator chooses a higher capital
requirement for banks with a subsidiary
structure. Since a subsidiary structure limits
the liability of the bank and thus is preferable
for riskier banks, banks with subsidiaries need
to have higher capital requirements.
Jens Tapking (ECB) presented a theoretical
paper “Horizontal and vertical integration in
securities trading and settlement”, joint with
Jing Yang (Bank of England). It looks at
welfare implications of two different types of
consolidation in the securities trading and
settlement industry, mergers of an exchange
with a Central Security Depository (CSD)
(vertical integration) and mergers of two CSDs
(horizontal integration). Though the model of
the paper is quite complex, the results are
strikingly simple: Both types of integration
increase the economic welfare compared to no
consolidation, but the welfare improvement is
greater in case of a horizontal merger. The
presenter emphasised that this result depends
on two crucial assumptions of the paper.
Firstly, it is assumed that investors have strong
preferences for securities issued abroad. If
instead investors preferred home securities,
vertical integration would outperform
horizontal integration. Secondly, it is assumed
that all exchanges are bound to settle in a given
CSD and cannot choose among different CSDs.
The results of the paper could change if this
assumption was not used.
The discussant was Harry Huizinga (Tilburg
University). On the first paper, he raised doubts
that the authors really controlled for all
relevant variables. For example, it was pointed
out that it was not possible to control precisely
for the nationality of lenders and borrowers. On
the second paper, he stressed that in reality
many banks have a hybrid structure with
branches and subsidiaries. It may therefore be
difficult to apply the results of the paper.
Furthermore, he argued that larger banks are
safer and it might therefore be more efficient to
let the capital requirements depend on size
instead of branch versus subsidiary structure.
On the third paper, Harry Huizinga made two
suggestions. Firstly, he asked if the high level
of economic welfare achieved by a horizontal
merger could also be achieved if regulators
forced the CSDs to charge a price of zero for the
transfer of securities through links. Secondly,
he suggested that the authors analyse in their
model if it can be expected that market forces
lead to the optimal form of consolidation.
On relation to the Carey-Nini paper, Jan-
Pieter Krahnen (CFS) wondered whether
using only companies on which only external
ratings are available could put structure on the
data set that should be considered in the
regression. Another explanation for the pricing
puzzle might be the extent of relationship
lending that is known to have effects on loan
prices. Carey agreed that there might be a
selection bias, since loan size is bigger in
Europe than in the US but not significantly so.
On relationship lending, he replied that they
addressed this issue by considering both the
number and nature of lenders in a syndicate, on
the presumption that when there is a large
number of lenders, the marginal lender in a
syndicate is less likely to have relationship
lending. They find that this factor is priced as
well, but not enough to solve the puzzle.
SESSION 3.2 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
LINKAGES – COMOVEMENTS
Michael Binder (University of Frankfurt and
CFS) chaired the second session on
“International Financial Linkages”, dedicated
to asset price co-movements. Clara Vega
(University of Rochester) talked as the first
speaker about her paper “Real-time price138
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discovery in stock, bond and foreign exchange
markets” (joint with Torben Andersen,
Northwestern University, Tim Bollerslev,
Duke University, and Francis Diebold,
University of Pennsylvania). Using intraday
futures data over the last 5 to 10 years, the
paper estimates in the first place the effect of
macroeconomic news releases on different
asset prices. News releases are limited to the
United States, whereas euro area, UK and US
markets are covered for stocks and bonds, and
the Japanese yen is also added for exchange
rates. In a first step the impact effect of the
surprise component of news releases on
individual asset returns is assessed. In a second
step, returns are estimated simultaneously as
functions of contemporaneous and lagged
returns of other assets and news surprises. A
first result of this analysis is that by using
intraday data the effects of macroeconomic
variables on asset returns can be identified in a
much clearer way than in the previous literature
using lower-frequency data. Second, positive
news on the economy can have different effects
on stock market returns, depending on the stage
of the business cycle. During the expansion of
1998 to 2001 “good news” tended to increase
stock returns, whereas during the downturn of
2001 to 2002 they tended to decrease stock
returns. The same does not apply to bond yields
and dollar exchange rate returns, which
unambiguously increase in response to positive
news. Finally, the authors identify significant
cross-country linkages between stock markets
that are not explained by US macroeconomic
news.
The second paper of this session on
“Commonality in the time-variation of stock-
bond and stock-stock return comovements”
was presented by Robert Connolly
(University of North Carolina). The paper,
which is co-authored by Chris Stivers
(University of Georgia) and Licheng Sun (Penn
State Erie), discusses how cross-country stock-
stock and domestic stock-bond return co-
movements vary with stock market
uncertainty. One approach used compares
return correlations across the different
quintiles of the distribution of stock market
uncertainty, as indicated by implied volatilities
in major stock markets (measured by the
Chicago Board of Trade Option Exchange
Volatility Index (VIX) and the German Option
Volatility Index (VDAX)). Another approach
uses a GARCH model to estimate changes in
correlations. And, finally, a two-state regime-
switching model is applied, in which transition
probabilities between the different states can
vary as a function of stock market uncertainty.
The data is daily, covering Germany, the
United Kingdom and the United States between
1992 to 2002. The results for cross-asset
returns provide evidence in favour of flight-to-
quality and flight-from-quality behaviour.
When implied stock market volatility is high or
increases, then stocks and bonds tend to be
negatively related. When stock market
uncertainty is low, then stocks and bonds are
positively related. Moreover, in times of high
uncertainty cross-country stock market
correlations tend to be particularly strong.
Overall, these asset linkages seem to be driven
by global rather than domestic developments.
The last paper of the session on “The breadth of
currency crises” focused on co-movements
among industrial country exchange rates,
among emerging market exchange rates and
between industrial country and emerging
market exchange rates. It was presented by
Philipp Hartmann (ECB), who co-authors the
paper with Stefan Straetmans (Maastricht
University) and Casper de Vries (Rotterdam
University). In contrast to the first two papers
of the session, this paper puts all the emphasis
on very extreme returns and, hence, crisis
linkages. To do so, it presents a new
methodology how to estimate semi-
parametrically multivariate asset return co-
movements based on extreme-value theory.
From this methodology the authors derive,
inter alia, a “contamination function” that
illustrates the probability of having many
markets crash, given that a specific number of
markets crash. Weekly returns for 5 industrial
country currencies and 10 emerging market
currencies between 1987 and 2003 are139
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considered. One first result suggests that –
contrary to conventional wisdom – the breadth
of extreme currency spillovers are not greater
among emerging market currencies than among
industrial country currencies. (Univariately,
however, emerging market currencies crash
much more often than industrial country
currencies.) Second, lagged extreme spillovers
tend to be generally weaker than
contemporaneous extreme spillovers. Third,
extreme spillovers between industrial country
and emerging market currencies are relatively
weak. Finally, there are a number of currencies
that constitute “hot spots” in the foreign
exchange market, i.e., they are more often
associated with widespread currency turmoil
than other currencies.
The discussant, Paolo Pasquariello
(University of Michigan), pointed out that co-
movements of asset price are a very important
topic in financial economics, with implications
for risk management and portfolio allocations.
He felt that all three papers addressed different
features of this topic in a rigorous way. As all of
them are primarily of an empirical nature, he
threw a more theoretical perspective on
international financial linkages, focusing on
“excess co-movements”. Based on one part of
the financial contagion literature, he defined
excess co-movements as a situation in which
asset prices move together beyond the degree
justified by their economic fundamentals.
While the Vega et al. paper was identifying
such excess co-movements, the Connolly et al.
and the Hartmann et al. papers do not control
for fundamentals. On the Vega paper the
discussant cautioned that ignoring non-US
news could bias the coefficients in the
estimations. He also pointed out that basing the
interpretation of the stock market results on
only one upturn and one downturn constituted
relatively limited evidence. On the Connolly
paper he criticised that the implied stock
market volatilities used may not be a good
measure of asymmetric information, which
according to the paper is one theoretical
explanation for the spillovers observed.
Moreover, referring to some of his own work,
changes in risk aversion are not sufficient for
excess co-movements in rational expectations
models, and he was interested in hearing which
other frictions are responsible for the
correlations identified. On the Hartmann paper
he challenged the association of very extreme
returns with crisis situations, as a full-blown
crises should also be associated with large
social and economic costs. He also suggested
that the authors would account for exchange
rate regimes in the different currencies.
Michael Binder opened the floor for question.
Hartmann made two comments on the Vega
paper. First, he suggested allowing the
parameters to change with the introduction of
the euro, as the strength of return and news
spillovers may have changed with EMU.
Second, a discussion of some recent work by
Carlo Favero (Bocconi University, Milan)
could be useful, as this author argues that US-
European stock market spillovers seem to be
related to inefficient propagations of US
innovations, whereas the same does not hold
for bond market spillovers.
POLICY PANEL – DRIVERS OF EUROPEAN
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: MARKETS OR
POLICY?
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (ECB) opened the
panel session on “Drivers of European
Financial Integration – Markets or Policy?”
After briefly outlining the current status of
financial integration, he turned to the central
question to which extent markets or policy
makers should determine the degree of
integration of markets. In his view, this is an
aspect that should be left to markets. However,
the market should not face any legislative or
regulatory barriers in its development towards
a more integrated market. To this aim, it was
essential that policy created a framework in
which markets could operate towards the
optimal level of integration. Mr. Padoa-
Schioppa mentioned two areas in which the
policy framework needed improvement. The
first concerned the implementation of a
common rulebook. He stressed that it was140
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crucial that the FSAP measures were translated
efficiently into a consistent EU rulebook and
enforced coherently across the EU. He
criticised that so far, policy makers had placed
emphasis on rule-making, but put little focus
on competition policy aspects. The latter could
ensure that national authorities would not try to
protect national markets. The second aspect
concerned the enforcement of rules. Here, Mr.
Padoa-Schioppa mentioned two objectives: on
the one hand, a convergence of supervisory
practices, and second, a higher level of co-
operation between different supervisory
agencies.
Mario Draghi (Goldman-Sachs) assessed the
status of integration from the perspective of a
wholesale market institution. The degree of
integration was very diverse in the different
market segments – while equity markets
showed a strong home-bias, bond markets and
derivative equity markets, for instance, were
basically unified. Pan-European activity was
increasing, but hard to quantify (because large
parts of the markets are done over-the-counter)
and concentrated in very few market places
such as London, Frankfurt, or Paris. Mr. Draghi
pointed out the conventional wisdom that a
wholesale institution already operating at a
European level may be content with the
segmentation of markets because of its unique
potential to profit from European-wide
arbitrage. However, he asserted that it was still
more likely to profit from more integration
because it would benefit from deeper and more
liquid markets. He criticised that none of the
FSAP proposals had so far been implemented at
the national level. In his view, responsible for
this delay was mainly the strong desire of
national regulators to maintain competencies.
Alexander Schaub (European Commission)
stressed that both markets and policy processes
were important in the development of
integration, but that market forces had been
playing a more dominant role. Especially until
the launch of the FSAP in 1999, policy was not
the driving force, as the development of
financial markets was not on the political
agenda. Market forces, on the other hand, did
influence policy, among other factors, because
of increasing globalisation – an example was
the case of Enron, which led to a
reconsideration of EU rules.
Mr. Schaub then proceeded to comment on the
future of the FSAP. In his view, the most
important challenge was to eliminate obstacles
to integration by eliminating or harmonising
national rules. As examples, he mentioned a
growing need for broader market access rights,
to address new sources of European-wide
financial risk, for consolidated supervision of
conglomerates, and to address loopholes in the
legislative framework. The degree of
harmonisation, however, was an aspect that
should not be determined ex-ante but rather
develop over time. He criticised that
practically none of the 42 FSAP measures had
so far been effectively implemented in national
rulebooks. However, the mere announcement
of introducing these measures already had an
effect because of the expected implementation.
He asserted that the future of the FSAP would
be driven further by market forces. Four
working groups consisting of market players
have already issued their first reports, which
will be an important input for future work.
Jens Thomsen (Danmarks Nationalbank) first
addressed the lack of integration in retail
markets. He stressed that reasons were mainly
due to differences in language and consumer’s
restricted knowledge of information on foreign
companies. This led to a domestic attitude for
many consumers. He then proceeded to the
topic of market or policy driven integration. As
an example for market forces leading to more
integration, he mentioned the MTS electronic
platform. Finally, he commented on the Second
Banking Directive. He criticised that the
Directive remained silent about the regulation
of bank branches located in different countries.
For a small country like Denmark, this topic
was of great relevance since the market share of
foreign banks in Denmark was extremely high –
about 25% of the market being covered by the
Swedish bank Nordea alone.141
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Mr. Padoa-Schioppa then opened the floor for
question.  Garry Schinasi (International
Monetary Fund) mentioned differences
between Europe and the US in the regulatory
framework. In his view, the degree of political
union was the main difference between the two
areas. He furthermore questioned whether lack
of integration was really the biggest
inefficiency in EMU. Similarly, Jesper Berg
(Danmarks Nationalbank) conjectured that
large European banks might not be interested in
diversifying across Europe, but rather on a
global level. Philipp Hartmann (ECB) asked
Schaub about the main messages that had
emerged in the FSAP expert groups. He also
inquired what may have led Nordea to
announce the adoption of a branching structure.
Mr. Thomson replied that most likely, Nordea
has difficulties achieving scale economies
when operating with subsidiaries. It was more
efficient to also unify the banks’ head
operations. He also mentioned that this will
have an impact on supervision, since
consolidated supervision of the bank will now
be necessary.
Mr. Padoa-Schioppa asked Mr. Schaub
whether competition policy may be allowed to
play a greater role. Mr. Schaub answered that
pressures on the Commission from
governments and lobbyists were very strong, so
that that it was likely that “weak”
commissioners not urging for more
competition policy were put in place.
Several remarks from the floor addressed the
drivers of both policy makers and market
players for enhancing integration. Jan-Pieter
Krahnen (CFS) asked Mr. Draghi whether
integrated or separated markets were more
profitable for an institution like Goldman-
Sachs. Also, Mr. Padoa-Schioppa’s was
interested in the reasons why pan-European
market players did not push policy makers
more for removing obstacles to integration. Mr.
Draghi replied that it was hard to judge whether
most of these market players actually benefited
from fragmentation of markets, for instance
by profiting from tax arbitrage. Still, he
acknowledged that if anyone profited from
segmentation, it was likely to be large players.
Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell (ECB) then
closed the Policy Panel with some remarks on
“The role of the ECB in financial integration”.
Ms. Tumpel-Gugerell explained that the role of
the ECB in promoting European financial
integration is threefold. First, it co-operates
and acts as a facilitator or catalyst between
several parties. Second, in fields where the
mandate of the ECB applies directly, it
implements structural reforms that foster
financial integration. Third, it raises awareness
by doing specific analysis and assessment of
the current state of financial integration. She
then went on explaining each role in more
detail.
Regarding the first role, the ECB regards the
co-operation with the European Commission as
of particular importance. The ECB participated
actively in the production of the two reports of
the Giovannini Group, about the structure of
the security settlement industry in Europe. She
reported that while the ECB fully supports the
conclusions of the reports, consolidation is
slow and market forces may be insufficient in
this sector.
Regarding the second role, Ms. Tumpel-
Gugerell highlighted several examples of ECB
measures that foster financial integration.
Obviously, a uniform interest rate for the short
term interbank market, was a major
contribution of the ECB to the integration of
the money and bond markets in January 1999.
Also, she explained that the ECB supports a
standardised and safe contractual basis that can
be used in different national jurisdictions to
improve the integration of the euro repo
markets. In particular, the ECB will introduce a
“Single List” in the collateral framework to
replace the current two-tier system of eligible
collateral, in order to ensure a level playing
field in the euro area, to further promote equal
treatment of counterparties and issuers, and
to increase the overall transparency of the
collateral framework. Finally, she mentioned142
ECB
Capital markets and financial integration in Europe
December 2004
the next generation of the Eurosystem payment
system, TARGET 2, which will contribute to
further financial integration by consolidating
infrastructures in the market for large-value
payments and by homogenising features at the
user end.
Regarding the third role of the ECB consisting
of raising awareness, Ms. Tumpel-Gugerell
stated that research is more than just raising
awareness and welcomed the ECB-CFS
Research Network on “Capital Markets and
Financial Integration in Europe” as the most
extensive forum through which the ECB carries
out and stimulates its research work on
financial integration.
She then turned to the past and future work of
the ECB-CFS Research Network, and how they
relate to the objectives of the ECB in terms of
financial integration. She mentioned and
elaborated further on three achievement of the
network. First, the network successfully
established itself as a “network of people”. In
her view, the Network provided the necessary
structure to exploit synergies and cross-
fertilisation between researchers from
different institutions. The results of this type of
repeated interaction is a higher productivity
and output that goes beyond what can be
expected from the simple one-off organisation
of traditional seminars and workshops.
Second, the network kicked off a new research
field on securities settlement systems, one of
the big challenges for further financial
integration in Europe.
Last, Ms. Tumpel-Gugerell mentioned that
research conducted within the network
improved the knowledge about European
financial integration. First, regarding the
European banking sector, first integration
appears not to be very advanced in retail
banking markets. Second, some of the inherent
characteristics of traditional loan and deposit
business constrain the cross-border expansion
of commercial banking, even in a common
currency area. Hence, the implementation of
some policies to foster cross-border integration
may be ineffective. There is also increasing
evidence that the introduction of the euro has
contributed to a reduction in the cost of capital
in the euro area, for example in the form of
corporate bond underwriting fees. Monetary
integration therefore improved access to
finance for investment and prospects for
growth. Finally, on securities settlement
systems, she reminded the audience of findings
by the Bank of Finland, presented in the
network, that securities settlement in Europe is
more than 30% more costly than in the US, and
highlighted two reasons to explain these
numbers: market power and a lack of
consolidation. With the absence of
competition, there is no pressure to develop
systems operating at unit costs. Beyond that,
she mentioned another paper presented in the
third workshop that showed that fragmentation
and the still relatively limited consolidation in
security settlement systems, which is a remnant
of the epoch with national currencies, prevent
the full exploitation of scale economies as
shown in the Finnish study.
Ms. Tumpel-Gugerell then announced that the
ECB Executive Board decided to continue the
ECB-CFS Research Network for three more
years.  In this new phase, three areas will be
added to the list of network priorities. 1. The
relationship between financial integration and
financial stability. 2. EU accession, financial
development and financial integration, and
3. Financial system modernisation and
economic growth in Europe. These three areas
have become particularly important at the
current juncture, but have not received
particularly strong attention in the past two
years of the network. She then completed her
remarks saying that the research network will
organise two workshops per year until 2007.
SESSION 4.1 FIRMS FINANCING AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Jan-Pieter Krahnen (University of Frankfurt
and CFS) chaired this session. The session
started with Mihir Desai (Harvard University)143
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presenting the paper “Institutions, capital
constraints and entrepreneurial firm
dynamics: evidence from Europe” (joint with
Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner (both Harvard
University)).  The paper investigates the
importance of the institutional framework for
entrepreneurial activity in Western and Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE region). Measures of
entrepreneurial activity include rates of firm
entry and exit and different moments of firms’
size and age distribution, such as average size,
skewness and industry vintage, a size-weighted
measure of firm age. Controlling for industry
fixed effects and different levels of economic
development, the authors identify a particular
sensitivity of entrepreneurial activity to
institutional factors (corruption/fairness,
protection of property rights, well-functioning
legal system) for countries of the CEE region.
In particular, less corruption and better
protection of property rights increase entry and
reduce exit.  While the average size of the firm
decreases, there is an increase in industry
vintage.  Finally, descriptive statistics show for
the CEE region that the firm size distribution is
skewed to the left with decreasing skewness for
older firms.  The authors interpret their results
as supporting the view that well-designed
institutions foster entrepreneurial activity
partly through the positive impact on relaxing
capital constraints, which can potentially
account for the results on the skewness of
young firms.
In the second paper, “A Theory of friendly
boards” (joint with Daniel Ferreira, Stockholm
School of Economics), Renée Adams
(Stockholm School of Economics) addressed
the question why – contrary to the US –
European governance structures rely on a
“dual” board system. Such a system separates
the monitoring and advising roles of the board
of directors. The analysis is based on a model
where a manager is hired to make an investment
decision for a risky project from which he
derives a private benefit.  His ability to identify
good projects is unknown to the board and even
to himself. Both the board and the manager
receive signals concerning the quality of the
project.  After receiving his signal the manager
decides to reveal his information to the board in
exchange of a recommendation which is based
on the board’s signal. Finally, before signals
are received, the board chooses a probability of
monitoring the manager ex-post. Monitoring
enables the board to learn the manager’s signal
and to obtain information about the manager’s
ability.  For a given probability of monitoring,
the manager faces a trade-off for revealing his
signal. Revealing information and getting
advice enables the manager to make better
decision, but this might increase his chances of
getting fired when his information changes the
board’s opinion about his ability. This trade-
off provides a rationale for the board to reduce
its monitoring activity up-front whenever it is
not too costly to induce the manager to reveal
his information. The authors show further that
the first-best level of monitoring can
nevertheless be attained when the two roles
(advice and monitoring) of the board are
separated.
João Santos (Federal Reserve Bank of New
York) presented the third paper of the session
“Identifying the effect of managerial control on
firm performance” (joint with Renée Adams
(Stockholm School of Economics). The goal of
this paper is to re-evaluate the effect of
managerial control through voting rights on
firm performance by focusing on voting rights
rather than on share ownership of managers.
Shares provide managers not only with control
rights, but also cash-flow rights making it
difficult to disentangle incentive effects from
potentially positive effects of voting rights.
The authors use data from a historic sample of
large banking institutions in the US that hold
their own stock – as a result of their trust
activities – in the capacity of a fiduciary. This
enables the authors to construct a proxy for
managerial control rights to measure cleanly
the effects of control, since the fiduciary has no
cash-flow rights attached to the shares. The
authors regress the performance of banks (as
measured by Tobin’s q) on the proxies for
managerial control rights (and their squares)
controlling for firm size, leverage, uncertainty144
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and historic performance. They find a negative
relationship for small voting stakes, but a
positive one for larger stakes, thus confirming
several findings in the theoretical literature.
Quantitatively, the result seems to be
economically significant. A change in control
equal to one standard deviation causes changes
of up to a third of the standard deviation in
Tobin’s q.
Giancarlo Spagnolo (University of Mannheim
and Sveriges Riksbank) discussed the papers of
this session.  For the first paper, he stressed that
the analysis provides novel and interesting
evidence on the importance of institutional
variables for firms. Most importantly,
institutions seem to matter more for transition
economies than for advanced economies.  He
stressed, however, that the link between
institutions (and other legal variables) and
entrepreneurial activity is still lacking a
thorough theoretical explanation, which could
partly account for the partly ambiguous effect
of legal variables.  Moreover, given the long
lags between institutional reforms and
investment activities, he expressed concern
that the real test of these relationships can only
be assessed seriously when more data become
available over the next few years. Spagnolo
praised the importance of the second paper in
establishing a novel trade-off when boards
simultaneously advise and evaluate managers.
As his main theoretical criticism he pointed out
that the results could change when there is a
career concern for the manager. This would add
reputation into the model inducing the manager
to reveal his information more readily once
recognised as being of high quality.  As minor
points, Spagnolo pointed out that the
separation of board functions might be related
to specialised skills, and that preventing the
flow of information might be impossible even
in separated boards. For the final paper, he
proposed to control for two more factors.  First,
large shareholders might matter, since they
have more control rights than managers or
fiduciaries have. Second, cash flow
consideration could matter nevertheless, since
the overall level of the fiduciary’s cash flow
rights could influence the importance of his
control rights.
Jan-Pieter Krahnen then opened the floor for
questions. João Santos was first asked whether
they had access to firm specific performance
measures, and if they tried to use this
information rather than the measures of
performance of the bank itself. On the second
paper, the assumption that supervisory and
management boards do not communicate with
each other was questioned, as in reality it is not
clear how these boards are synchronised.
Renée Adams was then asked whether they
have evidence of commitment problems from
boards and whether these boards use a
commitment device.
João Santos replied that they do not control for
whoever is controlling the rest of the bank, as
they do not have access to such data. Regarding
the positive link between large voting rights
and the value of the institution, Santos replied
that there are two possible theoretical
explanations. First, when control increases,
individuals are willing to invest more human
capital in the institution, which in turn
increases its value. Second, in case of a hostile
take-over, increased control would imply that a
higher bid is asked for. Renée Adams agreed
that they needed to address the point of career
concerns. However, she does not think that
boards generally share information. Finally,
regarding the commitment technology, she
mentioned soft (but not direct) evidence for
cultural norms in the boardroom that managers
are not asked questions on their policy.
SESSION 4.2 SYSTEMIC RISK
The session was chaired by Gary Schinasi
(IMF). The first paper, entitled “Bank
contagion in Europe” was presented by Reint
Gropp (ECB). The paper analyses contagion in
a sample of European banks during 1996-2003.
The paper builds on the recent literature
examining large movements in financial
markets. The paper examines large movements
of the weekly first differenced distance to145
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default of European banks. It estimates a two
stage model: In the first stage, in a Poisson
model the number of banks experiencing a
large shock at the same time is explained with a
set of macro and sectoral risk exposure
variables. The paper shows that the sector risk
exposure variables improve the fit of the model
dramatically. Using the unexplained portion
from this regression, the paper estimates the
probability of an individual bank experiencing
a large shock. This approach is intended to
generate a contagion variable that is orthogonal
to common shocks affecting more than one
bank simultaneously. The paper finds
significant domestic and cross-border
contagion, although there is no cross-border
contagion from the smaller banks in the
sample. There is, however, significant
contagion from small banks within countries.
Overall, the results are consistent with a tiered
interbank market structure, in which due to
asymmetric information only the largest banks
perform cross-border transactions. Further, the
paper finds that the introduction of the euro
may have reduced domestic contagion, while
there is no increase in cross-border contagion.
In the second talk of the session, Gregory
Nguyen (National Bank of Belgium) presented
“Interbank exposures: An empirical
examination of systemic risk in the Belgian
banking system”. The paper investigates the
evolution of contagion risk for the Belgian
banking system from 1993 to 2002, using
detailed information on aggregate interbank
exposures of individual banks and on large
bilateral interbank exposures. The paper
simulates the effect of the failure of one bank
on defaults of other banks. Overall, the results
suggest relatively little contagion. The paper
finds that the structure of the Belgian banking
system changed from a complete structure (in
which all banks have symmetric links) to a
“multiple money centre bank structure” (where
the money centres are symmetrically linked to
some banks, which themselves are not linked).
The paper suggests that this change may have
resulted in a reduction in the risk and extent of
contagion. Also, the increase in foreign
interbank assets and liabilities has reduced the
risk of domestic contagion but potentially
increased the risk of contagion from foreign
banks.
The third paper of the session “An analysis of
systemic risk in alternative securities
settlement architectures” was presented by
Giulia Iori (Kings College). The paper
compares systemic risks in net and gross
security settlement systems. It studies the
settlement risk arising from exogenous
operational delays and compares settlement
failures as a function of the length of the
settlement interval under different market
conditions. The paper finds that settlement
failures are non-monotonically related to the
length of settlement cycles under both
architectures and that there is no clear cut
ranking of which architecture (net or gross)
delivers greater financial stability.
The discussant, Kostas Tsatsaronis (BIS)
thought that the three papers were well matched
in one session, as they provided different
perspectives on contagion as a source of
systemic risk. He emphasised that all three
papers focused on idiosyncratic shocks that
generate systemic losses. Clearly, this was
only one of at least four scenarios: common
exposures, dynamic interaction between real
and financial sectors, information contagion
and inter-linkages. He doubted that the latter
source, which the papers focused on, was the
dominant source of systemic risk. He then
proceeded to discuss the papers in reverse
order. On Iori’s paper, the discussant suggested
that an objective function clearly specifying
the trade off between output of the system and
risk may be useful, but felt that overall the
paper was a good first step to model the
complex interaction between strategic
behaviour and risk in settlement systems.
Regarding Nguyen’s paper, the discussant
suggested that the worst case scenario used in
the paper was a bit extreme and that the paper
would benefit from discussing more
extensively the change in the structure of the
banking system that took place in 1996/97. The146
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discussant also thought that the paper would
benefit from a better proxy for the prevalence
of the money centre structure of the banking
system. Finally, regarding Gropp’s paper, the
discussant questioned some of the
interpretations of the results in the paper and
argued that the weekly frequency of the data
may be too high, given that many macro
variables are only available at a quarterly
frequency. He also wondered about the
persistence of shocks in the paper.
In the general discussion, Steven Ongena
(Tilburg University) argued that in the Gropp
paper given the left censoring of the first stage
dependent variable a negative binomial model
may be more appropriate than the Poisson
model used in the paper. He also stressed that in
the set up chosen in the paper, it was difficult to
be sure that all macro/common shocks had been
accounted for. If they had not, the results of the
paper may be biased in favour of finding
contagion, especially cross-border contagion.
Regarding the Nguyen paper, it was questioned
whether the reduction in the risk of contagion
was due to the change in market structure
described in the paper or due to an increase in
Tier 1 capital, which could be observed in most
banks in OECD countries during the period.
Further, it was argued that the presence of
international exposures of banks may bias the
results in favour of finding cross-border
contagion. On Nguyen’s paper, some
participants defended the relatively high loss
given default assumptions used in the paper, as
even if the eventual recovery is higher, the
paper is concerned with the immediate impact
and not the long term consequences of a bank
failure.147
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International Equity Flows and Returns:
A Quantitative Equilibrium Approach
Rui Albuquerque Gregory H. Bauer Martin Schneider
November 2003
Abstract
This paper considers the role of foreign investors in developed-country equity
markets. It presents a quantitative model of trading that is built around two new as-
sumptions: (i) both the foreign and domestic investor populations contain investors
of dierent sophistication, and (ii) investor sophistication matters for performance
in both public equity and private investment opportunities. The model delivers a
uniﬁed explanation for three stylized facts about US investors’ international equity
trades: (i) trading by US investors occurs in bursts of simultaneous buying and
selling, (ii) Americans build and unwind foreign equity positions gradually and
(iii) US investors increase their market share in a country when stock prices there
have recently been rising. The results suggest that heterogeneity within the foreign
investor population is much more important than heterogeneity of investors across
countries.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F30, G12, G14, G15.
Keywords: Asymmetric information, heterogenous investors, asset pricing, in-
ternational equity ﬂows, international equity returns.
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Business Administration. Address: Carol Simon Hall, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627.
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ANNEX G
Financial Market Integration and Loan
Competition: When is Entry Deregulation Socially
Beneﬁcial?∗
Leo Kaas†
January 28, 2004
Abstract
The paper analyzes how the removal of barriers to entry in banking aﬀect
loan competition, bank stability and economic welfare. We consider a model of
spatial loan competition where a market that is served by less eﬃcient banks
is opened to entry by banks that are more eﬃcient in screening borrowers.
It is shown that there is typically too little entry and that market shares of
entrant banks are too small relative to their socially optimal level. This is
because eﬃcient banks internalize only the private but not the public beneﬁts
of their better credit assessments. Only when bank failure is very likely or
very costly, socially harmful entry can occur.
JEL classiﬁcation: D43; D82; G21
Keywords: Entry deregulation; Bank competition
∗This paper has been prepared under the Lamfalussy Fellowship Program sponsored by the
European Central Bank. Any views expressed are only those of the author and do not necessar-
ily represent the views of the ECB or the Eurosystem. I wish to thank an anonymous referee,
Hans Degryse, Philipp Hartmann, Thorsten Koeppl, Cyril Monnet, Bruno Parigi, participants of
the Joint Lunchtime Seminar of the ECB, the CFS and the Bundesbank, and at the ECB–CFS
workshop on “Capital markets and ﬁnancial integration in Europe” hosted by the Bank of Greece
(November 20–21, 2003) for many helpful comments.
†Department of Economics, University of Vienna, Hohenstaufengasse 9, 1010 Vienna, Austria.
E-mail: leo.kaas@univie.ac.at150
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Euro-Area Sovereign Yield Dynamics:
The Role of Order Imbalance
Albert J. Menkvelda, Yiu C. Cheungb, Frank de Jongb
February 3, 2004
Abstract
We study sovereign yield dynamics for ten-year government bonds in the
largest euro-area markets: Italy, France, Belgium, and Germany. We exploit
as of yet unused transaction data to explain daily yield changes. We ﬁnd
that these changes are caused by (i) a “benchmark” yield innovation, (ii)
a common yield spread innovation, (iii) country-speciﬁc innovations, and
(iv) (microstructure) noise. We relate changes in each of these factors to
order imbalance and ﬁnd that Italian order imbalance explains yield spread
innovations, French and Belgian order imbalance explain country-speciﬁc
innovations, and German order imbalance only changes yields temporarily.
Order imbalance, however, does not have explanatory power for the most
important factor: benchmark yield innovations.
aVrije Universiteit Amsterdam
bUniversiteit van Amsterdam
Corresponding author is Albert J. Menkveld, ajmenkveld@feweb.vu.nl, Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam, FEWEB, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands, phone:
+31 20 4446130, fax: +31 20 4446020, web: www.albertjmenkveld.org. Yiu C. Cheung
can be reached at y.c.cheung@uva.nl; Frank de Jong at f.c.j.m.dejong@uva.nl.F o r
this project, Menkveld received a 2003 Lamfalussy fellowship from the European Central
Bank, for which he is very thankful. And, we are grateful to MTS Spa and Barbara Rindi
for providing the data, to an anonymous referee at the European Central bank for useful
comments, and to Patricia van Dam for research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.151
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ANNEX G
Illiquidity Spillovers: Theory and Evidence
From European Telecom Bond Issuance
Yigal S. Newman
Michael A. Rierson
January 22, 2004
ABSTRACT
In a study of the European telecommunication-sector bond market, we ﬁnd empirical
evidence that a ﬁrm’s new bond issue can temporarily inﬂate yield spreads of other bonds in
its sector. We show that this effect seems unrelated to new fundamental information about
the bond’s issuer. Our results imply that an issuance of 15.5 billion Euros by Deutsche
Telekom temporarily depressed the mark-to-market value of 100 billion Euros in outstanding
European telecom debt by approximately 273 million Euros. This study is supported and
motivated by a stylized model of a risk-averse liquidity-provider in which supply shocks,
such as new issues, place price pressure on correlated securities.
†Newman (corresponding author) is at the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford,
CA 94305-5015. Rierson is at CitiGroup’s Global Equities. Email addresses: ynewman@stanford.edu
and michael.a.rierson@citigroup.com. The current version of this paper is available at
http://www.stanford.edu/∼ynewman. A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title
“The Volume of New Issuance and Its Impact on Market-Wide Credit Spreads.” We are deeply indebted to Darrell
Dufﬁe for providing guidance, feedback, and countless useful suggestions. We also thank Peter DeMarzo, Ken
Singleton, Ming Huang, Anat Admati, Mark Ferguson, Jeremy Graveline, Philipp Hartmann, Ilan Kremer, Paul
Pﬂeiderer, Jeff Zwiebel, seminar participants at Stanford University, the Hebrew University, Tel-Aviv University, the
Inter-Disciplinary Center Herzliya, the European Central Bank, the 3rd ECB-CFS workshop on “Capital Markets
and Financial Integration in Europe,” the Salomon Smith Barney Fixed-Income Quantitative Research Group, and,
especially, Yakov Amihud, for useful comments and suggestions. All errors and omissions are our own. This paper
has been prepared under the Lamfalussy Fellowship program sponsored by the European Central Bank. Any views
expressed are only those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the views of the ECB or Eurosystem.152
ECB
Capital markets and financial integration  in europe
December 2004
OXFORD REVIEW OF ECONOMIC POLICY
VOL. 20 NO. 4, WINTER 2004
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
(EDITED BY: XAVIER FREIXAS,
PHILIPP HARTMANN, AND COLIN MAYER)
CONTENTS
1 The Assessment: European Financial
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University, Philipp Hartmann, European
Central Bank, and Colin Mayer, Oxford
University
2 Financial systems in Europe, the US, and
Asia. Franklin Allen, University of
Pennsylvania, Michael Chui, Hong Kong
Monetary Authority, and Angela Maddaloni,
European Central Bank
3 Measuring European Financial Integration.
Lieven Baele, Ghent University and Tilburg
University, Annalisa Ferrando, Peter
Hördahl, Elizaveta Krylova and Cyril
Monnet, all European Central Bank
4 The Impact of Technology and Regulation
on the Geographical Scope of Banking. Hans
Degryse, University of Leuven, and Steven
Ongena, Tilburg University
5 The European Bond Markets Under EMU.
Marco Pagano, University of Naples, and
Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, University of
Mannheim
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ANNEX H OUTLINE OF THE SPECIAL ISSUE OF THE
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ANNEX I LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS TO THE ECB-CFS
RESEARCH NETWORK (2002-2004)
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Stockholm School of Economics
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University of Rochester
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University of Pennsylvania
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European Central Bank
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Ghent University
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Banque de France
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European Central Bank
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Giessen University
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University of Toulouse
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University of Frankfurt and CFS
Roberto Blanco
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European Commission
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Giorgio Calcagnini
University of Urbino
Mark Carey
Federal Reserve Board
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University of Mannheim and
Center for Financial Studies
Yiu Chung Cheung
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Harvard University
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European Central Bank
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European Central Bank
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Xavier Freixas
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European Central Bank
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Stockholm School of Economics
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Bank of Greece
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European Central Bank
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Bank of Finland
Enisse Kharroubi
DELTA and Banque de France
Stefanie Kleimeier
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World Bank
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Stockholm School of Economics
Jan Pieter Krahnen
Center for Financial Studies
Randy Kroszner
University of Chicago
Alexandre Lamfalussy
Université Catholique de Louvain
Philip Lane
Trinity College Dublin
Gyongyi Loranth
London Business School
Simone Manganelli
European Central Bank155
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Arnaud Marès
European Central Bank
Colin Mayer
Oxford University
David Mayes
Bank of Finland
Michael Melvin
Arizona State University
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Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Joël Mérère
Euroclear France
Cyril Monnet
European Central Bank
Yigal S. Newman
Stanford School of Business
Grégory Nguyen
National Bank of Belgium
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University of Turin
Steven Ongena
Tilburg University
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Norwegian School of Management
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European Central Bank
Marco Pagano
University of Salerno
Bruno Parigi
University of Padova
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University of Michigan
Maria Fabiana Penas
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Yale School of Management
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Ohio State University
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Bank for International Settlements
Helene Rey
Princeton University
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Bank of Finland
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Bank for International Settlements
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ANNEX J
The Research Network is organised by a Steering Committee. This is composed of representatives
of the two organising institutions (ECB and CFS) and of outside scientific experts from academia.
ANNEX J COMPOSITION OF THE STEERING
COMMITTEE (2002-2004)
For 2004- :
Roberto Mario Billi
Center for Financial Studies
Lorenzo Cappiello
European Central Bank
Franklin Allen
Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania
Giancarlo Corsetti
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Vítor Gaspar
European Central Bank
Philipp Hartmann
European Central Bank
Jan Pieter Krahnen
Center for Financial Studies and University
of Frankfurt
Marco Pagano
University of Salerno
Axel Weber
Center for Financial Studies and University
of Frankfurt
Secretariat:
For 2002:
Bernd Kaltenhauser
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Simone Manganelli
European Central Bank
For 2003-2004:
Christina Metz
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Chair Hartmann, Philipp DG-Research (Financial Research Division)
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ANNEX K COMPOSITION OF THE ECB INTERNAL
CONTACT GROUP159
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National central banks have nominated a contact person for network related matters. The
composition of the NCB contact group is:
COMPOSITION OF THE NCB CONTACT GROUP
Oesterreichische Nationalbank Martin Scheicher
Nationale Bank van België / Marina Emiris
Banque Nationale de Belgique
Suomen Pankki – Finlands Bank Tuomas Takalo
Banque de France Henri Pagès
Deutsche Bundesbank Hannah Hempell
Bank of Greece Heather Gibson
Central Bank of Ireland John Frain
Banca d’Italia Carmello Salleo
Banque Centrale du Luxembourg Patrick Lunnemann
De Nederlandsche Bank Leo de Haan
Banco de Portugal Goncalo Ribeiro
Banco de España Juan AyusoRESEARCH NETWORK ON CAPITAL MARKETS
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